


THE ONE AND INDIVISIBLE CAMEROON



Lund 1982

JOHN W. FORJE

NATIONAL UNITY

"The integration of the national territory remains one of the components of national unity."



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THE ONE AND INDIVISIBLE CAMEROON

POLITICAL INTEGRATION AND SOCIO-
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A FRAGMEN-
TED SOCIETY.

by

JOHN W. FORJE



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
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TO
MY FATHER, MOTHER AND UNCLE



The United Republic of Cameroon



First Government of the Federal Republic of Cameroon



Camrade Ahmadou Ahidjo swears before God and Cameroonians to commit his services to Cameroon during a fifth mandate in the Presidency of the United Republic

P R E F A C E

Cameroon represents Africa in miniature, a microcosm of various factors which would militate against political integration. The country embraces well over 200 ethnic groups. The very nature of such ethnic fragmentation constitutes a divisive ingredient disjecting political stability and mutual inter-ethnic intercourse. The country has a chequered political history partly as a result of the 1884 Berlin Conference that sanctioned the scramble for colonies and the eventual allocation of such colonies in Africa; and partly due to the evolving international system after the two World Wars.

It was first a German colony, later occupied by the victorious military forces of Britain and France during World War I. It was given a mandate status under the League of Nations following the Treaty of Versailles, thereby legalizing French and British spheres of influence. With the coming into being of the United Nations in 1945, the mandates were converted into Trust-territories. The British sector was subsequently partitioned and administered as provinces in Nigeria, while the other part of the country remained intact under French administration, later to achieve sovereignty on 1 January 1960. On 1 October 1961, a part of the British administered territory, following a United Nations plebiscite conducted on 11 February 1961, was reunited with the former French Cameroons to form The Federal Republic of Cameroon. Following the peaceful revolution of 20 May 1972, the country moved towards an integrated political community, One and Indivisible Nation.

A research paper, especially one as wide-ranging as this, is the fruit of many encounters with individuals and ideas. It has therefore benefitted from counsel and encouragement by a great many people and institutions in and outside Cameroon. It is impossible to extend individual thanks to all. The list would be too long, and, in any case much of the most valuable help I received was supplied with the understanding that the source would remain anonymous. Still, my intellectual debt to others is too great not to be acknowledged at least in a general way.

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I am indebted most of all to my supervisor, Professor Hans F. Petersson, and Professor Göran Hydén (Ford Foundation, Kenya) who was always available for consultation, free with criticism, but liberal toward my often critical response. In many ways, they consciously or otherwise stimulated my interests in aspects of the subject at hand.

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Even though the ideas and support of many persons have gone into this work, I feel more than the conventional obligation to assume full responsibility for errors committed.

John W. Forje

Bali Airport Junction, 1979
and Lund, 1980

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ABBREVIATIONS:

CNU	Cameroon National Union
CPNC	Cameroon People's National Convention
CUC	Cameroon United Congress
FDSE	Faculté de Droit et de Science Economiques, Université de Paris
FPUP	Front Populaire pour L'Unité et la Paix
KNDP	Kamerun National Democratic Party
MANC	Mouvement d'Action Nationale Camerounaise
NPC	Northern Peoples Congress
NCNC	National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons
OK	One Kamerun
UC	Union Camerounaise
UNC	Union Nationale Camerounaise (or CNU)
UPC	Union des Populations du Cameroun
JPRS	Joint Publications Research Service

POLITICAL CHANGES

1945	British Cameroons	French Cameroon	1945
	↓	↓	
1954	Southern Cameroons	Cameroon Republic	1960
	↓	↓	
1961	West Cameroon	East Cameroon	1961
	↓	↓	
1972	South-West North-West Provinces	Central-South, Eastern, Coastal, Northern & Western Provinces.	1972

West of the Mungo = West Cameroon:
(Anglophone)

East of the Mungo = East Cameroon
(Francophone)

INTRODUCTION

The study analyses political integration in a transitional, fragmented society. It elucidates the successful case of the Cameroon, once under the tutelage of two different colonial administrations, in articulating and aggregating large-scale system and social changes and of maintaining political stability in the course of these structural changes.

Attention is focused on the capacity of its political system in withstanding and articulating concerted policies against the multifarious disintegrative impact of such magnitudinal changes. In other words, it centres on the interplay between (1) political integration, (2) system change/social change, (3) political stability, and the impact of multifarious mal-integrative forces.

The relationship between the three phenomena presents what may be visualized as the problem of integration, hence the conceptualization of the proposition incorporating four variables (authoritarian, paternal, indentific and consensual) and its inter-relatedness in manifesting stability, continuity and peaceful change within the new polity. In this respect the study provides us with issues and problems that are of a general pattern in Africa, but which few African states as such have been able to solve.

Cameroon's endeavours in controlling its cultural complexities scattered in a kaleidoscopic *mélange* and judging from its chequered historical past, make it a unique case on the African continent. Much of the interest in the integration problems and prospects of Cameroon originates from this dinkum. Secondly, interest on the Cameroon is a foilage that two decades of integration has been marked with a steady progress and other achievements in bilingualism and multi-culturalism as corner-stones of national unity. Even states which had developed under a single colonial system have lacked the centrifugal capacity of maintaining national cohesion. The cases of Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda and the former Belgian Congo (Zaire) mirror the incapacity of these societies that had developed under a common colonial tutelage to adjust peacefully to the hectic pace of change and conflict engineered by decolonization and modernization.

To explain these developments the theory of integration has been adopted in elucidating the specificity of the problems and issues involved. The author fully appreciates certain limitations of the theory of integration particularly when one takes into consideration the speed at which politics and developments in transitional societies change from one period to another. It is in light of this limitation that the theory is transiliently linked with the general process of political development theory.

With this in mind, it is right to characterize the approach of the study as one of "political sociology". In such analysis, the correlation between historical and social factors is seen as responsible for the distribution of power among political actors and considered indispensable to the understanding of the quest and aspiration for political unity among the different factions making up the Cameroon society. On the other hand, there is also the ardent struggle for political hegemony among the diverse social formations found in the polity.

The problem of integrating the several ethnic and cultural groups and the degree of political cleavages prevalent in the society are complicated and compounded by the solidarity and cohesion of each individual in his respective group. To break down the primary identification and loyalty of

the individual to his/her own group and to manifest a national image or symbol of identification necessitates an approach that is within the range of encompassing the process of system change in a wider context.

The two major dimensions of national integration can be summarized as values and identities, and linkage and structures. A continuing question is how these two dimensions are inter-related as processes. Do common values and identities permit the establishment of infrastructures and institutions, or vice versa?

Thus the theoretical consideration of the study has been woven round the precepts involving the way in which separate political systems are integrated, and that such integration involves change at both the state and individual levels.

The country is seen as the African nation that really works in view of its successful merging of two distinct colonial administrative systems without any major political upheavals threatening the foundation of the polity.

UNIQUENESS OF THE CAMEROON POLITY:

There are cases where nations integrate to solve specific problems, but continue to maintain their national identity. There are others like the Cameroons where they ended up by creating a single nation; and the feeling of oneness. This constitutes the uniqueness of the Cameroon in contemporary African politics.

To begin with, a multiplicity of factors have contributed to the uniqueness of the body politic of the Cameroon as a case study in national integration. The country offers a particularly revealing illustration of the interplay between ethnic, cultural, political and religious pluralism with in the African setting. On the sectarian front Cameroon cannot in any degree be compared with the once troubled and torn community of Nigeria with all the tensions between politics, ethnic and religious fragmentation. Nevertheless, one can to some degree scan pockets of conflicts between politics, ethnic and religious pulverization during the colonial period and multi-party system. Either individual politicians, decision-makers, interest groups or political parties maximized their religious connections to rally support for their policies, or religious bodies exploited the political conflicts within the system in advancing their influence in various spheres of the decision-making process within the society. Religious differentiation exists between an Islamic dominated north and a Christian south with widespread indigenous religious belief all over the country. Fortunately for the country, it has been able to contain its religious differentiation within the frontiers of its socio-economic development. As a result, the country has so far successfully overcome the political turmoils of sectarian division and other political upheavals suffered by neighbouring Zaire, Nigeria and other African countries.

Ethnic fragmentation and diversity of the country's colonial past has not been a hinderance in forging new centres of power and authority. Rather, the politico-cultural differences (external and internal) through the skillful manipulation of the governmental machinery by employing authoritarian, consensual, identific and paternal attributes under various constellations appropriates the ideological stereobate for autonomy and the building of a political system that gives weight to its cultural diversity and authenticity.

Cameroon has been able to preserve the balance between unity and diversity while consolidating its political sovereignty. Political stability and continuity has prevailed in the country. Few African countries (if any at all) can match Cameroon's record of political integration across fragmented colonial administrative system.

Various attempts by many African countries to unify have failed, Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union, Senegambia association, and various attempts by Libya to form political union with countries like the United Arab Republic, Chad, Tunisia and Morocco. The disparities arising from distinct colonial administrations, the lack of agreement about the nature of unity, and the problem of creating genuine consensus among newly independent countries, all militate against the establishment of suprastate political communities. Concerted consensus among the political actors in French and British Cameroons and the subsequent birth of an indivisible Cameroon nation remains the only glittering example of unity and diversity and national integration on the African continent.

Furthermore, it is curious to observe that Cameroon's take-off to national integration departed from the precepts of "political federation" at the time when Africans came more and more to question the system's capacity in creating genuine and lasting unity as well as offering acceptable solutions to the basic challenges of development. The trend of development in many parts of the continent in the late fifties and early sixties leicited the situation were the "model of federalism" were less attractive - i.e. doubting both the prospects of its adoption and its utility if adopted to provide and facilitate the process of system change in the society. In this regard, federalism was not seen as a reliable mechanism in articulating an easy formula for enlargement and stability. The Cameroon went ahead and made a success of the integrative process by employing federalism as the instrument of merging the divided territories under one contour; hence Cameroon has been remarkably successful in consolidating the State, since achieving independence, unlike many nation states that have had to face the problems of dissent and instability.

PURPOSE AND SCOPE:

This study is an attempt to investigate the political emancipation of the Cameroon; how system change as a result of political integration and the skilful manipulation and application of authoritarian, consensual, paternal and identific attributes have significantly contributed to the emergence of a system that balances stability and change and that permits change in accordance with general popular support.

Moreover, apart from being a contribution to the political sociology of the Cameroon it considers to what degree such knowledge and experience of the country can be of relevance to other developing states, particularly those that have become regular visitors to the great hall of violence and the super-market of chaos and instability. Why has the Cameroon in spite of its historical "political culture" diversity and ethnic fragmentation been able to balance change and stability and above all, continuity? To what extent are political variables being manipulated to achieve economic objectives? How do socio-economic factors affect politics? In short, what continues to be the degree of inter-relationship between politics and economics and its overall effect on societal changes?

In searching for answers to these and other related questions, it is necessary to focus attention on factors that have influenced the process of

political integration and system change in the Cameroon. To achieve these objectives as many details as possible must be pieced together so as to shed light on certain crucial developments such as the 1961 United Nations plebiscite, the establishment of a federal government, the flight from the multi to single party system, the economic edification of unification: Last but not least, the general awareness and over all acceptance by Cameroonians of political institutions, procedures, a sense of nationalism and common destiny.

This study is envisaged to elucidate issues illuminating both the idiosyncratic and certain specific features that characterize national integration as an instrument for system change for the common good. It examines attempts by the Cameroon to achieve political unity at the time of power transfer from the colonial administrations to the country and the subsequent utilization of the evolving political structure in transforming ethnic and cultural diversity into national cohesion, thereby giving it a sense of political direction for the ultimate objectives of attaining a political community.

Within the framework outlined above, the scope of the study encompasses the period 1960-1980. For analytical purposes, we may catalogue this time period into three distinctive phases: the first phase, 1960-1966, as the era of federalism, with a multi-party system; the second phase, 1966-1972, with the characteristics of transition to unitary government and a single party operating within a federal context; and lastly, the third period, 1972-1980, following the establishment of a unitary government.

Even if these divisions and analysis are found wanting, the overall effect should be the therapeutic --- the faulted analyses will, hopefully, compel others to formulate counter theses inviting further exploration and meaningful debate on the unique process of national integration in contemporary Africa. In other words, I am suggesting that in success or failure, the study should have some beneficial influence in the inevitable process of system and individual changes in the Cameroon in particular, and Africa in general.

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATION - 1 -
OF POLITICAL INTEGRATION

Political science literature offers a variety of definitions of political integration. Scholars have articulated valid propositions, concepts and models central in theory building on the subject. Very often, they have been influenced by Western historical thoughts for regional unity and the quest for a world government.

As a matter of fact, there are complexities and contradictions involved within these theories that have been advanced. To some extent this is due perhaps to the lack of scholarly consensus on the basic concepts and methods as well as uncertainty about the criteria for judging the relevance and limitations of the various approaches. According to Haas,

political integration is a process whereby political actors in distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing nation-state.¹⁾

We can also posit integration as a receptacle of a spacious furnace of human relations and attitudes. Here Myron contends that it is a process incorporating

the integration of diverse and discrete cultural loyalties and the development of a sense of nationality; the integration of political units into a common territorial framework with a government which can exercise authority; the integration of the rulers and ruled; the integration of the citizen into a common political process; and finally the integration of individuals into organisations for purposive activities.²⁾

Or as Galtung points out,

integration is a process whereby two or more actors form a new actor. When the process is completed, the actors are said to be integrated.³⁾

A deduction of these theoretical approaches does exhibit three major trends essential to the present study;

- i. Unity among states and peoples;
- ii. institutional change;
- iii. sense of community.

Even such deduction leaves open several key questions about the pattern of organization, the degree of cohesiveness and identification of variables that enhance or hinder integration and not least how to measure the level of integration.

Complex as the theory of integration is, in order to use it as a base for analysis it is appropriate to spell out the key variables. Integration theory treats integration from two models, namely the "state model" and the "community model". These models treat integration using direct and indirect variables. For the "state model", its direct variable is federalism and it deals with political issues. It lays emphasis on two or more political entities anticipating integration and how to coordi-

nate and administer political activities. Its indirect variable is "neo-functionalism" which tackles the socio-political problems.

The "community model" lays emphasis on non-political issues. Its direct and indirect key variables are pluralism and functionalism. This study is about political integration; therefore only the state model is relevant to the study.

Notes:

1. Haas, Ernst, *The Uniting of Europe*, Stanford University Press, 1958.
2. Weiner, Myron. "Political integration and political development", *The Annals*, March 1965.
3. Galtung, Johan. "A structural theory of integration", *Journal of Peace Research*, 4. 1968, p. 377.

Federalism in principle implies the construction of a system or organization whereby consensus is reached between current demands of union and territorial diversity within an emerging society, by the creation of a single political system within which central and provincial governments are assigned coordinated authority in a manner defining both the legal or political limits of equality or subordinate functions. The nature of the emerging authority would often recognize or express elements of both unity and diversity. These limits are often spelled out within the constitution stipulating what each party can or cannot do.

Furthermore, there is the credence for generating unity and administrative coordination between previously disparate or isolated units. In other words, neither state nor central government could be independent, but the authority of neither would be subordinate. At each level of functions, some degree of dependence on the other would emerge to create a balance of power between the federal and regional governments.

The review of the many and varied overtures of federalism from their vantage position draws attention to a plurality of situations from which federalism can be realised. These models nurture the stereotype of the causation through which states or communities must desire to join under a single independent government for some purpose, they must wish to retain or to establish independent regional governments in some matters, and the states or communities must have the capacity, as well as the desire, both to unite and to remain distinct within the federation. The desire and capacity for federalism entails a number of prerequisites involving among others "geographic proximity, hope for economic advantage, wishes for independence earlier political ties, insecurity and similarities of traditional values."¹)

Whatever line of argument separates the various views of the federalist interpretation on integration, they nevertheless, exhibit common traits since they envisage the end-product of integration in terms of a political community. The perspicuity of political community is within the confine of power that gives at the same time explicit constitutional demarcation of powers and functions between the federal and state governments. Moreover, the division of such authority must evolve around the precepts of interdependence and dependence that harmoniously steers the functions and actions of the implicated parties towards unity and continuity underlying the new political community which must have

an effective control over the use of the means of violence, though it may delegate some of this to member units; it has a centre of decision-making that is able to affect significantly the allocation of resources and rewards throughout the community; and it becomes the dominant focus of political identification for the large majority of politically aware citizens.²)

The process condition of federalism encompasses degrees of system change within the altar of "high politics". It implies

a shift from the classic nation-state system to a single polity enshrined with constitutional and sociological characteristics. The change in many respects is dependent on the capacity of the ruling elites to accumulate, control and employ the assets of power in a given system.

A strong federal system would require (i) clear-cut allocation of powers between the state(s) and the federation; (ii) a range of supportive institutions, e.g. a constitutional court to guard over the demarcations of federal and state powers; and (iii) a division and distribution of powers within the federal system. Seen within this context, the federalist quest for integration is construed not on economic questions but on politics, power responsiveness and control, i.e. the harnessing of power by direct acts enshrined in constitutions which Freidrich sees as "the process of federalizing a political community".³⁾

The federalists in this respect embrace varying views stretching from static and legalistic to dynamic sociological perspectives of integration. On the one hand the static, legalistic perspectives of classic writers⁴⁾ do not focus attention on the cause and dynamics of the integrative process as such but advance varied assertions or background conditions in terms of common cultural heritage, external threat and economic incentives as inducements to integration. There is exiguous treatise of the relative substantiality of the points at which they are effective in the integrative process. In retrospect the dynamic sociological perspective concerns itself with behavioural and sociological traits. As such, its "background conditions" differ from those of the classics.

Thus, process-oriented federalism looks at background conditions from the perspective of political sociology in terms of (a) state of each unit of the potential union; (b) the aggregate of these units; and (c) the environment of the system.

In terms of the process of change, attention is directed to the quantity and distribution of integrating power as crucial determinants in the process. What kind of power; is it authoritative, coercive or identitive? Which of these powers and which constellations would be of comparative effective advantage at the different layers of integration?

Another area of comparative importance involves the distribution of power. It is a question of whether power is apportioned equally or centralized within a particular unit. The essence of such questions is to establish a common platform from which a kind of proposition can emerge relating to the application of power in the integrative process, for example the one advanced about authoritarian, consensual, paternal and identitive attributes in promoting stability and substantial degree or integration.

Moreover, the patterns of integration per se insinuate a two tier process. The first is symbolized by a "take-off and second spinning" actualized by the proliferation of assigned activities. In respect of the Cameroon one can scan the apportionment of these activities (i) historically, in the sense of locating those political parties that committed themselves towards the unification of the two Cameroons; or (ii) by

looking at the activities that were assigned to the regional and federal governments the morning after unification.

The other relates to the stage at which the system gets matured or stabilized. This involves determining the stage at which the sectors of the system are unified.

System change at this level insinuates a shift from the nation-state sovereignty by bargaining to a new entity. The archetypal method as Pentland suggests

is a constitutional conference where participants within the system strike a bargain on the structure of the new state authority to which they can surrender all or some of their governance of the assets of coercive, economic and identitive power.⁵⁾

As a matter of fact, the basic index of integration for the federalist is the disposition of the assets of power involving the legal expression of sovereignty and the political basis of the system. Integration stresses the primacy of politics at a high level; system change is dependent on the ability of the system's elites to amass, control and employ the means of power and where the maintenance of stability hinges on the power and liberty of the implicit policy and decision-makers to shift coalitions. There is the reliance on the creative capacity of the elites in forging out a federal contract between the states. The elite-mass linkages, as Etzioni points out, manifest the former's responsiveness to the latter's requirements furnishes a vital continuity of information upwards and elites' sensitive management of the reallocation of resources that inculcate the quiet consensus sustaining the federal contract.⁶⁾

At the system level the federalist lays emphasis on constitutional issues and where the system strikes a bargain on the authoritative allocation of the legality and political basis of the constituent state. The federal contract which aims at a balance of power incorporates mechanisms of trapping the substance of state independence, the abrogation of state sovereignty and the rise of a new supranational centre of authority.

Unification following the federalist articulation at the state level is not only just a matter of a federal contract but equally involves mutual agreement between states and elites responsiveness to state demands, i.e. elites acting on behalf of the states vis-a-vis the other state. These elites represent the states and articulate demands through a skilful application of their power assets not only for the purpose of upholding the values of the state but equally to seek, guide and gain support for the process of integration. Various centres of powers or interests are involved that attract or repel each other.

All these centres of power compete to lead the process in the direction they desire, or retard it, and the success of integration depends on the kinds of bargains and coalitions they form.⁷⁾

There are possibilities that in the process of change some of the various autonomous units can almost become personified with the system so that success or failure of integration de-

pend on them. Therefore the constitution around which the federal contract has its legal expression and political basis creates agreements for separate and common activities and a continuous shifting locus of power for the political actors to manifest their bargaining intentions.

Only concerted political power can overcome separate political power; only a direct confrontation can overcome national autonomy. 8)

Turning to the last level of analysis of the role of individual attitudes and behaviour in integration, we discover that emphasis is directed to democratic values, popular support and elites' responsiveness to individual demands and the support of the system.

The community becomes a focal point because its leaders and institutions possess assets capable of being used to build up 'identitive power'. This power is based on the identification of the subject with norms, values, symbols over which the holder of power has control...or an identification with his personality that makes his disapprovals powerful. By such means as education, religion, national rituals, propaganda and the manipulation of symbols, the integrating elites harness or create a supporting will. This will, in turn, provides a justifying ideology or a degree of legitimacy for integration. 9)

Another factor of importance is "political will" among a cross-section of the society, in manifesting consensus, the composition and distribution of power in the system. The configuration of power either personally or institutionally in the integrative process must be sufficiently authoritative and effective in shifting the pre-occupation of the units and their members from localism to nationalism, thereby enhancing the authoritative rights of the new centre of political power.


Political integration as individual attitude and behaviour calls for political will, loyalty and identification within the system. It is also a question of how the identification of such loyalties is focused on the various units making up the system.

The units of the system (see figure 1) hold and exercise different forms of powers; contractual division of authority.

Last, but not least, it may also be postulated that federal political systems, unlike unitary systems, are less efficient and are slower in policy making and policy implementation due to broad input by local and regional initiative which is encouraged and usually respected.

FEDERAL POLITICAL SYSTEM

Fig. 1



Note: All levels of government (e.g. federal, state and local) maintain some degree of separation of powers between the executive, the legislative and the judicial functions of each, as well as checks and balances.

Notes:

1. See Wheare, K.C. *Federal Government*, Oxford University Press, 1964; Deutsch, op cit. 1957.
2. Etzioni, A. *Political Unification*, New York, 1965, p.4.
3. Friedrich, Carl J. "Federal Constitutional Theory and Emergent Proposals", in A.W. Macmahon, *Federalism, Mature and Emergent*, New York, 1965.
4. See Etzioni, *Political Unification*, N.Y. 1965; *The Active Society*, N.Y. 1968; Wheare, K.C. *Federal Government* 1963, Macmahon, *ibid*, 1955; Bennett, W.A. *American Theories of Federalism*, Alabama, 1972; Birch, A.H. *Approaches to the Study of Federalism*, Political Studies T4.T. 1966; Friedrich, C.J. *Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice*, London, 1968; Mogi, S. *The Problem of Federalism: A Study in the History of Political Theory*, 2.vols. London 1931; Mitrany, D.A. *Working Peace System*, Chicago 1966; Deutsch, K.W. *Political Community and North Atlantic Area*, Princeton, 1957.
5. See Pentland, C. *International Theory and European Integration*, Faber 1973, p. 163.
6. Etzioni. *Political Unification*, op cit. pp 73-76.
7. Pentland, op. cit. p. 167.
8. Haas, E.B. "The Uniting of Europe", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 4, 1967, pp 326-331.
9. Pentland, *ibid*. p. 172, See also Etzioni, *ibid*. pp 37-72.

The evolution of neo-functionalist theory of political integration has been influenced by three major developments: (i) it emanates from a sympathetic critique and the quest for reforming the functionalist thesis of integration; (ii) it has much to do with the establishment and dynamics of the European Economic Community; and (iii) it owes a lot to the conceptual and explanatory tools fashioned by the new breed of American political scientists - the behaviouralists.¹⁾

According to neo-functionalists, political integration between states is a pluralist bargaining process which involves the interaction of salient political forces - political parties, interest groups and governments - each seeking to maximize the process for its own interest.

Depending upon the situation, it is anticipated that conflicts inherent in the process are resolved, giving more power and competence to common organisations, thereby increasing the scope and significance of decisions agreed corporately rather than separately by national governments.²⁾

Neo-functionalists maintain that political integration is not a condition but a process of change which leads to some sort of community. Apparently the question of defining the end-product or the goal of the integrative process remains a problem of major concern to neo-functionalists. As a result, neo-functionalists tend to modify their definitions in line with the subtle evolution and experiences of the European Economic Community.

The political dynamics of the European Economic Community induced Haas to define political integration in terms of

a process whereby political actors in different political environments are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national boundaries. The end result of a process of political integration is a new political community, super-imposed over the pre-existing ones.³⁾

The definition of a political community according to Haas incorporates

a condition in which specific groups and individuals show more loyalty to their central political institutions than to any other political authority.....⁴⁾

Or a political community being a legitimate system for the resolution of conflict, for the making of authoritative decisions for the entire group.⁵⁾

This definition correlates with the federalist postulation of a political union implying arrangements whereby existing nation-states surrender some of their autonomy and decision-making capabilities on a wide spectrum of policies; and where "the politicized decision-making process has acquired legitimacy and authority."⁶⁾

Neo-functionalist theorists have turned to system theory⁷⁾ as offering valuable tools for assessing the process of inte-

gration. From this perspective, political integration is essentially

*the emergence or the establishment of collective decision-making process, i.e. political institutions to which governments delegate their decision-making authority and/or through which they decide jointly via more familiar intergovernmental negotiation.*⁸⁾

Neo-functionalists view politics in a wider perspective or perhaps in an abstract sense, i.e. politics perceived as scarce values; hence, politics or political action is purposively correlated with individual or group perception of interest and the political process is simply a configuration of different interest bodies, individuals, and political parties seeking access and directing their expectations to forces that synchronize the allocation of values.

A similar view is put forward by Lindberg, who, following Easton, defines a political system as "that system of interactions in any society through which binding or authoritative allocations are made and implemented."⁹⁾ The essence of neo-functionalism is its aim at a consensus balance between "low and high politics" - a reconciliation between politics and economics, welfare and conflict within a conceptual framework that builds ostensibly on the resolution of political conflicts among political actors and political activities.¹⁰⁾

The neo-functionalists are more concerned with process than with goals, values and conditions of integration. While the end product for the federalist is the construction of a supra-national state, for the neo-functionalist the levers of integration are enshrined within a decision-making system in which values are allocated authoritatively to the participating units. The scope and level of such decisions emerges out of bargaining, competition or interest-group conflict and resolution.

At the systemic level, a neo-functionalist theory of integration comes nearer to political development theory. This is evidenced by the degree of emphasis on political functions being conducted on the basis of party competitiveness and interest-group conflict and mirrored by judicial legislative and executive procedure.¹¹⁾

Apparently political integration as a process of political development inhibits issues of a "developmental approach" or system models, necessitating the system to acquire the capacities for the formulation and implementation of collective decisions, a centralized institution with assertive authoritative power being necessary to balance the claims of the competitive bodies in the society. An integrative system faces the problems of (a) establishing its legitimacy, (b) penetrating into the social fabric of the society creating a centre of political activity and expectation for parties and individuals; (c) developing a capacity to allocate values efficiently and authoritatively and drawing the entire system together in a web of interactions.¹²⁾

The system also has to develop a distinctive pattern of

decision-making, hence the necessity of a central institution with considerable political skills and resources for goal articulation, coalition building, recruitment etc. Consequently the progress and prospect of integration ties in very much with the role of central institutions in representing the common interest that bring states together as well as accommodating conflicts of interests that are bound to manifest themselves.

The neo-functionalists rely on the positive and active role for bureaucracy in advancing the acquisition of more authority by central institutions. Power generates more power, as succinctly stated by Lindberg:

the initial task and grant of powers to the central authority creates a situation or series of situations that can be dealt with only by further expanding the task and the grant of power.¹³⁾

At the nation-state level, neo-functionalism treats political leaders, or elites, as one group among a constellation of interest groups, coalitions and parties. Thus, integration centres on institutionalized patterns of politics. Nation states are considered as decision-making centres and the spring-board for group interests and political demands or as actors in the emerging new polity. The process of integration manifests itself on the basis of shifting coalitions of convergent interests represented by government officials, interest groups and parties.

Lastly, political integration at the individual level and following neo-functionalism involves elite images and permissive consensus, or as Pentland points out, "a shift of political loyalties and expectations to the emergent common decision-making centre." What this entails relates to the way individuals develop, maintain and alter their political attitudes. The problem ties in with how political attitudes change individual attitudes and behaviour, the time of such attitudinal change in relation to institutional change, and the mechanisms of change assumed to be involved.¹⁴⁾

Whatever the goal of integration, the dynamics of change has to be seen in the need for developing a sense of community or a political culture from which people are capable of responding to symbols. Even with a most modest intention, integration requires "passive, permissive and consensus" responses for the unification of states. The connotation of "permissive consensus" or "passive antipathies" exhibits favourable and negative attitudes of the people towards institution, acts of elites and other practices embedded in the political system.

Of course an individual's political attitudes as perceived by the neo-functionalist tend to be varied and divided therefore the shift of loyalties and expectations cannot be immediate, but gradual. A neo-functionalist contends that political attitudes that count are those of the national political, administrative elites, hence the conceptualization that integration is a process whereby political actors in several different environments have to shift their expectations and political activities to a new centre. General public attitudes

have long been neglected by neo-functionalists until recently when public consensus has emerged as a key variable. The view of Inglehart is worth mentioning in this context.

To what extent do public preferences constitute an effective influence on a given set of national decision-makers, encouraging them to make decisions which increase or diminish integration?¹⁵⁾

Any attempt to answer the question would incorporate factors related to (a) the distribution of political skills in society ('cognitive mobilization' manifesting public attitudes more favourable to integration), (b) the relation of decisions to deep-seated values among the public (internalization of integrative values and the relative effects of short and long term feed-back) and (c) the openness and responsiveness of national decision-making structures (the effects of the 'permissive consensus' on elites).¹⁶⁾

A neo-functionalist's emphasis on political attitudes and behaviour, the shift of loyalties etc makes possible the employment of various variables applicable to political development in the study of political integration. The developmental assumptions of neo-functionalism suggest that group dynamics theory provides the neo-functionalists' approaches with appropriate leverages for analyzing political attitudes and behaviour.

Political integration involves changes in many spheres of social actions besides the political. Within the political sphere itself, usually as the result of cultural diffusion and the emergence of new elites which are the bearers of new ideas, national integration implies the emergence of a new culture of politics which stresses certain institutional arrangements for government and a specific range of relationships between the rulers and the governed within a nation.

Notes:

1. See Almond G.A. and Coleman, J.S. (ed) *The Politics of the Developing areas*, 1960; Pye L.W. (ed) *Communication and Political development*, 1963; LaPalombara, J. (ed) *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, 1965; LaPalombara and Weiner Myron (eds) *Political Parties and Political Development*, 1966; Coleman, J.S. *Education and Development*, 1965; Binder, L. & Coleman, J.S. (eds) *Crises and Sequences in Political Development*, 1971; Pye, L. & Verba, S. (eds) *Political Culture and Political Development* 1965; Lasswell, Harold D. *The Analysis of Political Behaviour: An Empirical Approach*, 1966.
2. Pentland, Charles. *International Theory and European Integration*, Faber and Faber, London 1973, p. 110.
3. Haas, E.B. *The Uniting of Europe*, Stanford 1958, p. 16.
4. Haas, *ibid.* p. 16.
5. Lindberg, L. *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration*, Stanford, 1963.
6. Haas, E.B. "The study of Region integration: Reflections on the Joy and

- Anguish of Pretheorizing", *International Organisation*, Vol. XXIV, 1970; Haas, E.B. & Schmitter, P.C. "Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration", *International Organisation*, Vol. XVIII, No. 4.
7. Easton, David. *The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science*, N.Y. 1953; *A Framework for Political Analysis*, N.J. 1965.
 8. Lindberg, L.N. "Political Integration as a Multidimensional Phenomenon. Requiring Multivariate Measurement", *International Organisation*, Vol. 24, No. 4, 1970, p. 663-649; "Integration as a source of stress on the European Economic Community System", *International Organisation*, Vol. 20. 20. Bo. 2, 1966, pp 233-65; *The European Community as a Political System*, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 4, 1967, pp 344-387.
 9. Lindberg, L.N. *The European Economic Community as a Political System*, *op cit.* p. 346.
 10. See Lipset, S.M. *Political Man*, N.Y. 1960.
 11. Pentland, *op cit.* p. 114.
 12. Pye, L. *Aspects of Political Development*, Boston 1960, pp 62-67.
 13. Lindberg, L.N. *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration*, Stanford, 1963, p 288; Etzioni, A. *Political Unification*, N.Y. 1965, p 53-54; Haas, *The Uniting of Europe*, 1958.
 14. Pentland. *op cit.* p. 122.
 15. Inglehart, R. "Public Opinion on Regional Integration", *International Organisation*, Vol. 24. No. 4. 1970, pp 764-795; "An End to Europe Integration", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 61. No. 1, 1967, p. 95-105.
 16. *ibid.*

Apparently, a new polity has to grapple with a number of integrated problems involving the dynamics of transition and change. This involves,

a continuous interaction among the process of structural differentiation, the imperatives of equality, and the integrative, responsive and adaptive capacity of a political system. 1)

For the purpose of political analysis of an evolving society, there is a need to go beyond the frame of theoretical classification and explore trends of developments when the society starts to experience the stresses of change or integration with regard to differentiation, equality and capacity, or the stresses of integration with regard to

a broad demand for equality and participation when there is a need for increased capacity, and when the processes of differentiation and specialization tend to become more acute. 2)

Integration is not just a question of creating new centres of political authority. Equally essential is the need for the attainment of articulated functional requirements of the political system to provide for and promote issues that enhance the adequate functional performance within the society in meeting anticipated problems generated by the process of change.

Some of these problems generally known to political development theory³⁾ and which an integrating polity has to contend with are:

- the problem of integrating political actors and political activities;
- the problem of coordination;
- the problem of administration;
- the problem of ethnic fragmentation;
- the problem of elite-mass gap;
- the problem of participation and mobilization;
- the problem of leadership and sense of direction.

The propensities for the problems in developing areas are not superintended just by political eventualities alone but also synchronously by the overall nature of the polity. Therefore the existence of the political system depends upon the creative capacity and capability of the polity to decipher and to cope with the different developmental problems and to work together effectively in seeking collective goals. However, a brief explanation of the problems mentioned will suffice at this stage.

Elite-Mass gap: This incorporates the concept whereby a society splits into an upper and lower stratum, with the upper strata enjoying a monopoly of power and the lower stratum being less privileged. The process of western education in the developing countries has contributed to the division. The elites tend to de-emphasize their ethnic and cultural heritage.

There are problems involved since these people must continue to deal with the traditional sector in the state and at the same time generate wide-spread support for the building of political and economic structures.⁴⁾

Administration: This involves the structure of the civil-service bureaucracy and includes the legislative, judicial and executive institutions. Some structural problems have emerged regarding the civil service in many developing countries; this involves the relationship of the civil service to the political service to the political parties.⁵⁾

Participation: Participation is defined as a process of increasing complexity whereby the people partake actively and committedly in the process of development. Apparently, participation varies from nation to nation. In some areas, participation in the political system is intrinsically linked with the widening of adult suffrage and the induction of new elements of the population into the political process. In some systems articulated interest bodies and political organisations constitute the basis for extensive participation. Others offer a minimum degree of participation, the political system being manipulated by a clique of rulers.

As a result, input into the system is generated by a small group in comparison to a political environment offering extensive citizen participation in the political system. However, participation limited or widespread constitutes a central type of linkage in the process of national integration since it represents a means of forging new loyalties and a feeling of national identity.⁶⁾ Attention is often paid to the electoral process as a means of popular participation in the process of government. Other mechanisms of participation include party structure, interest groups and mass media as inputs in the integrative process.

Ethnic fragmentation: A major obstacle to integration and political development in emerging societies is the question of ethnic diversity. Few developing countries can boast of not having to face potentially active problems of inter-ethnic competition and conflict. One of the main problems of integration is to build new kinds of linkages between ethnic groups. Common types of linkage which ought to be regarded as significant in the overall phenomenon of integration are value congruence, identity congruence and common authority. Value congruence implies the sharing of the same values by a group; hence the possibility of interaction in the social and political system of the society. Identity congruence involves the willingness of ethnic groups to perceive themselves as components of an identifiable system. This does not mean that they relinquish their ethnic affinities, but that the nation-state becomes a new or additional area of identity and from which it is possible to strive toward a common identification.

Finally the linkage of fragmented groups may evolve around the establishment of a common authority (institution or person) popularly accepted and respected by the people, or alternatively such an institution or person has the coercive potential of enforcing its claims to the people.

Three dominant patterns of ethnic relations in an integrated system can be envisaged as (i) the pattern of assimilation, i.e. the subordinate group taking up the values and identity of the dominant partner; (ii) a pattern of amalgamation involving the meshing together of groups to produce a new entity; and lastly (iii) the pattern of cultural pluralism, incorporating the retention of group identity and the willingness to interact and become interdependent.⁷⁾

Political actors and activities: The problem involves the meshing together of divergent shades of political opinions and patterns of participation (active or passive) and where opportunities for political involvement within the political stratum exist to include all the inhabitants. The problem becomes more pronounced particularly when the integrating states inhabit political actors schooled differently and where political activities have been dominated by either peaceful or radical evolutions. Cleavages must be balanced so as to contribute to a harmonious integration of the polity.

Coordination: Perhaps the most acute problem for an integrating society is coordination. Every unit of the political system has to interact so as to develop its political culture and authenticity. Activities within the system must be coordinated for the system to persist. In short, coordination means the establishing of a working relationship between structures and functions for solving problems (pattern-maintenance and tension, goal attainment or goal gratification, adaptation and integration)⁸⁾ generated by the process of integration and the political system. The effective performance of functions depends upon the interaction of the units, the individuals and collectivities of the system.

The magnitude of these problems would vary from country to country. No generalized solution can be offered. However, the acuteness and relevance of these problems within the Cameroon context will be treated as they arise in subsequent sections of the study.

We have so far focused attention on some of the essential traits pertaining to two theoretical approaches (federalism and neo-functionalism) to integration. The two approaches exhibit similarities and differences in many respects. It can be postulated that the two also diverge on the end product and process of integration. While the neo-functionalist advocates the emergence of a supranational decision-making system as the end product or structure, the federalist quest is for a supranational state. At the process level, the neo-functionalist seeks political development and the growth of centralized institutions, as against the constitutional resolution clothed with the distribution of authority and power promulgated by federalism. Another distinctive characteristic of the two approaches is that while the neo-functionalists posit the integrative process as the effects of successful decision-making and conflict resolution on elite attitudes, the federalists seek the differentiation of loyalties according to level of government.

From this crude theoretical juxtaposition the choice or

combination of certain specific facets of the theory of integration becomes obvious for the present study. But this does not mean that we attain a problem-free subject area, for it is still engraved with limitations. For example, if political integration is perceived within the narrow confinement of just the physical merger of two states per se into a new entity, then such a theoretical exposition becomes obsolete in the Cameroon context following the establishment of a unitary government in 1972. In light of this single example, one may question the wisdom of articulating the choice of the theory of integration. However, it is not events unfolding themselves after 1972 that are of significant concern, but developments that preceded this period, that accentuate the need for the analytical base to be construed on such a theoretical foundation.

The applicability of the theory of integration from a wider perspective introduces value judgements essential in the understanding of events in a society undergoing drastic political and developmental restructuralization. It gives certain leads that lend themselves to an overview of patterns and trends that manifested themselves in the society between 1960-1966 and which are still unfolding in contemporary Cameroon.

As a matter of fact, it is difficult if not impossible to present any single theory that will be uniformly accurate throughout the two decades following the historical merger of the two Cameroons. Even with its relative degree of stability and continuity the society is far from being a culturally integrated polity like western societies. There are still areas unintegrated and which are crucial to the emergence of an authentic Cameroon political culture that have to be fully integrated; hence the necessity of the theory of integration that draws attention to various facets of socio-political factors in a developing community.

An understanding of the theoretical consideration of national integration and its eventual ramification in the Cameroon experiment calls for the merging or development of a framework which incooperates propositions that aid in highlighting the uniqueness of the Cameroon experiment. We must now focus attention on this task.

Notes:

1. Binder et al. *Crises and Sequences in Political Development*, 1971, p. 74.
2. Pye, L.W. *Aspects of Political Development*, Boston, 1966, p. 63.
3. See Almond & Powell, *Comparative Politics: A developmental Approach*, N.Y. 1966; Almond and Coleman, *The Politics of the Developing Areas*, Princeton, 1960; Almond, G. "Political systems and Political change", *The American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol. VI, June 1963; Lucian Pye, *Aspects of Political Development*, Boston 1966; Donald L. Blackmer, *The Emerging Nations*, Boston, 1961; Deutsch, Karl W. "Social mobilization and political development", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LV,

- No. 3, September 1961; Shils, Edward, *Political Development in the new states*, The Hague, Mouton, 1962; Siffin, W.J. (ed) *Toward a comparative study of public administration*, Indiana 1957; Huntington, S. "Political development and political decay", *World Politics*, XVII, 1965, pp 386-430.
4. Le Vine, V. *Political Leadership in Africa*, N.Y. 1967; Anderson, C. Mehden, Fred von der and Young, Crawford, (eds) *Issues of Political Development*, N.J. 1967.
 5. For more details see Coleman, J. and Rosberg, *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa*, 1964. Zolberg, A. "The structure of political conflict in Tropical Africa", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LXII, 1968, p. 70-78;
 6. See Pye, L.W. *Aspects of Political Development*, op cit., Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*, Princeton, 1963.
 7. For more details see Cohen, P. Middlen, J (eds) *From tribe to Nation in Africa*, USA, 1970; Kuper & Smith, *Pluralism in Africa*, 1969.
 8. See Talcott Parsons, *The Social System*, 1951; *The Structures of Social Actors*, N.Y. 1937; LaPalombara (ed) *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, 1963; Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis*, 1965; Stephenson, R.M. *The Analysis of Social System*, Holt, 1962; Levy, Marion J. Jr *The Structure of Society*, Princeton, 1952; Pye, L. and Verba, S. Op. cit. 1965; Almond & Powell, op cit. 1968.

Since the two theoretical approaches from their vantage positions advocate the emergence of some sort of political entity (political community or political decision-making unit) and since the two have common affinity with variables and concepts akin to political development theory, it becomes necessary to view integration as involving "system and individual changes". This necessitates the following proposition,

A political system striving for integration maximizes its opportunity for accomplishing a substantial degree of integration, enduring stability and continuity if it is authoritarian, consensual, paternal and identific.

Conversely the absence of these four diagnostic attributes within the functioning capacity of the system would eventually herald different forms of destabilizing effects and integration and national cohesion being prolonged or even impeded totally,

around which various political variables will be analysed. Thus, there is the need to spell out what the various concepts entail.

System Change involves the evolution of new patterns of decision-making and the redistribution of legal and political authority among the integrating bodies.

Individual Change entails attitudes and behaviour of individuals as political actors - this involves social-psychological variables from which an individual derives his political attitudes. It is necessary to bear in mind such key concepts as "compliance" where the individual is influenced because he anticipates a reward; "identification", where he identifies himself with another group and lastly "internationalization", where the individual is influenced since his behaviour is congruent with his value system.

Authoritarian means the concentration of power either in an institution or individual and the ability to use such powers to implement policies.

Consensus/Consensual means the art of striking a balance or bargain among different organs in effecting a purpose - minimizing the politically divisive effects of socio-political differences and promoting mutual understanding or compromise among actors within the system.

Paternal entails the oligarchic concentration of initiative as well as the manifested will and ability to lead.

Identific implies the degree of mutual identity between the political class and the governed - the political solidarity of the people towards the nation and its institutions (system and sub-systems).

By and large, the hypothesis advanced here carries with it various forms of value dimensions that are of utmost relevance to the study of national integration. Some of these value dimensions can be listed under the theme of orientation towards the following.

Community, defined as perceptions of the legitimate scope and boundaries of group affiliations, and the circumstances in

which loyalties, identities and cultural responses are appropriate within each type of community. There is no doubt that orientation toward community is perhaps the fundamental value in a political system because it defines who is included or excluded in the system and it also relates to the perceptions of legitimate classifications within the nation, in that it lays the conceptual basis or ideological foundation expanding the extent to which multiple community identities, values and even loyalties are allowed or encouraged to exist.

Conflict-resolution refers to the preferred ways of resolving or containing disputes within the community.

Distributive justice refers to the principle of distribution of material resources (including appointments, rewards, development projects etc) within the community.

Time and innovation implies the degree to which people accept changes in the system.

Authority, implying the basis of legitimacy on which decision-makers are selected and maintained in power. In a way, authority is power plus legitimacy. The bases from which authority is derived are many and varied, ranging from traditional, to bureaucratic, to parliamentarian, to charismatic.

Scope of government: involves the extent to which the government is all-encompassing or restricted in its range of activities. Broadly stated, the scope of government is legally defined within the constitution, but the constitution does not stipulate strategies for creating links between sub-national units and national structures.

Some of the areas on which emphasis would be centred include:

Constitution: which spells out the specifics and the legality of the functions of the system and its sub-systems.

Election: whose outcome widens or narrows the basis of consensus as well as offering the arena for participation - orientations toward community.

Leadership: which provides a sense of direction (capacity) for combining and manipulating people with great intelligence, coherence and ideology. Two ideal types - the "brokerage" and the "creative" feature in the study.

Party, Interest Groups, Organisations etc: which are means of articulating change and a basis for functional cooperation, for combining and manipulating people; the basis for successful recruitment and successful mobilization and politicization.

Institutions: Presidency, Parliament, Law Courts and the Bureaucracy.

Within this framework the process of change could be seen as the outcome of participation, interaction and influence of both the individuals and the system in a variety of styles and where different methods and means such as force, persuasion, coercion and material rewards or other incentives in different constellation are manipulated in forging national awareness (orientation toward community) and a common political culture among the people.

In short, what kind of mechanism and dynamics of social and political system has the Cameroon employed that enables it to function in a stable manner and not in a violent pattern wit-

nessed by a number of African states, Nigeria, Chad, Zaire, Somali, Ethiopia and Uganda for example? What kind of consensual bargaining and trading between political actors or sub-systems have contributed towards her relative degree of stability, change and continuity? What means have been employed in mobilizing and politicizing the people? What has been the general attitude and behaviour of the people towards the functioning and institutionalization of the evolving political system? As many leads as possible must be provided for one to grasp the dynamics of continuous interaction underlying national integration in the Cameroon.

It is possible to argue that the elements of a functional system could begin to function without a general political authority, but a political authority without active social functions would remain an empty temple. Given the Cameroonian milieu, reunification did not only imply the manufacturing of constitutional blueprints, but, equally important a material content and an indication of the consequences of decisions. Stated somewhat differently, integration involved issues concerned with the structures and practices through which human needs, welfare and security are met in the polity. The way integration relates to the broader issues of widening parochial loyalties or promoting structural changes that catalyze widespread attitudinal change differs from one community to another. Some are slow to emerge and others do not exert a direct impact on the daily life style of the people.

Unmistakably, the unification of the two Cameroons, seen as a process of political integration, brought about system change. National integration as system change addresses itself to a suggestive model of the kind of political entity towards which the system evolves and from which a single standard indices can be used as a measure of the extents of integration in the system - political or national community for example, where at least four dimensional approaches are evolved dealing with (a) decision-making, (b) the performance of functional tasks, (c) patterns of social behaviour and (d) political attitudes.

CONSTRUCTING THE NEW POLITY: FEDERALISM 1961 - 66

THE EVOLUTION OF THE
FEDERATION:

The emerging international order following the defeat of nazist Germany and the establishment of the United Nations legalized the inalienable political rights of the peoples in the colonies to self-government.¹⁾ As a result, interest groups, organisations and political parties of various dimensions seized the opportunity for articulating and aggregating demands for the reconstruction of the unscrupulous process of territorial grabbing by the colonial powers which ignored the national areas of tribal settlements and geographical coherence. West Africa for example was a senseless jumble of British and French territories that bore little resemblance to the ethnic and cultural heritage of the people.

For the people of the Cameroons who from 1919 found themselves under two different political cultures, the evolution of the new international system implied not only the quest for independence but also the desire to reconstruct the political order that existed in the region before 1919. From 1919 the two Cameroons were functioning and developing under different kaleidoscopic patterns of political and administrative cultures that reflected the governmental modes of the colonizing powers.

Perceptibly, the pace and mode of decolonization varied. The British colonial rule was based on the understanding that in due course when British institutions had been firmly established, self-government would be granted to the colonies. France's attitude of decolonization was witted with less good grace because they had based their colonial policies on the concept of permanent rule - colonies being extended provinces of imperial France.

Obviously, the subjection of the people to foreign values and different administrative patterns influenced the trend, behaviour and attitudes of the political actors towards the attainment of independence. France's policy of assimilation gave few options to the people of East Cameroon. Rather, the policy was a major source of confrontation between the colonizing power and some of the more radical interest groups.²⁾ It sowed the seeds of insurgency in the society and as a result the political actors were divided on how, when and by what means independence should be granted to the country, which it finally achieved on January 1, 1960.³⁾ Colonial policies therefore restricted orientations toward community.

Generally, all the political parties in East Cameroon were not opposed to integration per se, but rather, they accorded different degrees of priority to the unification of the two societies. As far back as in the late forties, the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC) had formulated a two point nationalist programme which demanded the unification of the two Cameroons and rapid progress towards complete independence under the terms of the United Nations Charter. The hostility of the French Government towards the UPC forced the party into clandestine means of articulating for self-government and the

unification of the two countries⁴). In contrast to UPC clandestine nationalism were the more cautious, moderate approaches towards unification adopted by Union Camerounaise (UC), Action Nationalae (AN) and Mouvement d'Action Nationale Camerounaise (MANC).

The situation in British Cameroon was different in that her independence was intransigently tied with choosing between two options. This was determined through a United Nations plebiscite where the people were asked to choose between

(i) Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent Federation of Nigeria:

or

(ii) Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent Republic of the Cameroon.⁵)

The result was a landslide (1-3) victory margin (233.573 to 97.741 votes) in favour of joining the Republic of Cameroon. The result was influenced by a number of factors such as

1. Earlier Cultural ties: Even though administrative and legal diversities existed between the two Cameroons, social connections were not broken among the various ethnic groups that found themselves on either side of the administrative boundary. Social ties and cultural heritage kept the two communities intact. In spite of the degree of ethnic fragmentation in the Cameroons, cultural affinity between these groups were stronger than the administrative and political intercourse between British Cameroon and Nigeria. The presence of Southern Nigerians, particularly the Ibo's numbering about 250.000 and non - Cameroon Africans about 100.000, contributed to indigenous discontent. English speaking Cameroonians felt a kind of foreign domination threatening their national identity.
2. Insecurity: The feeling of foreign domination in a way correlates to Riker's analogous precepts of diplomatic and military threat or Wheare's prescription of a "sense of military insecurity arising from an outside threat and the need for common protection."⁶) The threat to the Cameroon came from the internal dynamics of political squabbles among Nigerian politicians. Seen within the circumstances underlying the situation of British Cameroon within the Nigerian federation, it is well documented that the fear of Nigeria swallowing the territory prompted the desire for a new political constellation.⁷) West Cameroonians felt insecure within the Nigerian political community. Their fear was proved to be correct five years after unification following the 1966-70 Nigerian Civil War. This threat was a motivating force for British Cameroon to seek union with French Cameroon.
There was also the threat of economic insecurity. Foreigners, mostly Ibo's dominated the economy of British Cameroon.

Atrocities often caused by the Ibo's activated hatred towards them by a wide cross-section of the Cameroon society.

3. *Previous Political Ties: Wheare's attributes of some "earlier political association" existed in the Cameroon in that there had been a united nation long before the advent of colonial rule. The period of German rule 1884-1914 saw the administration of Cameroon as one state, hence the idea of the Kamerun nation.*

The Conscious adoption of "Kamerun" in the orthography of the Southern Cameroon parties indicated a fond recollection of German rule, as well as the long-range goal reunification. The existence of alternative boundaries brought a note of confusion into the growth of political movements; partition of the German colony showed to the inhabitants that borders could easily be redrawn by the ruling parties.⁸⁾

The decision taken by voters in the British administered sector on 11 February 1961 to integrate with the Cameroon Republic created a new political formula which obliged the major political actors to honour their pledge and the verdict of the plebiscite. It was now the duty of the various implicit bodies to articulate and aggregate concerted plans on the nature and functioning of the new society. The Cameroon polity was subjected to a political union that required system change in a wider dimension. Far reaching structural changes were necessary to effect the integrative process particularly in an environment swamped with different political cultures.

Apparantly, the emerging society was bound to face a number of problems. The issue on the one hand entailed genuine formulas for meeting rising expectations through the adaption of a system of government capable of maintaining a coherent pattern of administration and plans for economic development to the emerging situation; on the other, factors enabling people who hitherto had little consciousness of political unity outside their own small group or region to think in terms of broader political interest and responsibility, accepting ultimately the authority of a national government after forty years of colonial separation. In short, this was the first stage on which to articulate the various value dimensions, particularly that of orientation toward community.

A compromise had to be struck between the collective differences of values and interests possessed by the political actors on both sides if the new society was to withstand the test of unity in diversity. In the first place, political parties in British Cameroon had to agree on a common political formula found fitting for the new Cameroon society. There was division among the people on whether to achieve independence by either joining Nigeria or integrating with the Cameroon Republic. The other involved the polemics between British Cameroon and the Cameroon Republic to hammer out acceptable consti-

tutional framework for the country. To set out the basis for both conflict resolution and distributive justice, as well as the scope of government for the new community.

The Bamenda Conference⁹⁾ agreed on a loose federal structure and a comprehensive set of proposals as the basis for negotiating the political integration of the two Cameroons. Some of the agreed proposals centered on the distinctive rights of the States so as to secure the maximum possible degree of autonomy for each of the federated states; a new capital for the country; a bi-cameral federal legislature; allocation of far-reaching legislative powers to the states; a ceremonial rather than an executive head of state; maintenance of the British legal system and safeguards for the continued practice of the customary court system prevalent in the territory; federal citizenship etc. The other conference between British and French Cameroons took place in Foumban.

Prior to the Foumban constitutional conference, The KNDP controlled government of British (Southern Cameroons) in light of the Bamenda accord had three major proposals;

- i. *to create a set of federal institutions and delimit federal and state jurisdiction;*
- ii. *to preserve virtually intact the local autonomy hitherto enjoyed by the two states;*
- iii. *to maintain as long as possible the political status quo in both Cameroons.¹⁰⁾*

The demands put forward by Southern Cameroons fall within the premises advanced by Wheare as "dividing power so that the general and regional governments are each within a sphere, co-ordinate and independent".¹¹⁾

However, the desire of Southern Cameroon for decentralization through a loose federal structure as agreed at the Bamenda summit was whittled down at the Foumban and Yaounde Constitutional Conferences.¹²⁾ The proposals advanced by Cameroon Republic emphasized a strong preponderance of centralization. State governments were to be subordinate to the federal administration as the supreme authority of the newly constituted nation. The idea of over-riding the political prerogatives of the regional administration has to be understood within the parameters that Cameroon Republic was already functioning under a system of a strong and powerful executive and a weak legislative assembly, following its 1960 constitutional set-up.¹³⁾ The head of state did not want any form of administrative pattern that diminished his authority and the unchallengeable power enjoyed by Union Camerounaise (UC). For East Cameroon orientation toward authority had to come from the President and Party, power sharing between the centre and periphery being the prerogative of the centre, in a way, making the President the symbol of national identity and unity.

Southern Cameroon found herself in a political dilemma. On the one hand it was not an independent nation, therefore it had no working constitution but only a package of constitutional proposals. President Ahidjo being under the pressure of his

own Republic, advanced a clinching argument on this point.

It was incumbent on the Republic of Cameroon which was already independent to revise its constitution in order to make possible this union.

In this connection, the constitution of East Cameroon or its constitutional proposals were the basis for discussion, hence Ahidjo obviously emerged as the arbiter. Legally and strategically, he stole the day. Secondly, the KNDP government had thrown away the strong bargaining cards of the region due to the way it went about the issue of integration. Thirdly, the Cameroon Republic was fully aware of the appalling economic situation of Southern Cameroons and the degree of disunity that ravaged the region during the campaigns for independence with either Nigeria or Cameroon Republic. The political wound sustained during the struggle for votes among political parties was unhealed. Finding themselves in such a weak bargaining position and seeing most of their original proposals passed over in silence by Cameroon Republic, they had no option but to devote their energies to salvaging what few of their initial proposals remained. In their rescue attempt, they succeeded in retaining a bi-cameral system in Southern Cameroon, election of the President and Vice President by universal adult suffrage and the maintenance of the Southern Cameroon customary court system. As for a federal bi-cameral system the idea was rejected on the grounds of lack of resources.¹⁴⁾

The document that finally emerged from the conferences integrating the two countries was a curious mixture of presidential and parliamentary governmental forms, a mélange bearing the superficial imprint of a series of political compromises between the Prime Minister of Southern Cameroon and the President of Cameroon Republic. It cemented peculiarities and uniqueness transigent in the Cameroon political scene. The consensus that maximized itself at Foumban and its final climaxation of the birth of the federation on October 1, 1961 added further significance to the special efforts and determination of the political leaders and the people in general in forging unity in diversity. President Ahidjo's address at the summit is worth stating here:

We have chosen a federal structure for our future state. Why this formula? Because of the existing linguistic, administrative and economic disparities we cannot seriously and reasonably envisage a unitary centralized state; because, on the other hand, a very loose federal system would not permit the specific reconciliation and close rank which we want...¹⁵⁾

The statement elucidates the obligatory pressure on the political actors to achieve a common platform for reconciliation and consensus - conflict-resolution - that satisfied the wishes of the people, particularly those who favoured the political union of Southern Cameroons with Nigeria. Ahidjo's statement and the general "good will" consensus symbolizing the Foumban Agreement reflects in a nutshell the maximization of the socio-

logical precepts of federalism construed on the cybernetics of "social diversity rather than one of constitutional mechanics".¹⁶⁾ What mattered most was not necessarily the letter, but rather the spirit, of the constitution. In terms of the sociological precepts, the response of Southern Cameroon was one characterizing "individual change" or orientation toward time and innovation by accepting the constitution as not being perfect but as constituting the inevitability of a configuration of intentions and actions and the eventual realization that the constitution presented the best acceptable functioning code of principles for the nation in view of the historical circumstance of the two Cameroons and of its future. It further accentuates what Riker sees as,

A willingness on the part of the political actors who accept the bargain to give up some independence for the sake of the Union.¹⁷⁾

Both sides were able to hammer out a common formula or end-product with the logistics of authenticity, sovereignty, equal participation and national cohesion. Thus, the uniqueness of the Fomuban Accord reflects the peculiar circumstance which prevailed in the country at the time, whilst the rest represent the intention and determination of the drafters of the constitution to incorporate universally acceptable principles tried and tested by other nations. Within these parameters, we find that the constitution of the Cameroon is written, republican, federal, later to be unitary, democratic, and provided with a Bill of Rights. It is also the supreme authority that outlines the limits within which the various institutions must operate as well as it guarantees to the citizens basic fundamental rights that on no account must be transgressed by the functioning institutions and political actors.

Following the Fomuban agreement the evolution of the federation and of its structures was spelled by Article I(I):


With effect from 1st October 1961, the Federal Republic of Cameroon shall be constituted from the territory of the Republic of Cameroon hereafter to be styled East Cameroon, and the territory of the Southern Cameroons, formerly under British Trusteeship, hereafter to be styled West Cameroon.¹⁸⁾

Provisions are made in the constitution whereby powers are conferred, separated and limited. It confers implied and inherent executive powers on a federal President, and express powers on the unicameral legislative assembly (National Assembly) and on the Judiciary. At the federal level, each of the tripartite branches of government was vested with specific functions. The National Assembly as one of the federal institutions exercises enumerated legislative powers under Article 24; the President, as the other federal authority, exercises plenary executive functions, although he shares the legislative powers with the National Assembly under his rule-making process. The judicial functions are vested in a Judicial Council following Articles 32-35.

Analytically, the constitution conferred authoritative powers, consensual, paternal and identific functions as well as decision-making jurisdiction to various institutions within the system. See Fig.1&2. The distribution of power is an important dimension of the value system itself; the political attitudes and interaction among the elites affected and influenced the capacities of the federated states in defining and pursuing their interests as collectivities vis-à-vis the central government.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS MANIFESTING AUTHORITARIAN, CONSENSUAL, PATERNAL AND IDENTIFIC ATTRIBUTES:

Fig. 2



Note: The figures here refer to articles of the constitutional provision of the Cameroon, following the 1961 constitution. The 1972 constitution bears these Articles but under different numbers. For example Article 15 (1961) appears as Article 11 (1972).

The society was compelled to grapple, on the one hand with the problem of regionalism and on the other the federal structure as the major co-ordinating institution involved with the allocation of resources i.e. distributive justice - and the structure of the administrative system. In identifying the patterns of conflict complementary, and continuity in the values relating to the distribution of powers, one has to bear in mind the values attached to the unification of the two states by the elites and political leaders.

Genuine differences in values between the two groups which emerged could be attributed to their different colonial administrative systems. There was a clash of cultures - where culture in a wider ramification provides standards of evaluation, a medium of communication, identity, etc. The political actors were influenced as a result of their cultural ties by the political philosophies of the colonizing powers. Their education was patterned in line with those of either Britain or France and in a way, their thinking eventually suffered the same fate.

Therefore it could rightly be contested that their motivations were equally different, which identically distorted their pattern or style of evaluation.

As a matter of fact, perhaps the outstanding characteristic of their value difference was mirrored by the desire for a tightly centralized federal structure (characteristic of France) by the leaders of East Cameroon as against the loosely structured federation with substantial fragmentation of power, the symbiosis of Apter's "pyramidal distribution of power"¹⁹⁾ between the federal, state and local levels of authority. Another significant area of disparity between the two groups was that the ruling elites and political leaders of East Cameroon, unlike their western counterparts, had a clear, precise and detailed image of their structural plan for the federation. Confusion and disagreement ravaged the ranks of the political leadership of West Cameroon.

Ultimately, West Cameroon was subjected to heavier and more drastic changes. For West Cameroon elites, the evolving system impoverished their previous prerogatives. Some form of alliance was necessary in upholding their status quo. Interaction between the leaders of the two territories contributed to the establishment of a highly elitist system but with the result that "the dominant political elite was initially relatively imbalanced between representatives of the two states".²⁰⁾ However, borrowing the language of Etzioni,²¹⁾ the structure of the integrative power that eventually emerged was thus more utilitarian and coercive than identitive since it represented the extensive internationalization of powers in the political and bureaucratic leadership of East Cameroon.

But this internationalization did not mean a "winner takes-all" situation but one involving a paternal lead by East Cameroon in one respect and a consensual and identific "good-will" on the part of West Cameroon toward the efficacy of a common interest. An entrenched one-and-indivisible Cameroon coming out of the colonial turmoil required a political structure imbued with a basic ideological and functional consensus if it was to survive the strain and problems posed by system-change from traditional to modern society. A solid base or framework for merging facts and values was necessary. Hence, federalism in the Cameroon context was envisaged as a process by which separate systems (English and French) developed a common skeleton with the capacity of developing and implementing policies in pursuit of agreed goals. One of the distinctive goals was that federalism was the off-spring of a unitary government, hence the "individual feeling" replaced by the "we-feeling", (orientation toward community) i.e. a belief structure, common identity and destiny or the gradual politicization of the various actors' attitudes and behaviour towards a concrete end product of societal transformation. It was the start of the development of new expectations and loyalties. The preference for a federal rather than an immediate unitary constitution implied that different forces, strong and divisive, were at work in such magnitude that an outright unitary government would have only sowed the seeds of disintegration and chaos. Hence, the draf-

ters of the constitution and the political actors were convinced with the ideals that other mechanisms making for continued national unity (orientation toward community) and increasing the degree and level of integration were to be given priority.

Thus, the disengagement of communal or traditional or regional loyalty in place of forging national values - orientations toward community - required the establishment of national institutions as the focus of political authority. The scope of government had to rest on both political and legal implements necessary in creating harmonious links between subnational units and national structures. What is implied here refers to the conflict-consensus or conflict-resolution hypothesis between the centre and periphery, individual and national values - the aspiration gap existing between the ruling elites and the masses, and not least among the political actors within the left-right political spectrum. Their differences had to be resolved through peaceful means through institutions designated to carry out such functions which included a modern-legalist model of conflict resolution and the traditional approach for solving personal differences and intrasocietal conflicts.

What form of organisations or institutions existed in articulating for the common good? How could the various participants exercise influence? How were the old centres of authority going to respond to the new changes? What policies best produce particular patterns of community relationships? What kinds of infrastructural linkage produce community orientation? In what way could disagreement on distributive justice principles contribute to fissure or gap within the society? Is there a rigid adherence to past traditions or structure and procedure, or is there a resilience in the attitudes of people toward change and innovation? Where is the line drawn between public and private functions? Is the basis of authority derived from traditional, bureaucratic, parliamentary or charismatic sources? How are conflicts managed or resolved in a way that preserves the system? Was it by coercion, persuasion, persecution or consensual intercourse between the centre and periphery as the periphery (masses or regions) became organized and concerned with exercising influences and sharing also in the allocation and distribution (distributive justice) of the nations resources following the evolving new political setting?

The problems and solutions are better understood by looking into issues that articulate orientations toward community, conflict-resolution, distributive justice, scope of government, elucidating the framework within which the states and federal government had to operate; the type of party-system that made possible the competition for resources and allocation rewards; and the administrative set up that was inoculated with the obligation of coordinating and directing the affairs of the new state.

Notes:

1. See United Nations Charter, Chapter XI - The Declaration Regarding Non-

Self-governing Territories; and Chapter XII, The International Trusteeship System, Article 76 (a) "To promote the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the Trust-territories, their progressive developments towards self government or independence.

2. Gardinier, David E. *Cameroon, United Nations Challenge to French Policy*, Oxford University Press, 1963; Thompson, Virginia, and Adloff Richard, (eds) *French West Africa*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1958; Ardener Edwin, "The Political History of Cameroon", *World Today*, August, 1962; Ekang, Joseph Nzo. *An introduction to Eastern Kamerun*, Yaba, Nigeria, John Okwesa and co. 1956; Lewis, William, *French-speaking Africa: The Search for Identity*, Walker & Co. 1965; Mortimer, Edward. *France and the Africans*, 1944-60; Faber and Faber, London, 1969; Gray, Harold S. "A Study of Cameroun's UPC Rebellion and Chinese Communist Involvement", M.A. Thesis, The American University, 1971; Le Vine, Victor T. *Cameroon from Mandate to Independence*, Berkely, 1964; *The Federal Republic of Cameroon*, Cornell University Press, 1971; Joseph, Richard A. *Radical Nationalism in Cameroon: Social Origins of the UPC Rebellion*, Oxford University Press, 1971; "The Difficult Birth of the U.P.C.", *Journal of African Studies*, ii, 2, 1975 pp 201-229; Johnson, W.A. *The Cameroon Federation: Political Integration in a Fragmentary Society*, Princeton University Press, 1970; "Cameroon Reunification: Political Union of Several Africa's", Ph D. Thesis, Harvard University Press, 1964. Eyenga, A. *Introduction à la Politique Camerounaise*, Paris, Antropos, 1978 and Ahidjo, A., *Contribution à la construction nationale*, Presence Africaine, Paris 1964; *The Political Thought of Ahmadou Ahidjo*, Monaco, 1968.
3. See Le Vine, Victor T., 1964, 1971; Joseph, R.A. 1971 and Weiskel, Tim, "The French Cameroons: 1944-1960: Develution, Decolonization, and Independence, Yale Senior Papers, 1969. See also a number of publications in footnote 2.
4. Joseph, R.A., 1975, 1977; Le Vine, 1971; Johnson, 1970 and Zang-Atangana, Joseph Marie, *Les Forces Politiques au Cameroon Reunite*, F.D.S.E. Paris, 1963.
5. See United Nations Resolution 1352 (XIV) 1960; United Nations Document, *Southern Cameroons Plebiscite - The Two Alternatives* Government Printing Press, Buea, Southern Cameroons, 1961. See also, Rubin, Neville. *Cameroon: An African Federation*, Pall Mall, U.K. 1971. *Cameroon National Peoples Congress (CPNC)*, Plebiscite Message to All Voters of the Cameroons, Lagos, Times Press, February, 1961. *Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP) United Cameroons-Federal Constitution*, Victoria, Cameroons Printing nad Publishing Co. Ltd. 1960.
6. Riker, W.H., *Federalism, Origin, Operation and Significance*, Boston, 1964; Wheare, K.C., *Federal Government*, Oxford University Press, 1963.
7. The population at the time was at the ratio of 35-1 in terms of Nigeria Cameroon; and 3-1 in terms of Cameroun Republic and British/Southern Cameroons. Any form of political union with Nigeria implied technically stated, Nigeria swallowing up Cameroon since the population ratio between the two countries was 35-1, ten times higher than that of British Cameroons joining Cameroon Republic, 3-1. See also Debates, Southern Cameroons House of Assembly, Vol. 1-111, 1954-1955, St Theresa's Press, Calaba, 1955; Report of the Conference on Nigerian Constitution, Lon-

- don, 1953; CMD, 8934; Report of the Nigerian Constitutional Conference, 1957, HMSO, London 1957, CMD.207, Annual Report of H.M. Government to the Assembly under United Kingdom Administration 1946-1960, HMSO, London; Cameroon Times, Victoria 1960-61; Cameroon Champion, 1960-61, Vic-torial; Press Release from Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP), One Cameroon (OK), Cameroon Peoples National Congress (CPNC) during the period 1957-61.
8. Welch, Jr. Claude E. *Dream of Unity*, Cornell University of Press, 1966, p. 349; Bayart, Jean Francois, *L'Etat Au Cameroun*, Paris, 1979.
 9. Record of the All Party Conference on the Constitutional Future of the Southern Cameroons held at the Community Hall Bamenda, from June 26-8, 1961. Government Printing Press, Buea, 1961.
 10. See Le Vine, Victor T., "The New Cameroon Federation", *Africa Report* No. 11, December 1961, p. 7-10; "Unifying the Cameroons", *West Africa*, July 15, 1961, pp 774-775, London; Welch, Jr. Claude, 1966; Cameroon Times, June-October 1961, Cameroon Champion, June-October 1961; Report of the "All Party Conference on the Constitutional Future of the Southern Cameroons, Bamenda, June 26-28, 1961; Johnson, W. 1970. K.N.D.P. "United Cameroon's Federal Constitution", Buea, 1960.
 11. Wheare, op cit. p. 11.
 12. Record of the Conference on the Constitutional Future of the Southern Cameroons held at Foumban, 17-21 July 1961.
 13. See The Constitution of Cameroon Republic which came into operation on January 1, 1960.
 14. Speech by President Ahidjo at the Foumban Talks. "The bicameral system in a federation is, without doubt, classic; but it is necessary to lighten as much as possible our parliamentary apparatus in relation to the resources at our disposal", Presse Release, Foumban Constitutional Conference, 1961.
 15. Speech at the Foumban Constitutional Conference, 1961.
 16. Livingston, W.S., *Federalism and Constitutional Change*, Oxford Univer-sity Press, 1956, O. 2.
 17. Riker, op cit.
 18. Article 1 (1) of The Federal Constitution of Cameroon, 1 October, 1961.
 19. Apter, David, *The Politics of Modernization*, University of Chicago Press, 1967, p. 92-95.
 20. Johnson, op cit. 1970, p 200.
 21. Etzioni, A. *Political Unification*, op cit. 1965, p. 37, 48.

West Cameroon acquired the British colonial policy which was influenced by the doctrine of direct and indirect rule. Indirect rule was based substantially on Burkean principles of cultural relativism. The policy implied that colonial territories were ruled partly according to principles and partly through native institutions which had grown up in the various societies. The nature of the traditional society before the arrival of colonial rule was the traditional council whose chairperson was either the Fon or Chief. The system of colonial administration delegated the duties of a District Officer to the head of the traditional council. Thus, the institution instead of continuing to delve into the cultural problems pertaining to the traditional society was now loaded with administrative and judicial powers and functions of the central administration. There were occasions when the fon or chief could "take the salute", as the representative of the District Officer on "Empire Day", later "National Day".¹⁾ The use of active traditional authorities and structures already in existence avoided the creation of complex colonial administrative structures on the local and district level. It kept government expenditures at a minimum. There was the assumption that the use of native authorities would assist pacification since they could collect taxes and enforce law and order. The colonial civil service also recognized that its personnel had only limited knowledge of the local surroundings and conditions.

Therefore, the use of native authorities was a means to overcome some of the difficulties resulting from ignorance of local procedures and practices since it was believed that it might avoid the introduction of drastic reforms that would dislocate and disrupt the fabric of the society. In short, there was an interplay between native authority and the government. District officers (including Fons and Chiefs) were the major link between native and state administrations. Native authorities were expected to evolve around a Burkean principle of gradualism - maintaining ancient institutions and modernizing them to keep pace with the trends of development - political prudence requiring political sensitivity to history; "People will not look forward to posterity who never look backward to their ancestors",²⁾ became the political philosophy that piloted British colonial policy.

The underlying aspect of colonial policy in East Cameroon was a belief in the unity of overseas areas with the mother country - politics of assimilation. The territory was to be assimilated into the French system and civilization. In this regard, there were few concessions to indigenous cultures and institutions in the Cameroon under French administration. The symboisis of the system practiced was characterized by state idealism and a comprehensive code of standardized regulations levelled on all and sundry by Parisian officials as the custodians of state virtue. Such was the code of conduct after independence governing the relationship of the ruling elites (bureaucracy) in Yaounde and the rural areas.

Political integration in the Cameroon situation called for

a deep commitment by the governments to overcome the existing disparities between the two systems, and to create a common pattern of shared cultural traits and values in the system's people. Political integration insinuated the amalgamation of two administrative systems construed on (i) the philosophical orientation of a comprehensive pattern of centralization and (ii) the functional gradation of decentralization. That is why political leaders and administrative elites on both sides strove to retain, as much as possible, the pattern of administration they were accustomed to.

Therefore, a two tier system was adopted whereby each side was expected to mirror its inherited pattern of administration at the state level whilst the federal administration was totally construed on the symbiosis of dual source of executive legitimacy and the central monopoly of rationality.³⁾

The application of centralized hierarchical imperatives with the political system of West Cameroon implied that the state had to give-call to certain aspects of societal values acquired from British administration. Institutional and administrative changes were inevitable.

The creation of the Federal Republic required little of East Cameroon beyond the interposition of a further stage between the Eastern Legislative and Ministerial institutions and the Presidency. The East state and the federal institutions were essentially one in origin as well as in function. For West Cameroon they represented a level super-imposed upon by the pre-existing legislative and government organs which was different in kind as well as in hierarchical degree.⁴⁾

However, these changes did not always insinuate the commutation of the East Cameroon French-acquired values for West Cameroon correlative English pattern that warranted changes, but that some of the alterations, drastic or not, were propelled by the motivation and search for new and common indigenous patterns capable of embracing the established orders and values without necessarily eliminating them; others sprang from a genuine attempt to give content and vitality to a new nationalism, one of whose sources had been the quest for an indivisible authentic Cameroon culture and values. And not least, changes arising as the inevitable end-product of the creation of new state.⁵⁾

However, the crucial nature of the challenge presented by the two cultures was not the question of which one was going to be dominant in the emerging political environment. The deciding factor was whether unification would "evolve without subordination, predominance and without domination"⁶⁾ without give and take, and how consensual, paternalistic and authoritarianism would be applied to effect system change. What form of acquiescence, adaptation, participation and resistance was West Cameroon as a smaller partner in the federation to exhibit and conversely, how was the "big brother" to articulate and adjudicate its will on the state of West Cameroon?

It goes without saying that the survival of the Cameroon nation called for concerted and well articulated approaches in

overcoming the problems of administrative, economic, cultural and political differences in the new federation. In what ways were the needs of the society to be met and how could constraints from general, political (such as party system) and non-political environment - e.g. geographical factors be tackled? What was the level of technological and economic development in the two states? What were the forces that could generate disruptive tendencies and so on? The solution to the enormous problems facing the new society had to be sought from different processes. The conditions for change needed process solutions incorporating (i) the skills of negotiators and organization officials in bargaining out acceptable policies of integrating the two systems; (ii) the growth of new institutions to facilitate communications and consultations in the system; (iii) specific social and economic problems that called for immediate actions; (iv) social and institutional pressures on attitudinal dimensions shifting both the perception and loyalties of the participants from their original to a new centre of authority.

Some of the concrete measures seen appropriate as means to an end included;

- *constitutional guarantees and the appointment of West Cameroonians to key Federal posts;*
- *the adoption of French and English as the official medium of communication and for official business;*
- *the introduction of a federal system of administration and the Federal Co-ordination Committee.*

But translating these policy approaches into realities required extra stimulants and in a wider magnitude - dynamic leadership and positive response from the people. The quality of leadership which gives the nation a "sense of direction" coupled with the "will of the people" in responding properly and timely to the arduous task of nation-building was extremely important in piloting system change. We shall return to this at a latter stage.

CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES AND APPOINTMENTS:

The solutions articulated by the people to the problems of national integration had to be adjudicated within an agreed code of conduct or a constitution expressing common endeavours of the degree of consensus regarding ends and means, i.e. the system required in the first instance fundamental laws setting out the basic instruments of government and its functions, the distribution and application of power and the relationship between the state and the individual in bringing about national cohesion, stability and development.

What regulations guided the political actors, institutions etc in articulating and adjudicating solutions to the underlying issues of national integration?

To start with; a constitution⁷⁾ may be considered under two conventional view points; the first relates to the sum or quan-

tity of power which it vests in the central government, including the restraints imposed on the states; the second refers to the particular structure of the government and the distribution of power among its several branches and in the regulation of its functions. Two important questions are eminent here; (i) were any of the powers transferred to the central administration unnecessary or important, and (ii) is the entire mass of them dangerous to the portion of jurisdiction left to the federated states?

From this, we face the problematics of inquiring still further, whether the scope of Government, i.e. the aggregate power of the federal government was greater than it ought to have been? To start with, we must however, remember that though states federate purely to promote their collective self-interest, they usually do so reluctantly, they submerge their identities grudgingly, they make the act of federalism a compromise; a process approach succinctly stated by Friedrich as the idea of "union of groups united by one or more common objectives but retaining their distinctive group character for other purposes."⁸)

Furthermore, the marked central bias of the Cameroon institutions regurgitated from a profound and firm experience of unity during the German period of colonization, from the common revolt against foreign rule and from hopes of economic development. The synthesis of the demands by the various groups on either side of the administrative line required a common form of authority that could safeguard individual and public rights. Thus the bargaining approach articulated by Riker:

A constitution is federal if it provides for two levels of government, each of which has at least one area in which it is autonomous and each of which has some guarantee even though merely in a statement of its contained autonomy within the sphere."⁹)


Therefore diagram 3 summarizes institutional provisions within the constitution elucidating the guarantees which were necessary to bring system change and the nature of the relationship linking rule-making and rule adjudication. The constitution sets out the framework for conflict resolution and scope of government.

It can be stated that the fundamentalities enshrined within the 1961 constitution was one of power-limiting and power enumeration following Articles 5 and 6 that spells out the jurisdiction of the federal and state governments. The adjudication of power was to be shared by three organs. Article 38 (1) gave residual powers to the federated states.¹⁰) See Figs. 1-3.

Of course, the cardinal point to note is that the limitations of rule-making, rule application and rule adjudication functions and powers of the state governments were equally compensated by what could be visualized as "guarantees" particularly in the case of West Cameroon so as to create equitable balance and harnessing consensus between the two fragmented states. The provision of bilingualism¹¹) was entrenched to gain the support of West Cameroon and to quench any feeling of an

Fig. 3

INSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS WITHIN THE CONSTITUTION
AND THE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP LINKING RULE-
MAKING AND RULE ADJUDICATION:



(E) Election; (A) Appointment; (C) Communicates to the nation and the Legislature through messages or decrees; (D) The cabinet is responsible to the President; (BOG) Legislative, Executive and Judicial branches of government; and (TS) Two State Governments. The two state governments were abolished following the 1972 constitution.

The constitution vests national sovereignty in the people (S) following Article 2(1). According to Article 1(1) it created two states (TS) and a federal government, each of these governments entrusted with an executive, legislative, and judicial branches of administration (BOG). The President, Vice-President and members of the legislative assemblies assume office through elections (E) following Article 10(1). Members of the cabinet are appointed (A) by the President according to Article 11(1) and Article 34 which empowers the President to appoint members of the Judicial Council. The President communicates to the nation (C) through messages or by decrees; the cabinet is responsible and accountable to the President (D) and not to the legislative assembly.

Eastern conquest of the western state. Secondly, a safeguard clause for the autonomy of the states was provided in the following statement:

Before promulgating any bill the President of the Federal Republic may on his own accord or on request by the Prime Minister of either State request a second reading at which the law may not be passed unless the majority required by the last preceding Article shall include a majority of the votes of the members from the federated states.¹²⁾

The clause virtually establishes a type of concurrent majority voting system, designed to prevent the passage of any federal legislation or constitutional amendment¹³⁾ to which either state objected. Following the political climate at the time of the drafting of the constitution, it was anticipated

that the inclusion of Article 18 (see note 12 above) was designed to be a compromise between decentralization and centralization, between local autonomy and federal supremacy. The Article could also be seen as fulfilling one of the pledges of the advocates of a political union with East Cameroon presented by the KNDP¹⁴⁾ in a pre-plebiscite communiqué defining the general "Constitutional Position of the Southern Cameroons in the Event of It Electing to Become Part of the Republic of Cameroon", signed by the President of Cameroon Republic and the Prime Minister of Southern Cameroons stating that,

Certain federal laws will only be enacted in such a way that no measures contrary to the interest of one state will be imposed upon it by the majority (system of second reading with qualified majority).¹⁵⁾

A third guarantee provided by the constitution with respect to West Cameroon, and as a measure for balancing conflicting claims and promoting national cohesion, ties in with distributive justice or appointments. For example, the following provision in the constitution states;

The President of the Federal Republic and Vice President, who must not be natives of the same Federated States, shall be elected on a single list by universal suffrage and direct and secret ballot.¹⁶⁾

The capstone implied that the East (theoretically and practically) would provide the President and the West his deputy. Thus, the establishment of the office of Vice-President¹⁷⁾ and with the incumbent being the Prime Minister of West Cameroon¹⁸⁾ gave the territory the authoritative capacity of overseeing development throughout the territory as well as articulating a peaceful transitional period. Other appointments worth mentioning in this context include that of Bernard Fonlon, who as the most accomplished Cameroonian in the French and British cultures proved exceptionally valuable to President Ahidjo as Chief of Mission in Ahidjo's office. Fonlon has always been the most forceful and articulate spokesman for West Cameroon interests in the language question.¹⁹⁾ Solomon T. Muna, as Federal Minister of Works, Transport, Communications Post and Telegraphs and Mines and Powers, whose Ministry energetically worked towards terminating the physical isolation of West Cameroon cannot be by-passed in this respect.

The Speaker of the newly constituted West Cameroon House of Assembly and a lawyer by profession, was appointed Deputy Minister of Justice with the objectives of overseeing the difficult task of cordial harmonization of the legal and criminal code systems of the two countries inherited from Britain and France. Likewise, another West Cameroonian was appointed Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and as head of a diplomatic mission to Asian and Middle East Countries in 1963, it was implied that his duties as Deputy Foreign Minister were not restricted to problems affecting West Cameroon such as British-Cameroon relations over the question of continuing Commonwealth preferences on West Cameroon banana export of Britain, nego-

tiations with Nigeria over Nigerian investments in the Southern Cameroons, and the restoration of normal relationship between Cameroon and Nigeria following the dispute that arose out of the plebiscite conducted in Northern Cameroons which Cameroon Republic had challenged in the International Court of Justice. The agreements concluded during the diplomatic mission to Asia and the Middle East provided for commercial, economic, technical and cultural cooperation between Cameroon and the countries involved.

West Cameroon, right from the initial stages of integration, played an important role in articulating and aggregating the foreign policy of the new nation. It can be concluded that the allocation of representative positions and executive responsibility in the new administrative setup served as mechanisms linking all important regional areas into a common network of authority in a way that did not give any region per se preponderant strength or undue weakness. It was an articulated move of creating a common platform for participation and mobilization of human resources in the process of system change. A team of this kind was needed to establish the appropriate spirit of working together and in structuring a common socio-political culture.

The provisions, checks and balances, "guarantees and appointments", "distributive justice" were complimentary mechanisms not only reconciling diversities but as instruments of forging national awareness of cohesion for the common good.

COMMON MEDIUM OF COMMUNICATION:

Measures were taken to promote bilingualism as the tool and mechanism for constructing the solid foundation on which to erect a common authentic Cameroon culture and set of values.²⁰⁾ The following statement conveys the importance attached to the subject.

Convinced of the historic importance of the experiment for the African continent and its relevance for the nation, the Federal Government, on the marrow of reunification, made it its business to promote bilingualism.²¹⁾

Some of the incentives provided at the initial stages included the establishment of the first Federal Bilingual Grammar School at Man-O-War Bay (West Cameroon) in 1962; linguistic centres were established in many parts of the country and by 1963, the learning of both languages became compulsory in all secondary schools. Other incentives were provided.

At the administrative level, a degree of encouragement was provided by permitting civil servants to take courses in a second language and facilities for bilingual teaching were provided by UNESCO in Yaounde and in Buea. At the same time, salary bonuses were offered by the government for proficiency in the two languages.²²⁾

Efforts by West Cameroonians to become bilingual were both consensual and identific inputs in the integrative process, symbolizing the country's degree of stability particularly during the transitional period.

THE FEDERAL SYSTEM OF ADMINISTRATION:

The introduction of a federal system of administration was another means of overcoming administrative problems and promoting harmonious coordination of the two systems. Federal suzerainty in the state governments was under the charge of a Federal Inspector of Administration who was responsible for the co-ordination of federal services in his area of jurisdiction. Six such inspectorates had been created, with five in the East and West Cameroon making up the sixth.²³⁾

Administratively and constitutionally the introduction of the system of federal inspectorates ²⁴⁾ in West Cameroon created a situation where at the initial stages of integration District Officers and Prefects operated with dual or divided loyalties; but in general, the federal administrative system, systematically tied the states, as collectivities closely linked to the Federal machinery even when functioning within the states. West Cameroon politicians found that State Officials were at the same time exercising federal responsibilities. As federal powers expanded, these officials including District Officers, spent more and more time on federal rather than state work and began to resolve conflicts of jurisdiction in favour of federal institutions. Regional institutions were systematically made obsolete. The power and primacy of the functions of the federal inspector was a focal point on which to

- (a) *generate the mechanism and dynamism for balanced relations between West Cameroon and the federation;*
- (b) *find the dynamics from which to propel the growth of identitive integrative administrative structures and;*
- (c) *find a democratic way of legitimizing the sovereign power of the federal administration thereby promoting nation cohesion.*

In order to maintain stability and continuity during the transformation period, federal posts in state administration were occupied by West Cameroonians, and with their local knowledge, they brought the federal government nearer to the people. It contributed in promoting both the identific and paternal relationships between the grass-roots and the administrative hierarchy of the society. At the same time, the system also increased the ability of the chief executive to supervise political life shrewdly at the grass-roots level; in particular following the indirect allocation of authoritative powers to the federal inspector, ²⁵⁾ and the subsequent chain of downward command following the creation of more administrative districts²⁶⁾, created more rostrums on which the new centre of

authority could increase its functions and sphere of legitimacy in promoting national unity.

There were other factors that advanced the coordination of administrative functions. They involved individual changes with regard to compliance on the part of the bureaucratic elites of West Cameroon. In other words, ruling elites in West Cameroon actively advanced the logic of centralization, i.e. the proliferation of federal suzerainty aimed at integrating the hierarchical imperatives of the central government and the demands of the local community into a genuinely centralized system that bore relevance to the authenticity of the Cameroon nation.

The reason underlying elite attitudinal changes and behaviour were many and obvious.

To begin with, not many West Cameroonians attained a high-ranking administrative posting under British and Nigerian administration. Hence, there is the argument that unification was perceived by the administrative elites in terms of maximizing what was lost during the era of alien rule. There was at least something to gain from integration. Thus, alliance with administrative elites across the Mungo was to their comparative advantage.

The constitutional provisions of certain administrative institutions/functions falling directly under federal control, and others delegated to the state governments²⁷), created inequality in salary-scale among the civil servants. Federal workers, just like all workers in East Cameroon, were fabulously paid in comparison to the low salary-scale that existed in West Cameroon. While West Cameroon politicians were agitating for continued local autonomy, political and administrative pluralism (following their demands for a loose federal administrative and a ceremonial head) and autonomous state governments the administrative elites of West Cameroon, enticed by the power of the purse, were vigorously promoting the ideals of an identical administrative system. Their attitude and behaviour in this context could be analytically interpreted as a reaction against decentralization and regional autonomy as the destined system of promoting political modernization. By so doing, the administrative elites thwarted policy approaches in favour of administrative and political decentralization.

Such obsessive vigilance against potential state identity and autonomy manifested by the governing elites was utilized by the federal administration to coerce the state of West Cameroon into a semblance of consensual and identific order, the disparate and divided fragments of administrative mosaic suggesting one community and indivisible. By pursuing political and administrative centralization, by identifying themselves with their counterparts in the East, West Cameroon elites were ostensibly promoting individual change in the direction of "compliance, identification and internalization" as well as maximizing the propensity of a consensual process of integration. These changes account for the relative degree of administrative harmony and above all the peaceful transformation experienced by the Cameroon.

On the other hand, any pattern of insistence by West Cameroon political actors and administrators for decentralization and traditional localism was counter productive to the process of integration. Even though the decisive question was actualized by West Cameroon,²⁸⁾ resistance towards a concerted consensual formula for unification on their part could have been interpreted as an attempt to canalize and neutralize the dynamic mechanism promoting and harnessing domestic resources for national cohesion and stability.

After all, the essence of unification was to constitute a political whole. Furthermore, new centres of authoritative and identific patterns of administrative systems were to be established, and certain established values replaced in the interest of engineering an integrated community; orientations toward a community.

It was obsolete for West Cameroon to resist centralization following the general will of compliance, internalization and identification of the administrative elites across state frontiers. It was equally wrong for East Cameroon to impose its will on West Cameroon no matter how appalling the economic situation of the West and no matter how divided her political actors had been on whether or not to unify with East Cameroon.

There is the common adage that two masters clinging fast to their imperative rights cannot co-habit without some degree of subjugation for the purpose of mutual understanding and co-existence. A major factor underlying the integrative process was the need for consensual agreement in securing equality and stability within the federation. The analogy here is better understood from the following statement by Bernard Fonlon.

....unless the East Cameroon leader and intellectual, in whose hands cultural initiative lies, is prepared to share this authority with his brother from West of the Mungo, unless he is prepared to make the giant effort necessary to break loose from the strait-jacket of his French education, unless he will show proof of his intellectual probity and admit candidly that there are things in the Anglosaxon way of life that can do this country good, there is little chance of survival, neither for English influence, nor even for African values in the Cameroon.²⁹⁾

The essence was to establish a system based essentially on the traditions of the people and which does not identify with Western or Eastern European norms, succinctly expressed by President Ahidjo at the 1962 U.C. Congress at Ebolowa:

Our developing countries should devise political formulas which are suitable to their situation as well as their cultures which are completely different from those of Europe and America.³⁰⁾

West Cameroon had to adapt to the political culture of the East and to create its own means of coercing the techno-bureaucratic elites to bring about the cherished values of managerial efficiency³¹⁾ coupled with democratic participation thus en-

hancing the goals of national integration and socio-economic development.

The development of a civic culture which fundamentally changed the relationships between the polity and society of East and West Cameroon from a reciprocal blend of indirect rule and flexible centralized authoritarianism and intransigent local demagoguery (and, as elucidated by Fonlon, "the point to establish and ram down is that in this federation, these two cultures stand on the same footing of equality",³²⁾) entered a new phase in mid 1966 following the irresistible movement towards a single party.

By 1966 the administrative system had been fairly co-ordinated and the party organ organized so that, in reality, both were more or less one in degree and purpose.³³⁾

Considering the political circumstances at the time, West Cameroon could no longer evade the choice between the increased and strict administrative tutelage of prefectural rule and the inherent plenary political centralization of the party and its decision-making process, but had to contribute vigorously towards the positive attainment of system change. It was evident that political stability could only be achieved through interaction and within a framework of consensual "good-will" articulated in federal circles and involving greater measures of duality in the political and cultural interchange between the two communities.

The union of a people is not complete until they have forged for themselves a soul, that principle of life and continuity, that unity of thought and feeling that only common culture can give; the way to achieve this "is to create a new culture thoughtfully, methodically, diligently, from those" found in the Cameroon society.³⁴⁾

Active participation within the evolving politico-administrative centralized decision-making system was the only means of avoiding the political bedlam that had befallen other African countries.³⁵⁾

The realities of Cameroon unification involving (orientations toward time and innovation) system change have to be understood, not from the perspectives of a "conqueror" in that West Cameroon had to undergo drastic administrative and political changes, but from the values of the sum total of the vision and perception of the elephant by blind men. To put it differently, the tools of the blind men in our context are the four attributes consensus, authoritarian, paternal and identifi-
fic, underlying the hypothetical departure and how, in different combinations and time periods they have influenced the process of integration and stability experienced by the Cameroon.

As pointed out earlier, the spirit of give and take operates in the society. In this connection, factors of acquiescence, participation, adaption and positive resistance have prevailed in varying degrees and constellation in building the smooth establishment of the federation and the success of government. This had to be attributed, on the one hand, to the extent to which there was a West Cameroon acquiescence to changes, the

degree to which the region managed to adapt to these changes, and not least, how they in turn utilized and maximized the process of change for their own purpose.

On the other hand lies the crucial factor that East Cameroon articulated and exerted subtle pressures in the process of change. On the whole, acquiescence and the propensities of not dictating solutions succinctly outlined by the former Vice-President as

in a state of reconciliation we have obtained the disposition among all Cameroonians in preserving peace and stability.....36)

and the relatively relaxed pace at which the system transformed itself streamlines the uniqueness of Cameroon's political integration in contemporary Africa.

Some form of consensus - call it development and integration compromises - involving political, administrative and economic cooperation between the state and federal governments was necessary to project the authoritative allocation of resources between the respective functioning units to trigger harmonious and balanced development throughout the country. The incorporation of certain clauses within the 1961 constitution demonstrated in no small way the "will of compromise, consensus and action" among the political leaders and administrative elites on both sides of the Mungo.

Notes:

1. For more details see Chilver, E.M. "Native Administration in West Central Cameroons, 1902-1954", in K. Robinson & F. Madden, (eds) Essays in Imperial Government, Oxford, 1963, pp 89-139; Sakah, B.T., "The Influence of Western Civilization on the Nso", 1962, International African Institute MS, collection); Rudin, Harry R., Germans in the Cameroons, 1884-1914, London 1938; Kaberry, P.M. and Chilver, E.M., "Traditional Government in Bafut", Nigerian Field, 1963; "The Traditional Political System of Bali-Nyonga", Africa, xxxi (1961), pp 355-71; Gray Cowan, L., Local Government in West Africa, New York 1968. Ardener, Edwin, "The Political History of Cameroon", The World Today, 18, 1962, pp 341-350.
2. Burke, E. Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790) Works, London, World Classic Edition, 1907, Vol. IV, p 109.
3. The constitution of the Federal Republic of Cameroon, Articles 5, 6, 7, 13 and 38, Yaounde, 1 September 1961. The Constitution will henceforth be styled as Articles.
4. Ardener, E. "The Nature of the Reunification of Cameroon" in Hazlewood, A. (ed) African Integration and Disintegration, Oxford University Press, p. 289-90.
5. See Rubin, Neville, Cameroon - An African Federation, Pall Mall, London, 1971, Eyongetah, T. and Brain (eds). A History of the Cameroon, Longman, London, 1974; Ahidjo, A. Speech to the National Council for Higher Education, Yaounde, 1974.

6. Rubin, *op cit*.
7. See *The Federal Constitution of the Cameroon Republic, 1961*. For detailed analysis of the constitution see Enonchong, H.N. *Cameroon Constitutional Law*, Yaounde, 1967; *Principles of Cameroon Administrative Law: An Inter-play of Common-Law and Civil-Law Systems*, Yaounde; "The Position of the Cameroon State in Litigation", *Abbia*, No. 11, 1965, Yaounde, Cameroon, and Cazalou, H. *Note Relative à des difficultés de la Constitution Fédérale du Cameroun*, Yaounde, 1964. *Southern Cameroons (West Cameroon) Bar Association, Analytical Review of Constitutional Proposals*, Buea, 1961: *Minutes of the Emergency Meeting of the West Cameroon Bar Association*, July 12, 1961, Buea. 1961.
8. Friedrich, C.J. *Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice*, Praeger, 1968, p. 8.
9. Riker, W.H. *Federalism, Origin, Operation and Significance* Little Brown 1964, p. 10.
10. These Articles refer to Federal Constitution of 1961. Article 38 states "Any subject not listed in Articles 5 and 6, and whose regulation is not specifically entrusted by this Constitution to a federal law, shall be of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federated States, which within those limits, may adopt their own Constitutions."
11. Article 1 (3)
12. Article 18
13. Article 47. The Article calls for equilibrium between each of the states so that the state does not force its will on the other; moreover, it gives protection to the minority. Any amendments to the constitution required at least six members from West Cameroon voting with representatives from East Cameroon. The strength of the Federal Nation Assembly was 50 members, with 40 coming from East Cameroon and 10 from East Cameroon and 10 from West Cameroon.
14. K.N.D.P. "United Cameroons" Federal Constitution by KNDP", 1960. See also KNDP Newsletter published in 1959-60. "The Two Alternatives", *op cit*. Buea
15. The Statement was signed on 13 October 1960. See also the "Two Alternatives", *op cit*.
16. Article 9 (1)
17. Article 8 (2)
18. Article 52
19. Johnson, *The Cameroon Federation*, 1970, p 291-4. Dr Bernard Fonlon holds degrees in philosophy and education from Oxford and Sorbonne. He has been a Cabinet Minister and is at present a member of the Central Committee of the CNU and Professor at the University of Yaounde. He is the founder of *Abbia*.
20. Presidential Decree No. 62/DF 108 of 31st March 1962. Fonlon, B. "A case for Early Bilingualism", *Abbia*, No. 4, 1963 and No. 5, 1964. Yaounde - Cameroon. See also Tazifor, Charles "The Puzzles of Bilingualism in Our Country", *Cameroon Tribune*, October 22, 1980.

21. Ahidjo, A. Speech at the Inauguration of the Buea Lycée, May 1971.
22. Rubin, op cit. 1971, p. 164
23. Articles 5, 6, 1961; Decree 60-252, December 31, 1960; Decree 61-DF-15 October, 20, 1961; Cameroon Times, June 25, 1963.
24. Articles 5, 6, 38, 39 (1961) outlining which subjects were under federal and state jurisdiction. Cameroon Times, May 7, 1962; Johnson, The Cameroon Federation, op cit. p. 209.
25. Article 25
26. West Cameroon Budget 1 July 1963-64, Buea. Government Press.
27. Decree 62-DF-287 of July 26, 1962. Articles 6, 6, 38, 39 (1961) For deeper analysis see Johnson, The Cameroon Federation, 1971; Le Vine, Victor, The Cameroons from Mandate to Independence, 1964; The Federal Republic of Cameroon, 1971; Kale, P.M. Political Evolution in the Cameroon, Buea. 1968; Bayart, Jean-Francois, L'Etat Au Cameroun, Paris, 1979; Mokeba Mukoko M.P. "Cameroon Reunification: A Case Study in Political Integration", University of Pittsburg, 1966. George, S.A. Kame-run Unification, London, 1956.
28. See the results of the United Nations conducted plebiscite in Southern Cameroons on 11 February 1961, United Nations Year Book, 1962; See section dealing with the Evolution of the new Federation.
29. Fonlon, B. "Will We Make or Mar?", Abbia No. 5 March 1964.
30. Speech by President Ahidjo at the 1962 Union Camerounaise Congress at Ebolowa. See also The Herald, 30 April 1980, Victoria, Cameroon.
31. Mesembe, Moses, "Qualities of Administrators", Cameroon Tribune, December 17, 1980, Yaounde; Epule, Kome, "Our Concept of Work", Cameroon Tribune, November 12, 1980, Yaounde.
32. Fonlon, B. "Will We Make or Mar?", op cit. 1964.
33. Cameroon Times, June 1, 1962; Minutes of the Eight Annual Convention of the KNDP, Victoria, June 1962; Federal Press Release No. 2111, November 1962, Cameroon Times, September 1. 1966; Fonlon, B. "Under the Rising Sun", Cameroon Times, Victoria, April 1965; C.N.U. Militants Guide, Yaounde, 1976. See also Ahidjo, A. L'Unité du Peuple et le développement de L'Union Nationale Camerounaise", Key Address to the First C.N.U. Congress in Gaourra, October 1969.
34. Fonlon, B. "Will We Make or Mar?", op cit. 1964.
35. Take for example, The Congo (Zaire) Crisis of 1960; The Nigerian Civil War, 1966-70; not to speak of the many military coups that have taken place in Africa during the past two decades.
36. Foncha, John Ngu., "The Role of the Patroness of United Cameroon in Re-unification", Cameroon Tribune, December 24, 1980. Yaounde.

It would be useful to examine some salient features of the state of economic disparity within the administrative frontiers of East and West Cameroon in order to see how

- (i) *national integration brought significant changes in the economic structure;*
- and*
- (ii) *how the economy of the evolving society influenced the pattern of political development.*

To begin with, it was not just the physical relations that thwarted the national frontiers between the two Cameroons during British and French administration, but equally, the relative degree of socio-economic infrastructural disparity that existed within each of the states. Generally, the southern areas of the two states were more developed than the northern regions. Whatever infrastructures existed in the country particularly in the coastal regions, were only used to meet the needs of the colonial nations. In the Western State, railway lines and roads led from the plantations to the harbours and were not for public use. There was enormous communitive and economic disparity between the two states. Each side developed separately. In many places, there were no roads, telephones, telegraphs or rail communications linking the two countries.¹⁾ Customs barriers existed between them, and passport requirements also existed between the two states during the period up to unification in 1961. The following statement describes the situation in a nutshell.

Seldom can there have been a clearer example of the combination of neglect and shortsightedness on the part of two colonial powers administering adjacent territories.²⁾

This physical isolation was further compounded by the real obstacles presented by ethnic fragmentation and language problems.

Since British and Nigerian administration in West Cameroon left the territory in virtual economic backwardness, it was imperative that strong, decisive and rational measures be taken immediately by the central government to reconstruct the appalling economy; to integrate it to that of East Cameroon; and to exert its authority and seal the political vacuum following the sudden departure of Her Majesty's Government. The economic viability of East Cameroon, as such, constituted the backbone husbandry of the federation, i.e. East Cameroon enjoyed superior economic growth. The theory of political integration contends that some of the pre-requisites underlying the rationale for the merging of states include conditions such as "superior economic growth on the part of at least some of the participating units; expectation of greater economic gains and ties; a hope of economic advantage from the union."³⁾

The political impact of unification on the economy of West

Cameroon was

- i. *Articulating policies geared at overcoming both the physical isolation and relative backwardness of the region;*
- ii. *The purse of the state was controlled by the federal government and the region having lost its British and Commonwealth trade preferences, increased its dependency on the new centre of authority for its economic viability and development;*
- iii. *It had to re-orientate its money system; change from pounds to francs; convert from inches to the metric system, and from left to right hand driving. Trade and economic reliance on Britain and Nigeria had to be replaced;*
- iv. *It brought inflation and increased the economic hardship of the people in the short run;*
- v. *The determination of the new central administrative authority to wipe out any traces of West Cameroon as a liability to the newly created federation.*

As a result, requisite steps had to be taken towards forging national unity and cohesion in a fragmented environment. The most conceivable edification and deprivation of federating, on economic grounds, for both East and West and the federation at large, are summarily presented in Fig. 4. The action by the federal government to bring order to the economy of West Cameroon could be seen not just in light of three reports prepared for the territory at the time of integration but also within the theoretical exposition already mentioned.

To begin with, the Philipson's report commissioned by the then Southern Cameroons Government concluded that the revenues of a seceded Southern Cameroons,

might just suffice to enable it to maintain and even modestly to expand its recurrent services, but it would be a precarious hand-to-mouth existence.... As a completely independent state the Southern Cameroons at its present stage of development, would not be viable.⁴⁾

The second report, whilst expressing some grounds for optimism about the economic viability of West Cameroon, saw the existing nature of revenue allocation as not favourable to West Cameroon. Kenneth Berrill argued that government recurrent expenditure was "made possible rather by revised revenue allocation between the regions and the federation of Nigera than by the natural buoyancy in Government income".⁵⁾ The last report by Kjell Andersen of Norway, commissioned by Cameroon Republic to examine the economic aspects of possible reunification of the two Cameroons⁶⁾, underlined the need for the new central administration to carry out a carefully co-ordinated planning approach as well as the encouragement of foreign capital investment to trigger the development of the underdeveloped Western Cameroon and to promote national growth and balanced

ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES
OF INTEGRATION




Fig. 4

development within the federation.

These developments had to be achieved through an entirely different political and administrative system which people in West Cameroon were not accustomed to for it implied the employment of different socio-political philosophical orientation uncommonly applied in Western democracies. The typical example being the country opting for "a presidential ruling democracy" which gives the head of state the following advantages in national development. First of all, it enables the Head of State to be the symbol of the unity of a nation in the making; secondly, it enables the executive to play its full role as the force behind national development within the framework - as laid down by the constitution - of both separation and collaboration of powers and in an atmosphere of complementarity which affiliation to the same party imposes on all the organs of state, as opposed to

regimes in which executive action is constantly paralysed by demagogic rifts in opinion, struggles for position, and conflicts of personal interest.⁷⁾

Any attempt towards system change had to be apprehended within the wider dimensions of national cohesion and identical uniformity in economic and political activities of the new society.

Thus, the emergence of a new political culture required some form of departure from the established clusters of the old social, economic and psychological norms towards a new focus of socio-economic mobilization able to facilitate the flow of services between the centre and the periphery (Federal and West Cameroon) as well as maintaining a harmonious balance between the peripheries (East and West).

Consensus on development had to be reached between the respective governments (see fig. 5, in order to maintain stability and continuity.




Fig. 5

The policy action of the federal government to bring order to the economy of West Cameroon should be seen not just in light of the three reports prepared for the territory at the time of unification but also within the general theoretical exposition already discussed, which elucidates the linkage between integration and development.

Some of the measures taken included;

- a. *Adjustments in East Cameroon. First Five Year Development Plan to include West Cameroon. The Plan was drawn before the unification of the two states.*⁸⁾
- b. *Federal government subvention to the state budget of West Cameroon. See Table 1.*
- c. *Intensified administrative co-ordination and the taking over of duties originally designated to State control.*⁹⁾
- d. *Initiating communication infrastructure so as to end the physical isolation of West Cameroon;*
- e. *Appropriate utilization of the country's experiment (integration) to gain international financial assistance for capital projects particularly in West Cameroon and the Federation in general.*

While these policy approaches necessitate further elucidation, it is appropriate to state here that the precept of development calls for modification in the economic structure and institutional scaffolding of the society in question, and fastidiously in a polity like the Cameroon where economic and political disparities existed long before the insinuation of the federal and unitary system of administration. The need for such changes in the Cameroon environment was even more pronounced. The constraints or prospects arising from such societal transformation make it evident for socio-economic metamorphosis to be surveyed within the enclavements of consensual interdependence between federalism and development.

We have to bear in mind that the underlying objectives of these interrelated attributes (integration and development) involved an inculcated incinerator aspiration "for greater economic improvements in the position of the federal units and the steady increase over time of the capacity of the economy of the federation as a whole respectively."¹⁰⁾ Hence, the synthesis of integration and development predilection eponymizes what Ndongko predicts as follows:

*The organization and distribution of economic activities under 'federalism' - 'neo-functionalism' with a view to realizing economic development calls for the employment of a set of tools or machinery which directly intervenes in the manner in which the federated units had hitherto carried out their activities.*¹¹⁾

One of the solutions to the economic backwardness of West Cameroon and the overall balanced development of the country entailed equitable allocation of resources (distributive justice) between the federal and state governments "to arrive at consensual allocation of resources that permits acceptable attainment for the developmental goal."¹²⁾

A resolute decision in this direction was the Federal government subvention to state budgets following Table 1. Very often,

the fundamental problem of federal finance is that of ensuring that the distribution of revenue between the central and regional governments corresponds with the distribution of functions so as to enable each administration to effectuate its obligations by the best possible means. The redistributive impact on the allocation of resources was clearly in favour of West Cameroon during the period 1962-1971 which indicates that West Cameroon had more administrative obligations to meet since it was the region undergoing extra changes.

Right up to the time of the unitary government, subvention to the region was over fifty per cent of the state budget. Federal subsidies to the state between 1963 and 1965 increased from five to eight million United States dollars. On the average, the transfer represented approximately two-thirds of the revenue for the regular West Cameroon budget.

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SUBVENTION TO STATE BUDGETS

(1962-63 - 1970-71 in million francs CFA) Table 1

Year	East Cameroon	% of state budget	West Cameroon	% of state budget
1962/63	283	3.9	1.150	67.0
1963/64	890	23.5	1.270	68.0
1964/65	1.371	19.0	1.440	55.0
1965/66	1.285	14.0	1.350	51.5
1966/67	1.280	10.0	1.950	70.0
1967/68	1.000	9.9	1.800	64.0
1968/69	650	6.4	1.640	69.0
1969/70	-	-	1.400	50.0
1970/71	-	-	1.700	63.0

Source: Federal Republic of Cameroon Estimates 1962/63 - 1970/71.

In 1966-67 it accounted for 70 per cent of the total revenues of the state budget of West Cameroon. The capital budget grew by about 80 per cent over the pre-federation level as a result of increased foreign aid and growing federal subsidies. Moreover, subsidies to West Cameroon exceeded those that East Cameroon received from the central government, despite East Cameroon being four times larger in population and three times larger in state government expenditure.¹³⁾

By opting to join East Cameroon, West Cameroon lost its trade preference within the Commonwealth. Conversely, unfication came at the time when export quotas had been allocated for East Cameroon following the Yaounde Convention.¹⁴⁾ The consequences of these trends of development had an adverse impact on the economy of West Cameroon which necessitated substantial support from the federal administration.

There were strong economic and political arguments favouring special attention on the appalling situation of West Cameroon especially during the early phase of integration. Within the first years of unification vigorous attempts were made by the federal government to end the physical isolation of West Cameroon. One such development was the surveying and the eventual construction of roads and other infrastructures which hitherto were a source of embarrassment and inconvenience to the people as well as constituting bottlenecks in the overall process of development. Construction of the Tiko-Douala road, known as "unification road", opened in mid 1969, immediately integrated the economy of the southern part of West Cameroon to the commercial centre of East Cameroon - Douala.

The railway extension from Douala to Kumba (West Cameroon) started in 1963 was also completed in 1969. The internal road system of West Cameroon was resurfaced and extended, especially the Kumba-Victoria, Kumba-Mamfe, and Mamfe - Bamenda Roads, The Tiko-Douala road was also extended to the town of Victoria. Tiko - Buea and Victoria-Buea roads were also improved. Survey work was done on the Douala - Bamenda road and the work on it completed in the mid 1970's. Improvements were also made in air traffic by the development of internal air transport through the establishment of the State-financed Cameroon Air Transport Corporation. As a result, contact became possible not only with areas of the interior (such as Mamfe, Bamenda, Wum etc) hitherto only regularly accessible in good weather during the dry seasons, but also by means of a fifteen minute flight from Tiko in a light air craft.¹⁵⁾ East Cameroon was now accessible by road, railway, sea and air.

How did these changes (economic inputs) influence the political output of national integration? To start with, a general statement recapitulating fig. 4 on the economic consequences and rewards of unification is necessary. We discover that the gains, crudely stated, were incoherent as each state and its political actors procured capricious edification from the new structure of government. While the major problem was one of elevating the degree of imbalances in the rewards in light of the directional orientation of the technocratic and political actors (construed in terms of (a) the quest for equality/superiority of influence and participation and (b) the desire for a common purpose and sense of direction), the main aggregate factors of economic growth do show spectacular changes for West Cameroon since the historical agreement to create a single nation. In other words, the West had more to gain by joining her kin and kith across the Mungo.

Whatever gain there was to be derived from the union depended upon the criterion of economic efficiency of the federal system as well as on the essential part of the political bargain incorporated within the federal constitution. The assignment of revenues may have a crucial bearing upon the whole pattern of political and administrative relations between governments. The relative economic underdevelopment of West Cameroon called for some measure of equalization in revenue allocation between the federated states and the federal administra-

tion.

No acrimony in the allocation of federal finances has occurred in the Cameroon. The explanation involves a number of factors. The clashes of interest were limited because the Eastern and Federal Governments were somewhat similar: they shared a common consensual determination of promoting the success of the newly created federation and there existed a strong federal executive capable of balancing economic and political confrontations within the framework of national unity and diversity.

By far the most significant political output resulting from the series of economic changes was that it ended the physical isolation of West Cameroon and this in turn had a trickle-down effect on the political situation in many respects, such as (i) a process of conflict resolution; (ii) patterns of social behaviour; and (iii) material benefits. A brief explanation of the chain effects of these changes or impact on politics:

- a. *The elimination of the physical isolation of West Cameroon gave new in-roads of interaction with the people on the other side which eventually increased genuine understanding of the problems involved in nation-building.*
- b. *It increased the degree of communication and this was equally an answer to the problems of linguistic and ethnic differences in the society.*
- c. *It increased the need for social pluralism as well as it narrowed the patterns of social and political cleavages in the society.*
- d. *There was a change in the attitude and behaviour of the people, leading to a shift of the awareness and the loyalties of individuals from a particularistic focus on their local or national communities to a wider focus on the system as a whole, i.e. from thinking in terms of West Cameroon or East Cameroon to thinking in terms of the Cameroon Nation as One and Indivisible.*
- e. *Understanding insinuated peaceful conflict resolution and brought about stable political and institutional structures for decision-making which eliminate the use of violence; hence the country has escaped the political turmoils of many developing nations.*

Former Vice President John Ngu Foncha sums up the issue of peaceful conflict resolution and its significance on the politics of the country in the following way.

Peace creates the conditions necessary not only for the people to work and prosper, but also for the Government to work and plan for the ways and means to increase individual earnings and national income. At the 20th anniversary of Cameroon's existence as an independent country, comparing it with the past and so on, the truth of peace and national prosperity cannot be doubted.¹⁶⁾

There has been a substantial improvement in the standard of living i.e. the effect of need-satisfaction, or material rewards, has brought about participation, adaption and distribution in the system. The economy meets the need for adaption and in return, the polity or political system makes varying contributions to adaptation. The effect here clearly shows that the economy in the Cameroon situation partly controls and partly adjusts to the environment. The environment of the country is such that there is pattern-maintenance of stability, continuity and peaceful change; the maintenance of cultural and normative patterns of interaction, and tension-management, are essential if the system is to persist.

On the basis of issues raised here, it can rightly be stated that the economic predicament confronting the two states (i.e. specific social and economic problems that called for actions on system basis) was a motivating mechanism for them to settle for consensus and not confrontation; and for West Cameroon in particular to limit its claim for a loose federation. A loose federation with an economically unviable and physically isolated state such as West Cameroon would have been a breeding ground for conflicting claims and encouraged resentment, discontent and instability, thus increasing the prospects for disintegration or secession.

These factors manifest the need for any integrating system to be both authoritative and consensual in order to balance conflicting pleas between the richer (approbating the rectitude of compensation or derivation) and the poorer regions (requesting special assistance on the evidence of requirement), or between the quest for authoritative centralism and loose federalism.

Attitudinal change and behaviour (orientation toward time and innovation) in West Cameroon by the end of 1965 had dampened the quest for loose federation and promoted the acceptance of a centralist approach to development or what President Ahidjo styles "ruling democracy" as opposed to "regimes"; since executive participation in national reconstruction is paralysed by demagogic rifts among the various political parties.

The growth of new institutions facilitates communication and consultations in the system. Consultation promotes mutual understanding and this helps the system to persist, which is exactly what has taken place in the Cameroon polity.

While the economic interregnum 1961-65 required socio-economic-political adjustments on the part of West Cameroon, it also carried with it a timeless bomb that could stop the momentum of development by the very politics of change itself at anytime. Aware of this timeless bomb, the federal government hastened the pace for federal takeover of various services. People sympathetic with and articulating the federalist ideals of centralism were placed in charge of key positions that had direct impact and influence on the daily life of the people.

Rightly articulated, the propensity to mitigate the ideals of political and administrative centralism orchestrated the appropriate basis for cohesiveness and consensus within the society. Development planning and centralization had the policy

objectives of promoting rapid economic, social and cultural changes as well as generating a balanced and concentrated trend; it is embedded with the provisions for increasing opportunities for the population; it enhances the functioning capacity and ability of the system to pilot and sustain changes.

Federal subsidies to the state budget, the various development infrastructures engineered in the society including the Trans-Cameroon Railway, expansion of the educational system, public services, common salary scale, new labour code etc.¹⁷⁾ constitute the base from which the level of integration can be measured. This indicates the gains or benefits of merging nations, the "sense of community" and the purpose of organizing for the common good. There were shared functional interests on both sides of the old colonial administrative border to accept and implement institutional changes as a contribution towards promoting social equity, distribution of benefits and not least the pattern of mobility and stability.¹⁸⁾

Mobility and stability must be mitigated in the course of social interaction and national integration. Without this the polity cannot express the drive to power and consensus which gives it the right to authoritative decisions regulating the relationship between the ruler and the ruled. An end to the economic and physical isolation of West Cameroon was no doubt a goal-attainment or goal-gratification for the polity. This enhanced the polity to play a significant part in the allocation of the members to roles; and were important factors for adaptation.

Rephrased in another way, the end to the physical isolation of certain parts of the country and the new dynamic impetus given to the economy as a whole accelerated the production of goods and services for a wide variety of political purposes, making it possible for the polity to mobilize these goods and services for the attainment of certain specific goods (stability, peaceful change, balanced development, sense of oneness, authoritative allocation of resources, paternal, identific, participation, change in attitude and behaviour, ethnic cohesion etc. etc.) of the total society.

Thus the economic surgery performed on the state of West Cameroon was an articulated way for the mobilization of societal resources for system goals which concerns the political action of the society and its ability to survive.

Clearly enough, cleavages in the economic disparity and the organizational patterns of institutions had to be eliminated before meaningful and genuine development could take place in the country.

By way of summarizing this array of observations, let it be noted that

1. *There was a sharp difference in the relative participation of West Cameroon in the economic structure of the newly created federation as compared with that of East Cameroon.*
2. *This difference if allowed to continue would have increased the problems of integration and mobilization processes thereby limiting orientations toward community, time and innova-*

tion.

3. The relative backwardness of the economy of West Cameroon associated with parallel variations in East Cameroon needed forms of selectivity by the Federal administration in order to minimize what could be visualized as - the lower the overall participation of a particular region or group of people in the process of nation-building, the lower will be its response to changes and national cohesion and the possibility of the society becoming a super-market for chaos and instability;
hence,
the more socially and economically will be government investments; and recruitment and appointment of civil servants to key sensitive positions.
4. The central significance following political evolutions in the country indicated that the propensity for the maximization of rapid development existed in West Cameroon than in the East.
5. Hence, the East had to bear the development burdens of the West.
6. While unification was the common identical goal for the people on both sides of the demarcation line, the value perspectives and perception differed as to the nature of such political union.

On the one hand, the governing elites and political actors encountered the problems of inter-level distribution of power and legislative responsibilities which also included "legal procedures and structures for the transition, citizenship and provision for legal secession of states"¹⁹⁾ and on the other, a determined effort of creating a new political community through the vehicles of viable federal development.

In this respect, the option stood between a powerful centralized federal structure as advocated by the East and the aspiration of the West construed on the ideals of a weak cooperative federal system with equitable and correlated distribution of powers between local, state and central governmental institutions. This difference in values of the political actors within the federated states relates to a candid observation by Johnson that,

Many western political leaders found it difficult to conceive of the new reunified state as a single nationstate; their image of the federation shifted from that to one of a loose league between two states. Their problem is rooted in the perplexities that have troubled thinkers since the French political philosopher Jean Bodin elaborated the idea of sovereignty, the hallmark of the modern state, but a notion which is made to fit that of federation only with some strain.²⁰⁾

The expectations of the elites and politicians eventually merged in the reconciliatory constitution of parliamentary democracy and presidentialism stipulating a two tier governmental

structure in which policy approaches to administrative, economic and other needs were centered on (i) centralized federal power prerogatives and (ii) peripheral federal power jurisdiction according to Articles 5, 6 and 7 (1961) of the constitution. The conclusion to be drawn from the differences of values, expectations and aspirations of the various actors is that the federalist ideals of a weak-cooperative governmental political system between the centre and the periphery was topmost in the minds of West Cameroonians while the Easterners were clothed with the developmentalist precepts of a powerful centralized governmental structure bestowed with the prerogatives of solving the economic, administrative and other differential values or inequalities within the society through the authoritarian cliché of authoritative allocation of powers within the presidency.

The problem for the government was to devise means to erode progressively the dilemmas of socio-economic and other ethnic inequalities. The co-existence of these socio-economic disparities was a deterrent to the process of national integration. Many political implications were involved in either direction, i.e. socio-economic inequalities having the political consequences of fermenting instability and discontent, etc, while socio-economic equality had the opposite effect, being the tool for stability and national cohesion or a mechanism for orientation toward a community.

As noted, the potential influence following the diversity of the socio-economic cultural sector, induced the government to adopt more concrete, but flexible national integration strategies (consensual, paternal, identific and authoritarian) in a variety of contexts, as the mechanism for advancing the impact of socio-economic development processes in national integration.

The government, however, had optional strategies to minimize the magnitude of socio-economic inequalities in national integration. It could either impose its socio-economic strategies on the value perspectives of West Cameroon, or attempt some reconciliation. There is the case of the West Cameroon government turning down salary increases but opting for more development projects designed to give more employment, a decision which brought the government into conflict with the value perspectives of the administrators (civil service) who wanted equalization in salary-scale with East Cameroon workers.

Secondly, the federal government went ahead with the strategy of locating projects and other infrastructures in areas which lacked them. This strategy bore greater dividends for West Cameroon since it ended its physical isolation; it brought an integrated communication and transportation network structure into the system.

Another strategy minimizing socio-economic inequalities in national integration consisted of adapting socio-economic infrastructures and education curricula and organizational patterns to the needs and orientations of the population. Clearly enough, the Cameroon Government has made use of this technique by maintaining and utilizing the system prevailing in the regions as the stereobate for effectuating change. That is to say there

has been a more pragmatic approach to national integration. The process of socialization has been pursued with caution and pragmatic vigor. Political leadership in partnership with the institutions of government have endeavoured to establish organizational linkages between the various sectors of the economy and between the fragmented ethnic groups. Within this context, the Cameroon authority has adopted the most pragmatic means to erode socio-economic differentials. The degree of cohesion and level of integration as experienced by stability and continuity is an indication of the efficiency of the strategies employed by the Cameroon in national cohesion, which, of course, is worth emulating by other developing polities.

Socio-economic harmonisation in the Cameroon has brought a permanent awareness of its capabilities and the demands of its destiny, an issue clearly articulated by the President:

Cameroon's destiny demands lots of self-help towards progress and the increasingly closer links with the people towards overcoming the growing pains of national development.²¹⁾

The narrowing of socio-economic inequalities activated changes in the political attitudes and behaviour of the people. In this respect (distributive justice) economic harmonization or the end to the physical isolation with the subsequent output of increased living standards was a mechanism of political socialization for creating a common Cameroon political culture. The policy approach of "planned liberalism", succinctly elucidated as

We have, in fact, deliberately chosen planned liberalism as our method of development. If planning expresses our concern, however legitimate, to make an efficient use of the resources available, to limit the role of chance in economic undertaking and consciously orientate development towards measured and predetermined targets, we are, on the other hand, convinced that liberalism remains a decisive factor of progress...because, finally, it alone can reconcile harmoniously the demands of rationalism with the necessity of private (international) co-operation in a country where saving is still an elementary stage of growth, and the State, even though it may be called upon, by force of circumstance, to play a determining role of impulsion and control is far from possessing the means of assuming the whole 'burden of development'²²⁾

has brought the interaction of units; the individuals and the collectivities of the system as well as the manifestation of solidarity, the moral ethics of oneness. National integration requires co-operative activities, a procedural consensus, an accepted pattern of decision-making and a hierarchy of authority which possess inherent legitimate power to articulate, aggregate and adjudicate orders. It must be imbued with regulative norms a capacity for the effective performance of authoritative functions and with the mechanisms for resolving disputes. Patterns of authority serve to co-ordinate or integrate the units of the system. The effects of economic modernisation through a

pragmatic constellation of authoritarian, consensual, paternal and identific attributes in the Cameroon polity has increased the need for national integration.

The need for national integration results from the positive feedback relationship between economic and political variables which in different degrees influence and change the behaviour of political actors. The intensity of the process has so far not escalated into violence; rather, the country has witnessed a smooth process of change, where mutual cooperation and tranquillity dominate the system; it may be mentioned that by the same token, the conduct and motivation of the individual Cameroonian highlights the factors of a political system as being nothing but an individual writ-large. That is to say, one cannot hope to achieve national integration without the positive backing of individual conduct and motivation, where preference, expectations and actual outcome (results) converge in a harmonious acceptance of the system.

Certain environmental changes and the growth of technology and population directly or indirectly contribute in shaping such motivation and conduct. That is, environmental changes and technology are determinants influencing political changes. In this respect the results of certain political changes and shifts in conditions (improved living standards and material benefits, a new generation of people)²³ have been influenced by economic factors. The inter-relatedness of economic and political variables and the political impact vis-a-vis the two Cameroons show the degree of interdependence between the two systems and the need for convergence or reconciliation into a common authentic socio-economic-political unit. There has been harmony and congruence, not inconsistency and confrontation, between the preference and interests, expectations and rewards within the system and among the people. Thus the over-all valuation of behavioural changes in the country is mirrored by the degree of stability and consensus prevailing in the system.

Notes:

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23. People between the ages of 18-25 and perhaps 30 constitute a new generation of political actors who have grown up under the new system; their preferences and expectations have to a large degree been shaped by the socialisation process of political changes under the system and therefore their acquiescence to the system is different from that of the older generation who witnessed the process of change during the early years of integration.
The values of the older generation were tied up with what they had, what they expected from joining the other Cameroon. Any process of change that did not offer at least something they hadn't already was not happily accepted. The new generation therefore has not got the same choice; their resistance will be of a different character or construed from different value perspectives.

INTEGRATING THE POLITICAL
ACTORS:

Political integration glorifies the nation as the highest focus of identification; where individual loyalties culminate into a sense of national cohesion or community; where the augmentation of its power is focused on the pursuit of coherent national policy for the common benefit of all; where old loyalties have to be destroyed for the purpose of increasing a degree of conformity, the fulfilment of some ideological national purpose.

The effort to secure national integration in the Cameroon embodied spacious complex political and social problems. Many of these problems have already been identified. Some of them are conjured within the perspectives of the units making up the state, its political institutions and the code of conduct underlying its system of functions. Another major problem area involves its philosophical orientation and basic policy directions in the solution of problems. Priorities must be set and decisions reached on the overall authoritative allocation of resources for the purpose of national unity, development and modernization.

Politically, and analytically, these problems were those involving conflicts over "fundamentals" and "circumstantials" within which some distinction could be made relating to (i) specific disagreements involving concrete policy issues - value allocation by the political system and the code of conduct; the technicalities of allocating values; (ii) dissension in the polity on cultural divergence which was an outcome of its (a) internal ethnic fragmentation and (b) its inherited colonial cultural differentiation. Political leaders and administrative elites on both sides had different educational backgrounds and therefore their value orientations exhibited significant differences in terms of their political preferences; and (iii) there is also the division of segmental cleavages where at the initial stages of unification, political division seemed to be guarded by confrontation between the British (West Cameroon) and French (East Cameroon) ways of life; or where political parties drew their support following the lines of the imperatives of ethnic differential, or the emergence of regional differences in the newly unified society. The leaders, of course, had to militate cleavages construed on the centre-periphery confrontations, class structures of the "haves" and "have-nots".

The ramification of these conflicts over the fundamental and circumstantial manifested political competition of contrariety making up the different dimensions of civic patterns of political dissension. It meant that political fragmentation in the newly constituted Cameroon polity carried with it relative degree of the extensiveness of these divisions. To what extent was the depth of political dissension within the community or among the major political actors on issue areas such as the centralization and decentralization of the political and administrative system envisaged, the allocation of resources between the state and federal governments, segmental cleavages

between the politicians and the administrative elites? Secondly, the correlation between each pattern of political division for example, urban - rural connection? Finally, the relative intensity of the dimensions of political dissension. What was the distance of opinion among the political opponents, the degree to which their opinion differed from each other on the structures of the new society? What kinds of opening existed from which a sense of national cohesion could be formed? What were the mechanics and dynamics of the political situation?

DYNAMICS OF POLITICS UNDER THE FEDERAL SYSTEM:

The operation and effectiveness of a federal system and the entire political process in a society depends not only on the form of institutions adopted, but equally on the pattern of the party system functioning in the society. In addition to this fundamental factor, political integration in light of individual patterns of behaviour relates to how change in individual attitudes and behaviour contributes to or hinders the integrative process. There is no doubt that socio-psychological variables are crucial factors of fundamental dimensions in nation-building.

Without the positive/supportive role of individual attitudes and behaviour, Cameroon's process in the direction of an integrated national community would have taken a different turn. Such attitudinal roles and behaviour of individuals (including leadership) make it possible for the country to avoid the kind of political upheavals and tendencies of disintegration that befall many Third World Countries. The desire for both unity and diversity (or unity in diversity - i.e. national integration and local autonomy) expresses itself through constitutional distribution of powers between the integrative units. Different models influenced their search for unity, but in the end, some kind of "genuine innovations" - the generation of institutions appropriate to the local environment - must emerge to sustain the institutional practice and political process of the end product. In this way, each end product reflects a unique verification, the coalescence of distinctive pragmatic routes and practical structure, apportionment of powers, the organization of central administration and other structures necessary for the surveillance of the constitution.

It is the people, not the letters of the constitution that make it function. Therefore, the analysis of political institutions and the integrative process has much to do with the way people participate accept or reject the functioning of these institutions.

Without penetrating into the complexities of Cameroon (party) politics and without over simplifying so as to distort factors, political dynamics in the country has to be seen within the demarcating issues determining the pattern of political parties in the pre and immediate post years of unification.¹⁾ The strength and solidarity of nationalist movements²⁾ gave the qualifying impetus for self-government in spite of their position on the political continuum. Even the most conservative

party accepted and embraced the wind of colonial liquidation that blew over Africa in the late fifties.³⁾ What divided the political contestants on the left-right political spectrum was "how" to achieve political sovereignty. Political dynamics in the country at that time evolved on the platform of open competitive allocation of resources. Interest articulation and aggregation, rule-making and rule-application operated under the political terminology of pluralism and through the principles of a multi-party system.

In 1960 not many political leaders would have wished to occupy Ahidjo's seat, for the polity was still in the midst of a political crisis⁴⁾ in which guerrilla warfare (radical nationalism)⁵⁾ was playing a dominant role and claiming many lives. The gulf of ethnic fragmentation and religious secularization between the Christians of the south and Moslems of the north was wider than ever.⁶⁾ No doubt the successful unification of the British and French Cameroons in October 1961, gave a fillip to the sagging morale.⁷⁾

What was required at this point was that during the transitional period from colonialism to national integration the political system should develop concerted and consensual boundary-maintenance between the political party structures and governmental structures, in order to give new dynamism and legitimacy to the new system. The mechanism needed was first and foremost to get the political actors integrated at least in principle, so as invigorate the emerging new morale generated by the events of October 1, 1961. The movement in that direction was more to the dictatorial tendency cultivated by the President of Cameroon Republic as the leader of the ruling, crisis-ridden, Northern dominated Union Camerounaise. As far back as the early days of unification, President Ahidjo had sounded the call for total union of the political parties.⁸⁾ Ahidjo's call for the integration of the political actors was repeated during a visit to Victoria where he categorically declared his intention to institute a one-party system in the Cameroon as the first step towards garnering and galvanising all the country's resources in the national interest.⁹⁾

At the time of the merging of the two territories, the number of contesting political parties had been reduced to three in West Cameroon, the KNDP, CPNC, and OK and five in East Cameroon, namely, UC, FPUP, UPC, Democrats and Socialists. In West Cameroon, the political parties were divided on the grounds of their respective political recipe for the territory. On the one end of the "political future" spectrum stood the CPNC advocating independence with Nigeria; and on the other, both the KNDP and OK, propagating for political union with the independent Cameroon Republic. The plebiscite of 11 February 1961 decided the odds between the divergent position of these parties. The next phase of the political hurdle to overcome involved the type of governmental formula to unite the two territories.¹⁰⁾

Across the Mungo, radical nationalism, the crux of UPC challenge to French rule, had reached its climax.¹¹⁾ The region once ravaged by political dissent now entered a new political phase - the crystallization of power and thrust towards natio-

nal consolidations through coercion and consensus. Apart from the UC, the other parties were opposed to excessive powers bestowed on the presidency. As the party in power, the UC had the resources of making life hard for opposition parties, the allocation of these resources and rewards to opposing groups brought about defections and the eventual decline of the opposition parties. Shifting factions and unstable coalitions evaporated following UC's growing domination.

On both sides, the desire for political integration was particularized through the parlance of uncertainty and hope,¹²⁾ hope for those who believed that the reunification of the two territories would usher a change to the bedlam experienced during French administration. Opposition parties in East Cameroon envied the degree of political stability that clouded the political climate of West Cameroon in spite of the division of the political parties on the political spectrum of joining either Nigeria or the Cameroon Republic, and saw unification as the most useful mechanism of offsetting the pragmatics of the political environment that existed in the region. In other words, the pattern of political competition in West Cameroon offered a prototype cherished by many political groupings in East Cameroon. Uncertainty existed for those who like West Cameroonians were not accustomed to the nature of political violence that prevailed in East Cameroon but had to accept its existence since the verdict for unification could not be altered. All these factors contributed in shaping party politics both at the regional and national level. A national political system, in the sense of a recognizable set of political symbols, roles, institutions, persons, and organisations was not unexpectedly slow to emerge.¹³⁾

In the first place, unification contributed towards the diminishing of the number of political parties, just as it resurrected age-old rival groups. Secondly, it intensified infighting in the political parties, forcing the leaders to adopt new policy perspectives to construct and consolidate inner party cohesion in light of the new political situation and particularly for West Cameroonians who were expected to face the first general elections under the new constitution.

Prior to unification, the political balance in the legislative assembly of West Cameroon was 13 seats each for the KNDP and the CPNC.¹⁴⁾ The composition of the house as such intensified the boundary-interest between the political actors. This was a dilemma for the ruling party (KNDP) in fulfilling the obligations bestowed on it following the plebiscite results. The KNDP lacked the parliamentary majority in meeting the wishes of the people as reflected by the plebiscite results. The only solution was to seek a new parliamentary mandate from the electorate.¹⁵⁾

THE 1961 REGIONAL ELECTIONS:

The 1961 election was the first direct test of political strength between the various parties under the new Cameroon constitution. The contest was between three major parties, the CPNC, KNDP and the OK. Each of the parties from its vantage point was determined to capitalize on

either the success or failure of the administration under the new political formula. Both the KNDP and the OK had the good record of having favoured the reunification of the two Cameroons and had campaigned vigorously for this during the plebiscite. The CPNC on the other hand was opposed to any form of political union with East Cameroon. But the CPNC and OK had one thing in common. The two parties were victimized by the KNDP administration.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of development between 1 October and 31 December 1961 was the new political alignment that emerged between the OK and the CPNC. The two parties that stood at the opposite ends of the political spectrum on either independence with Nigeria or independence with Cameroon Republic were able to marshall an alliance prior to the elections. Circumstances that contributed to the new political constellation could be listed as follows. In the first place, external influences such as UN Resolution 1352 (XIV) and the outcome of the London Summit of November 1960 between the KNDP administration and the British government had forced the KNDP into a position of accepting "unification immédiate", leaving them with no alternative than to campaign for it. The idea of "unification immédiate" was not a policy of their liking.¹⁶⁾ Secondly, internal events such as the results of the plebiscite and the historical events of 1 October 1961 bolstered the standing of the OK as the true champions of unification. Thirdly, the failure of the KNDP to match its Eastern counterpart UC at the Foumban Constitutional Conference and the practical realities of events in the region immediately after unification became a burden and dilemma for the KNDP. The attitude of East Cameroon soldiers who had taken over security in the region towards the citizens of West Cameroon was appalling and pathetic in all democratic respects that the people were accustomed to. Fourthly, for fear of losing its prestigious standing in the country, the KNDP reverted to vindictive and oppressive policy attitudes towards its political opponents. Even the OK, its ally at the plebiscite, emerged as the outspoken critic of the KNDP administration. That the OK and not the CPNC became the main target of the KNDP at the December elections was no surprise. The OK was now a potential threat to the KNDP. The CPNC had already lost its political standing within the Cameroon electorate following the plebiscite results. Fifthly, the situation being what it was, an election alliance between the OK and the CPNC became inevitable. The alliance bolstered the CPNC campaigning image and strategy. Finally, the CPNC, not the OK, derived benefits from the short political courtship that existed between the two during the elections. The results of the elections appear in Table 2.

The comfortable majority obtained by the KNDP created the stereobate for advancing the ethos of functional cooperation and consensus across the frontiers of West Cameroon. The verdict at the polls mandated the KNDP to accelerate the integrative process without due consideration to the opinions of the opposition parties, hence the nomination of ten deputies from the party to the Federal National Assembly. There was no rep-

resentation from the opposition parties. It can also be con-
tested that the 1961 elections entrusted authoritarian powers
to the ruling KNDP just as developments in the East had en-
trusted authoritarian powers to the ruling UC. The ethos of
functional cooperation and consensus-formation following the
KNDP victory at the 1961 polls resulted in a parliamentary
alliance between the party and the UC in the first National
Assembly.

1961 General Elections in West Cameroon: Seats won and Compo-
sition of the House of Assembly after the Elections:
Table 2

DIVISIONS	KNDP	CPNC	OK	INDEPENDENTS
Bamenda	11	-	-	2
Kumba	2	5	-	-
Mamfe	3	1	1	-
Nkambe	1	3	-	-
Victoria	3	1	-	-
Wum	4	-	-	-
Total seats won:	24	10	1+	2+
Total candidates contesting:	34	22	16	26
Composition of the elected Legislature:	27	10	-	-

*Note: + The OK and Independent elected members later declared for the KNDP
which gave the party 27 seats in the newly enlarged Legislative
Assembly:*

*Source: West Cameroon Information Service, Buea: Press Release No. 1663,
4 January, 1962, and Press Release 1669, 10 January 1962.*

The nomination of ten KNDP parliamentarians following Article 54¹⁷⁾ created the situation of dual membership in the legislative structure of the country. On the one hand, these members found themselves with conflicting loyalties and responsibilities; and on the other hand it offered expedient contacts between the two tiers of rule-making (legislatures) as well as helping to minimize conflict between the two levels of government. Though the provision was partially an interim one, it had the effect of pulling parliamentarians on both sides to a better understanding of the problems involved, hence the interpretative connotation of

elites responsiveness to mass demands provides a vital flow of information to the top and the elites sensitive handling of the re-allocation of resources preserves the quiet consensus underlying the federal bargain...18)

Analytically the alliance between the KNDP¹⁹⁾ and the subsequent exclusion of the CPNC from the first Federal Government could be interpreted as:

- a. A disguised authoritative way of coercing the opposition to seek consensus and identification with the unfolding political realities of national integration;
- b. Reward to the KNDP to further the goals of unification;
- c. A subtle way of activating political actors in West Cameroon towards the ideological orientation of centralized federalism; i.e. political leaders were induced to shift their loyalties from regionalism to federalism.

Since the administration ignored the CPNC members, they immediately recalled the early speech of President Ahidjo in which he articulated the idea of seeing a united party formed which would work for the interest of all,²⁰⁾ and capitalized on it. In this way, the CPNC started advocating a single party in order to win the President's sympathy. The leader of the CPNC on a number of occasions and in meeting with the President declared his intention to play a constructive and loyal role in the political life of the country.²¹⁾ The President being tactful, and maintaining his objective which was to create a one and indivisible and peaceful nation, advised the CPNC to hammer out the existing political differences with other political actors in West Cameroon before a truly national single party could be considered. He also voiced assurances that "no one need be considered redundant" who sincerely wished to offer services in the process of national development.

On the basis of the President's reaction, the CPNC were encouraged to table a motion in the West Cameroon House of Assembly on the issue of a unified party system. The motion called upon the leaders of the major political parties to exert concerted and genuine efforts in assuring peace and unity, and approved "the appeal made in favour of the adoption of a single party for the whole of the Republic" as well as requesting the President to "intervene in order that all persons interested take immediately the proper measures to insure the realization of a single party through the absorption of all existing parties into a single one."²²⁾

The KNDP being aware of the forthcoming 1964 election were embarrassed and therefore did not reject the motion as such, but amended the original draft to express acceptance of the principle of a national party and support for all measures taken in that direction.²³⁾

The tactful answer of the President to the CPNC to seek consensus with the major political party in West Cameroon served a useful purpose in that it brought pressure on the KNDP in particular and the political actors in general to work towards

the realization of a united party. This move disguisedly helped in integrating the political actors to a certain level.

The KNDP reaction to the CPNC motion was a "delaying tactic". It could be perceived as having the following effects: (i) it narrowed conflict and confrontation between the two parties; (ii) it created hope for CPNC's participation in national politics; and (iii) it created a calm political atmosphere for the preparation of the first direct elections to the Federal National Assembly.

THE 1964 FEDERAL ELECTIONS:

The KNDP's reaction was seen as a strategy to integrate political actors in that the CPNC members thought that there would be an agreement between the two parties for the nomination of candidates, which did not happen. The CPNC was forced at the last moment to put up candidates for the election, but lost. See Table 3.

This was a second defeat which debarred their participation in national politics. It is not surprising that there were defections among CPNC members to the KNDP.

RESULTS OF THE FIRST DIRECT ELECTION TO THE FEDERAL NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, 1964:

Table 3

	PARTIES CONTESTING East Cameroon		West Cameroon	
	UC	Democrats	KNDP	CPNC
Number of candidates contesting	40	10	10	10
Seats won	40	-	10	-
Percentage of votes recieved	93.59	6.41	76.	24
Seats available	40		10	
Total seats in the National assembly	50			

Source: *Se L'Unité* Nos. 180 and 181, May 1964, .See also *Cameroon Times*, May 1964; Press Release
Information Services, Buea. 1964

THE FIRST PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION:

In 1965, a year after the federal elections, there was the Presidential election. The two candidates running for the office of President and Vice-President

were Ahmadou Ahidjo and John Foncha, leaders of the UC and KNDP respectively. The two leaders were returned unopposed. This meant that Foncha had to relinquish his post as the Prime Minister of West Cameroon, which he did. This brought a power struggle within the ranks of the KNDP on who to succeed Foncha.²⁴⁾ The President having the authoritative power of appointing the Prime Minister ²⁵⁾ in order to promote peace and avoid chaos, appointed Augustine Jua, (Deputy Leader of the KNDP and Minister of Finance, West Cameroon) as the Prime Minister, a choice which brought stability and peace. The President's solution of the Prime Minister problem opened a new perspective for the integration of West Cameroon political actors as illustrated in the inaugural speech of the new Prime Minister as he extended the hand of friendship and a call for cooperation to the opposition (CPNC) party.

.....the Opposition is respected and is respectable.. I would like to see both the Government and Opposition on the floor of this House cooperate as never before so that the West Cameroon electorate may reap maximum benefit from the efforts of the State Parliament. My Government will, therefore, stretch a right hand of fellowship to the Opposition and to its supporters outside the House.....²⁶⁾

Eventually, a coalition government was formed between the KNDP and CPNC, which signalled a genuine move towards national unity as Jua noted, "a new day had dawned in West Cameroon politics,"²⁷⁾ in particular and for the country as a whole since the political actors on both sides of the Mungo unitedly negotiated for a single party system which was formed on 1 September 1966.²⁸⁾

The rationale for the creation of the single party did not proceed from abstract ideological considerations. It arose from a searching analysis of the actual situation in the Cameroon. It was argued that the splitting up of political forces and the multi-party system may meet the democratic requirements of the people in the Western world, who are no longer concerned with national integration, but not of those who have to face a different set of social, technological and economic problems, in the Cameroon. Like any other nation on the continent the perpetuation of already divergent and mutually antagonistic political forces would inevitably impede progress. Thus, the CNU becomes the embryo of national consolidation and identification articulating goals and offering means of arresting the problems of fragmentation and underdevelopment.

CONCLUSION:

The success of political integration in the Cameroon during the critical period, 1961-1966 can be summarized under the attributes of authoritative and identific. There was the skilful usage of power by the leaders and the willingness of the people to cooperate and identify themselves with the ideological and paternal goals of the leaders.

The Cameroon political milieu exhibits the careful use of

consensus to create national stability. From the inception of the First Republic, consensual solution to administrative problems minimized ethnic rivalries and created a political environment that was calm enough to insinuate the political take-off towards a broader fundamental arena of trust and confidence, reconciliation and rehabilitation among political leaders to rally for a common good. The shift of loyalties towards the evolving new centre of authority by the people and the political actors either through coercion or consensus crystallized on 1st September 1966 following the birth of the CNU.

From the marco-analytical perspective, national integration presents a plenitudinal correlation, i.e. conflict is either disregarded or appraised to be in discord with political integration. This is true of the Cameroon situation particularly in the 1960s. The challenge of legitimacy articulated by the UPC to the UC regime in East Cameroon was totally ignored or considered to be in defiance with integration. In other words, greater attention was paid towards the achievement of a political union to offset the forces and challenges posed by the UPC. The same can be said of the political squables and differences that ravaged political parties in West Cameroon. The President skilfully employed these conflicting situations as a stabilizing constituent in conceiving a society with sets of complementary relationships necessary for societal development. These differences in a way created the basis of manifesting policy actions towards national cohesion.

On the micro-analytical gradation the theoretical consideration of integration and conflict has the same inbuilt incommensurable mechanism and other elements as on the macro-level. In considering intergroup conflict, Robert C. North et al contends that

conflict may result in the destruction or disruption of all or certain of the bonds of unity which may previously have existed between the disputants. On the other hand, conflict may strengthen pre-existing ties or contribute to the establishment of unifying bonds where none before existed.²⁹⁾

The second contention is relevant to the Cameroon milieu; her mobilization, reconciliation and coercive processes were used as mechanisms for bolstering fledgling support for integration and national unity. In the expropriation of special changes in a society, new conditions, new unity and non-rational basis for the polity as a whole are necessary to begin with. It is not just the question of getting consensus within and between the political parties but also creating a dimensional society broad enough to encompass the entity of the nation-state and its territorial boundaries, of weaving the boundary of each citizen into the fabric of national political life, whether that fabric is coherently patterned or not.

Notes:

1. See bibliography together with the following publications: *West Africa*, "Reunification in the Cameroon", November 26, 1955, p. 1116; *Larin*, V "The Cameroons Fight For Unity and Independence", *International Affairs*, No 10, 1955, p. 90-98; Forje, John W. *Unification and After: A Political Study of The Federal Republic of Cameroon*, Dept. of Politics, University of Lund, 1972. Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP), Newsletter, July 1968; Kamerun National Congress/Kamerun Peoples Party KNC/KPP, Memorandum presented by the KNC/KPP to the Resumed Constitutional Conference, London, September 1958; O'Ne Kamerun (OK), *Our Federal Constitution Exposed*, Lagos, T.O.C. Press, 1961; Frodin Reuben, "The future of the Trust Territories of Cameroon", *International Organization* Vol. 14, Winter 1960, p. 152-155. Fonlon, Bernard, *The Task of Today*, Victoria, 1964; Zang-Atangana, J.M. "Les Parties Politiques Camerounaise", *Recueil Repart*, No. 684, December 1960, pp 681-708; *Cameroon Times*, and *Cameroon Champion*, 1960. Myeng, Engelbert, *Historie du Cameroun*, Presence Africaine, Paris, 1963.
2. See foot notes No. 1 and the bibliography.
3. HMSO, *Report of the Conference on the Nigeria Constitution*, London, July-August 1953, CMD 8934, London. See section dealing with the Cameroon. See also *Reports of the Nigerian Constitutional Conference*, 1954, and 1957.
4. Le Vine, V.T. "The Course of Political Violence", Lewis, W.H. (ed) *French Speaking West Africa: The Search for Identity*, Walker & Company, New York, 1965, pp 58-79; Joseph, R.A. "Ruben Um Nyobé and the 'Kamerun' Rebellion", *African Affairs*, LXXIII, 293, October 1974, pp 428-448; "National Politics in Post-War Cameroun. The Difficult Birth of the UPC", *Journal of African Studies*, ii, 2, 1974, pp 201-229; Lamberton, Colonel J. *La Pacification de la Sanaga Maritime* (Cameroun, Décembre 1957 - janvier 1959) Centre Militaire d'Information et du Specialisation pour l'Outre-Mer 1960; Weiskel, Tim, "The French Cameroons. 1944-1960: Devolution, Decolonization and Independence, Yale Senior Paper, 1969; Bigart, Homer, "Cameroon Leader Ending His Exile", *New York Times*, February 18, 1960, p. 14; "Hashish-Mad Rebels Kill 74 in Cameroun", *New York Times*, February 25, 1960, p. 1; Gardinier, David, "The Movement to Reunify the Cameroons, Paper presented to The Annual Conference of the African Studies Association, 1960; Guan-Null and Ndumu, T.M. *The Kamerun Society and the Nigerian Constitutional Conference and the Unification Question*, The Kamerun Society, Victoria, 1957.
5. Joseph, R.A. "The Union des Populations du Cameroun in Cameroun Politics, 1948-55", B. Phil Thesis, Oxford University 1969; "Radical Nationalism in Cameroun: The Case of the Union des Populations du Cameroun", D.Phil Thesis, Oxford University 1973; *Radical Nationalism in Cameroun, Social Origins of the UPC Rebellion*, Oxford University Press, 1977.
6. Bigart, Homer. "Clashes Spread Over Cameroon", *New York Times*, January 20, 1960, p.20; Joseph, R.A. "National Politics in Post-War-Cameroon: The Difficult Birth of the UPC", *Journal of African Studies*, ii. 2, 1975, pp 201-229; Gray, Harold S. "A Study of Cameroon's UPC Rebellion and Chinese Communist Movement", M.A. Thesis, The American University, 1967. Le Vine, V.T. op cit. 1964'
7. Bigart Homer, "A Test for Ahidjo", *New York Times*, February 23, 1960,

- p. 3; "Crushing Issues Face Cameroun", New York Times, January 25, 1960, p. 1; Cameroon Times, Victoria, 1959-60; Ardener, E. "Crisis of Confidence in the Cameroon", West Africa, August 12, 1961; "The Kamerun Idea" West Africa, Nos. 2147, 2148, Liverpool, June, 1958; "Cautions Optimism in West Cameroon", West Africa, September 1961; West Africa, "Cameroons Fulani Premier", January 2, 1960 pp 5-6; "Muted Triumph for Premier Ahidjo", February 27, 1960, p. 235. Comte, Gilbert, "La Reunification avec la Cameroun Meridional" Europe France Outre-mer No. 379, June 1961, pp 24-26.
8. Ahidjo's Speech, October 1, 1961; Ahidjo, A. Contribution to National Construction, op cit.
9. Speech in Victoria, June 1962. See Cameroon Times, June 1962. Press Release, Information Service, Buea - Cameroon. La Press du Cameroun June 1962 and Oyowe, Augustine, "Cameroon: Continent in Minature", New Africa, March 1979.
10. See Le Vine, V.T. From Mandate to Independence, op cit. 1964; "Cameroon Political Parties", in Coleman, J.S. & Rosberg (eds) Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa, Berkeley, 1964; Roberts, Margaret. "Political Prospects for the Cameroon", The World Today, Vol. 16, July 1960, pp 305-312.
11. Le Vine, V.T. "Calm before the Storm in Cameroon", Africa Report, May 1961, pp 3-4.
12. Roberts, Margaret, "Prospects for the Cameroons", The World Today, Vol. 16, July 1960, pp 305-312; The Economist, "Cameroons under strain", Vol. 196, July 9, 1960, pp 175-176; West Africa, "How Real was Ahidjo's Victory", April 23, 1960, pp 459; "Crisis of Confidence in the Cameroun", April 12, 1961.
13. West Africa, "Cameroon Complexities", April 23, 1966, p 447; Le Vine, V.T. "The Politics of Partition in Africa: The Cameroons and The Myth of Unification", Journal of International Affairs, XVIII, No. 1964, pp 198-210; Hitchen, Helen, "Cameroon Faces Troubled Future", Africa Special Report, III No. 1, January 1960, pp 14-15.
14. Results of the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly Elections, February 1959, Press, Release, Southern Cameroons Information Service, Buea, 1959.
15. Of course, though the KNDP and OK had vigorously campaigned for reunification (and the plebiscite result was in their favour) it was necessary that West Cameroon electorate endorsed the over-all gubernatorial policies of the KNDP administration.
16. The London Summit between the KNDP administration and the British Government was about possibly granting to the Southern Cameroon immediately after the plebiscite the extension of British administration until a suitable arrangement for union with Cameroon Republic could be worked out. The KNDP was finding a means of getting a constitution for the Southern Cameroons.
In effect the KNDP was seeking approval from Britain for an interpretation of the plebiscite that would permit a delay in the implementation of reunification.
The CPNC equally favoured the idea of waiting with the implementation of the plebiscite result, asking for separate independence for Southern

Cameroons, This third view or alternative became somewhat popular but UN Resolution 1352 (XIV) did not cover it.

British reaction to the KNDP and CPNC proposals at the London Summit was a rejection of the idea, "the people of the Southern Cameroons should be told plainly that if they voted to join the Cameroun Republic this would definitely happen in a short time..., and also, "The United Nations, in adopting the two alternatives....clearly ruled out a period of continuing Trusteeship or separate independence for Southern Cameroons."

(See Report of British/Southern Cameroons Summit, London, 1960; Cameroon Champion, November 21, 1960.

Thus the KNDP was forced into a position of accepting "Unification immediate".

The KNDP approach in seeking separate independence before unification - call it the "delay tactics for unification"- was obvious for a number of significant reasons which have been discussed: Analytically, the

a. transitional period from Trusteeship to Unification (February - October) was too short in working out a constitutional blue-print for the country, in view of

(i) language and communication barriers between East and West.

(ii) time in getting the peoples' approval of the constitution. Cameroon constitution came into operation without being approved by the people.

b. a breathing-space was needed for West Cameroon political actors in hammering out their differences before facing their counter-parts:

c. the domestic situation prevailing in East Cameroon at that time was in question.

17. Article 54, states "Until the 1st April, 1964 the Federal Assembly shall be composed of members elected from among themselves by the Legislative Assemblies of the Federated states according to the population of each State in the proportion of one member to every eighty thousand of the population.

18. Etzioni, Political Unification, op cit. p 74-76.

19. Cameroon Times, May 28, 1962.

20. La Press du Cameroon, June 1962.

21. Cameroon Champion, December 1962, and January 11, 1963.

22. Debates, West Cameroon House of Assembly, February 1963. The motion was introduced by Tamfu, CPNC member for Nkambe. I was present in the Assembly during the debates and throughout the February session of the House.

23. *ibid*.

24. For thorough discussion of the events see, Rubin, Cameroon: An African Federation, op cit. Johnson, The Cameroon Federation, op cit. Press Release from the KNDP Kumba convention; Forje, John, Unification and After, op cit. Cameroon Times, 1961-1962, Victoria.

25. Article 39(1) states "The Prime Minister of each Federated State shall be nominated by the President of the Federal Republic and invested by a simple majority of the Legislative Assembly of that State." Article 39(3) gives the President the power to dismiss the Prime Minister and his Ministers.
26. Speech by Rt. Hon. Augustine N. Jua, West Cameroon House of Assembly, May 11, 1965, Buea.
27. Ibid. Jua, in a speech adjourning the House of Assembly July 7, 1965. The leader of the CPNC became Leader of the House. Another leading CPNC member, N.N. Mbile was also given a ministerial appointment.
28. Cameroon Times, September 1, 1966. One can state that the President had succeeded by a combination of persuasion and coercion in absorbing the three leading political leaders of West Cameroon, John Ngu Foncha (KNDP), E.M.L. Endeley (CPNC) and S.T. Muna (Cameroon United Congress - a break-away faction of the KNDP - following the Kumba KNDP Convention and the appointment of Jua as Prime Minister of West Cameroon) forming the Cameroon National Congress C.N.U.
By 1965 the East Cameroon was more or less functioning under a one party system. Elections to the East Cameroon Legislative Assembly in 1965 were a landslide victory for the UC which captured all the 100 contested seats. As a result of these developments, the opposition parties had no option but to accept political centralization as the new pattern of societal development. Their acceptance was a valuation of wide agreements alongside the four attributes presented in the theoretical section.
29. North, Robert et al "The Integrative Functions of Conflict Resolution, IV September 1960, pp 355-374.

Formation of a single national party in the Cameroon reciprocates my hypothetical argument of the interplay between the four attributes as a factor of importance maximizing national integration and enduring stability. The reciprocity of the argument has also to be scanned with the observation that the propensity toward national integration and political stability depends equally on able and intelligent political leadership and the fledgling willingness of the people to cooperate with the government's appropriate and vigorous use of resources and other instruments of public and economic policy.

From this brief juxtaposition, the people of Cameroon moved by historical, ethnic factors and economic gains took broader than a selfish view on policy actions on the issue of national integration and political development. This was the potential key that consolidated the ruling and opposition parties into fanning the ideals of political and administrative centralization.

The coexistence of visible and pragmatic political cohesion alongside considerable ethnic fragmentation in the Cameroon creates new authority patterns that become the main source for assertive claims for solidarity on different levels of society. In return the quest for the consent to cooperation accounts for some of the behaviour of Cameroonians; i.e. political integration as a change and effects of individual political attitude navigating national cohesion and political stability. The essence of the dialectic and the interplay of the factors influencing the move towards political cohesiveness and identification appear in fig. 6.

FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO NATIONAL INTEGRATION AND STABILITY




Fig. 6

The structure of traditional societies cutting across each other helped to produce a sense of nationhood; this quest for oneness in diversity, (orientations toward community), social, political and cultural interactions among people on both sides of the administrative lines, articulated towards the national cohesion of the society. The CNU is the symbol of national integration and the channel that harnesses all implements towards national loyalty and the destruction of ethnic or particularistic affiliation. The vitality of political stability and socio-economic development derives its strength from the degree of national cohesion and consensus linking all interest groups within the society.

Cohesive attitudes and the common sense of willingness facilitate the process for legitimate democratization and stability. When the partnership between the political leaders and political participant is unequal, or the value of one partner is denied, the results are disastrous. We have to turn to the factors that contributed to radical nationalism in the country before the independence of East Cameroon to find the answers for the above exposition.¹⁾ There are, also the cases of Nigeria (1966-70), Ghana since 1966, Zaire (former Congo, 1960-65) which lacking the political and philosophical orientation of national cohesion and because of the differences of inequality of values between the participating parties faced a situation close to national disintegration, suicidal demagoguery and insupportable anticipatory populism propelled by men in khaki from Sandhurst and St Cyr. Of course, there are cases where the shadows of Sandhursts and St Cyr have attempted to give the nation a sense of direction towards national unity. The short span of Mutala and Jerry Rawling's administration in Nigeria and Ghana respectively are typical examples.

That the Cameroon resorts to a combination of traditional authoritarianism and democratic authoritarianism to solve the pressing problems of socio-economic disparity and ethnic fragmentation or loyalty is no surprise. But the success of this lies in the nature of politico-military contract prevailing within the society.²⁾ In this respect, the CNU becomes the custodian and the forum for balancing the claims and aspirations of the various interest groups.

We find that the rise of charismatic leader and subsequent nature of any kind of authoritarian rule has much in common with the traditional African system. In other words, traditionalism has exerted different manifestations and forms of influence upon the emergence of a democratic system of government as practiced today under the covers of the one-party system. To this end Coleman and Rosberg contend, and I quote at length:

The relevance of traditional authority structures in the development of one-party systems, whether they are supportive or obstructive, is a function of two systems:
(i) their inherent strength, resilience, and adaptability,
(ii) the character of the colonial legacy, i.e. whether they were protected and supported, or neglected and ignored, during the colonial period.

In most British areas they were protected, and where possible

were made units of local government, in accordance with the principles of indirect rule. Although in some French territories they were shown some deference (e.g. the chiefs of Northern Togo and Cameroon, and the Marabouts in Senegal), French policy in general accelerated the demise of the traditional order. This difference in the colonial legacy helps to explain why national integration and consolidation of one-party rule have been comparatively easier in former French territories than in those previously under British administration.³⁾

The political life in a developing society like the Cameroon departs in several precepts not familiar to western democracies; their aspirations and values are different from those of western democracies; attributes such as authoritarian behavioural attitudes become very pronounced with the inception of the one-party system. To many westerners the CNU is authoritarian. But centralization and the divine authoritative right of the "head of the family or village chief" have always been part of the political structure of the African people.

Colonial liquidation created the appropriate breeding ground for a coherent expansion of ethnic social structures which culminated in the emergence of the one-party system. In a way, Cameroon inherited the plenitude of autocratic power possessed by the departing colonial governments, with few institutionalized restraints upon its exercise. Not only are Cameroonians struggling to construct a viable and genuine consensus (across ethnic frontiers) where none existed before, but they are involved in establishing new centres of power allegiance which is not totally devoid from the hierarchical and functional distinctions of traditional societies. That is to say innovating a consensual framework capable of linking the centre and periphery, preserving traditional values and forging modern concepts of democratic institutions. The views of Coleman and Rosberg are worth mentioning in this connection.

Two significant aspects of the immediate postcolonial situation, are (i) the heavy functional load thrown upon the new polity the state builders are seeking to stabilize and legitimate; and (ii) the fact that initially at least, the party is, or is rationalized as being, the most visible, immediately available, national organization for the performance of many, if not most, of the functions involved.⁴⁾

The socialization of nationalism has its dangers and the problem again is whether to restrict the growing power of the main political actors when that power flows directly from the involvement of both popular active or passive acquiescence of the participants involved in the game of politics. Because nationalism and the quest for political integration is the base epithet in developing societies we see that passive acquiescence of the major political participants often leads to a manic will of the elected representatives. There are cases like the Cameroon where political integration creates democratic authoritarianism and where such leadership utilizes the basis of

political integration to forge common social values through what may be conceived as a party of social integration in the face of a rapidly changing international system of relationships. The CNU as a unitary party can rightly be described as a system of social and political integration in the process of dying colonialism and the growing quest for modernity.

Examining the intricacies of the uniparty system we find that we are not only faced with the problems of value judgement and desirability but also with the laments and apprehensions stimulated by the flight from traditional to modern, and above all, the desire for national cohesion and political stability. In other words, the CNU has to be conceived, analyzed and adjudicated within the broad framework of political development and modernization, as a profound commitmental assimilation of equalitarian views, and thirdly as the most hopeful commitment or determination to remodel disintegrative community into a solid integrated political community. In short, as a process of system change.

For it involves the integration of different ethnic settings, administrative elites, politicians and the masses, and the managing of different ideological orientations under one common leadership. It is no easy task to relate or co-ordinate diverse value aspirations under an identical norm acceptable by all. The vision and "sense of community" must exist to propel and integrate diverse value aspirations. The CNU as the integrative political forum takes upon itself the missionary task of facing up to the challenges or myths and development crisis presented by Lucian Pye and Binder,⁵⁾ as the commandments or tabernacles of development. That is to say the CNU becomes the gateway for fulfilling development myths and the requisites of interest articulation, aggregation, socialization etc, in varying degrees.

It is not surprising that the realization of political integration and political stability in the Cameroon today is traceable through the CNU as the mechanism of promoting national cohesion and the forum where power permutation in society should rest or be delegated to promote energetic social leveling in a fragmented milieu.

Looking at the single party system from this perspective should not place us totally in a bias judgement or conclusion that the CNU as an integrative mechanism has not got its impediments or faults. Yet these predicaments must be objectively assessed within the political environment of the prevailing Cameroon setting and not through the value belief and other anomalies distant from the politico-cultural milieu of the community under scrutiny. Like any other political system the CNU and the system of government in the Cameroon has its weaknesses and strengths, its advantages and disadvantages, since it is a system like any other system created by man.

The increasing gap between rising expectation and growing frustration acts as a time bomb on the CNU, for not only must the major political actors devise policies of achieving thorough-going social reforms of balancing affluence and absolute poverty within a very short time, they must also be able to balance stability with the forces of instability visible and invisible

as these are the eventual results arising from meeting rapid social and equitable restructuralization. Here is the death trap waiting for the CNU. In the first place, there is no organized opposition party to blame for failing to meet the aspirations of the people, and vice-versa, there is no opposition party that blocks government policies and other developmental issues. The CNU encompasses both government and opposition and the constellation of these two essential elements in the development process equally determines the nature of output in the integration and modernization process.

There are cases where people have been mobilized to put down radical nationalism, or where radical nationalism has failed to live up to the people's expectation and aspiration. There are cases of receptiveness, where the single party has gone a long way in showing the willingness to cooperate with traditional institutions (in the short run) in order to establish an integrated society. The leaders in such situations have been sufficiently modern to mix enticement with coercion in a skilfully conceived pattern of governor-governed relationship. Traditional leaders have in many cases been the gangrene of the single party and as inadequate instruments to a more rapid integrative process. We find instances where ethnic differences have been difficult to up-root in the political life of the nation. Or where ethnic affiliations have been trouble spots in the functioning political capacity of the country, particularly when such tribal differences co-exist side by side with ideological orientation.

Ethnic difference and ideological cohesion between the Bamilekes and the Bassas/Yaoundes of the south became a breeding ground for radical nationalism in the country. The colonial administration made it difficult for the people with political aspirations different from theirs to meet the objectives of their ideological orientation. The price paid in bloodshed in silencing the philosophical ideals of the people in spite of their ethnic differences was great. Thus the CNU as a single party system could be seen on the one hand as an instrument for minimizing traditional distinctions and on the other as a mechanism for promoting functional interests basic to human requirements. It can also be conceived as the basic platform on which a striking attack on the social distinctions identifying both traditional and modern elements within a new society can be adequately coerced so that tribal collectiveness is transferred to national integration.

With such transforming elements, if properly applied, the CNU then becomes the compelling force of balancing rural poverty and urban affluence, between which the governing elites and the masses are given new dynamism in meeting the socio-economic wrongs of the society as well as providing the most persuasive evidence of the country's determination to forge a homogeneous community. The homogeneity of a community implies that the political integration of a state becomes an important extension of the functional political capacity of the nation. Hence, Myron Weiner's description of the functional political capacity as that "which holds a society and a political system together"

the indication of which must be "at a level commensurate with what their political leadership needs to carry out their goals"⁶⁾ to which Claude Ake adds "in essence, the problem of integration is one of developing a political culture and of inducing commitment to it".⁷⁾

These statements can be analyzed from the perspectives of the single party as the connecting link in the integration of diverse ethnic communities, or cultural pluralistic groups into a national entity, or as a means of maintaining effective political capacity. Maintaining effective political capacity, increasing pressures on the political structure, requires a forum where people can solicit openly and constructively a coherent solution to pressing problems. In the attempt to evade instability and to promote development, measures are necessary to hold the society united, which could be seen as a process of political responsiveness in national development. Göran Hydén's study of the Buhayas in Tanzania shows the credit given to a political "system in which only one authority was allowed to wield power". He found out that eighty percent of his respondents agreed to the statement: "A good government cannot exist without a one-party system".⁸⁾ The massive turnout for the 1972 unitary referendum and national elections in the Cameroon can well be interpreted in the same line of thinking expressed by the people in the Buhaya region of Tanzania.

For western democracies, such assessment seems distant and undemocratic; but yet, we cannot run from the golden trusim that authoritarian rule exists in every human society. In some societies, this is disguised, while others openly advocate or give their consent to it by articulating their interests in responsive manners that help to sustain a functioning political capacity of the system. The Cameroon is a good illustration in this case and the CNU has proved itself to be the most appropriate political mechanism for integrating the diversities of the country, and to orientate the people toward a community. It is clothed with the dynamics supplementing and promoting the authority and scope of government as well as it propels orientation toward time and innovation. How successful or not it has been in bringing about the realization of these value dimensions is a matter of individual assessment.

The guiding principle of the organizational and managerial structure of the party is grounded on "democratic centralism",⁹⁾ which calls for democratic participation through free discussion and where deliberations and decision-making are sanctioned through a monolithic hierarchic process. The galvanization of this axiom is to load the available and psychological advantages of mass participation with the need for forging ideological unity and bureaucratic expediency through central control. Hence, the framework of the party takes a pyramidic structure grounded on four basic levels,¹⁰⁾ namely: the cell, the basic committees, the sub-section and section as the approach necessary to provide the internal cohesion and efficiency required for the achievement of not only power but also the stimulants necessary to promote the cybernetics of national integration.

PARTY STRUCTURE AT THE GRASS-ROOT LEVEL.
 OPERATION AND ADMINISTRATION.





Table 4

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE PARTY AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL:



National Party operation and management takes the same flow procedure pertaining to the functions and structures of the party at the grass root level. As can be seen from the brief informative notes, decision-making and rule enforcement come from the National Political Bureau a small oligarchical body vested with enormous powers. The President of the Bureau happens to be the Head of State. We can classify this as guarded democracy in which liberal democracy is not discredited but becomes the instrument of coercion. In another perspective, the National Political Bureau harbours the attributes of being the sole policy making and administrative agency for both the party and the

governmental system of the country, particularly when the two institutions converge under one and the same leadership since the doctrinal orientation of the party is geared towards linking the party and state so as to transcend regional particularism and the manifestation of consensus and the unity of the community.

But in the final analysis, the task of the CNU as an integrative forum must be that of eliminating the paralyses of ethnic and cultural differentiation within the society by (a) creating a body politic in which regional and ethnic identities could operate in an atmosphere of mutual and peaceful co-existence; (b) articulating the philosophical framework for mobilization and activating participation as well as narrowing the elite-mass gap in the process of nation-building; (c) as the torch-bearer for national unity, development and social equity, it must create appropriate structures for vertical and horizontal linkages among the various social strata of the society, especially in East Cameroon where the legacy of French policy of assimilation, or attachment to values, beliefs and norms inherited from imperial France, has yet to be eradicated from the social fabric of the society. It must set the pace for the political will for change; and (d) lastly, it should act as a control mechanism on the output functions of the government, just as it must subject itself to thorough scrutiny, i.e. the party must provide the requisite platform for open debates and constructive criticisms.

Both the input and output structures and functions of the party apparatus must be given deep searching stock-taking in order to avoid the emergence of tyrants or issues that promote malintegrative tendencies in the society. Thus, the essence of the single-party system must be geared towards the policies of accommodation, consensus, reconciliation by harnessing views on the left and right of the political spectrum for the purpose of constructing an integrated polity capable of providing basic human requirements for all.

As it stands, one problem area at the core of the difficulties of the party is structural adaptation and distributive justice, the lack of which creates problems for economic growth and balanced development. To right the wrongs of the colonial system, it is therefore the duty of the party to build up structures of internalized constraints by articulating new perspectives of political and duty consciousness in the emerging polity. There must be substantive content and sense of purpose in terms of values, attitudes and ideological basis for self-determination and the authenticity of the Cameroon nation. Yet, it is not enough for the brains of the party to formulate the philosophical orientation for political recruitment, national integration and nation-building. Equally important to the task of nation-building is the fundamental principle of accountability - the degree to which the party machinery as well as the government permits constructive criticisms of its input and output functions. In a way, national awareness from above has not yet coincided with national awareness from below. The dilemma in such a relationship is that it gives the impression of the country merely borrowing political mechanics, and of creating an ar-

bitrary political system in a frantic effort to rid herself of a colonial legacy, without socialising the people along genuinely new and independent paths for national unity and self-reliant development.

But faced with the immense problems which involve the attainment of certain goals, national unity, ethnic intercourse, industrial modernization, free and comprehensive public education and health services, revitalization of the cultural heritage of the people, the system must employ the best techniques of democratic authoritarianism and centralism and the scientific potential of consensual mechanics in building a new strong and stable political culture or community.

Hence, the needs of economic growth and the ideological requirements involved in completing the revolution of 1972 call for consensus, reconciliation and active participation across the political cultures inherited under the era of colonial government. The suggestion is that the CNU as the integrative focus in the process of national integration must create the basis on which the nation can attain efficiency, effectiveness and continuous political stability. The content of the political style of the party in politics must involve the art of balancing policies which the government pursues against the expected and unexpected reactions of public opinion and interest groups. Even though there exist a grand alliance between the party and the government, the CNU must not depart from the political obligations of balancing government and public interests. It is only by playing such a role that the great leap initiated in 1972 can subvert the existence of cultural and political fragmentation.

Notes:

1. See the following publications which deal at length with the problems of national independence. A book which explains the problem in clear perspectives is the one by Richard Joseph, *Radical Nationalism in Cameroon: Social Origins of the U.P.C. Rebellion*, Oxford University Press, 1977. A quote from the introduction will suffice:

What renders the emergence of the UPC an interesting subject for a case-study along these lines is its apparent uniqueness. From the standpoint of the dominant pattern of nationalist politics in French sub-Saharan Africa, The U.P.C. did all the 'wrong' things. It demanded the independence of Cameroon from the one and indivisible Greater France. It demanded the reunification of Cameroon with the neighbouring colony of the British Cameroons, that is with a part of the empire of the chief colonial rivals of the French. It continued to view colonialism as based on capitalist exploitation and did not hesitate to say so.....p. 1-2.

See also Welch, Calude E. Jr. *Dream of Unity*, 1966. See sections IV. The Kamerun Idea and section V. Toward Federal Union in the Cameroon. Another interesting section comes from Basil Davidson's book, *Let Freedom Come: Africa in Modern History*, Little Brown 1978. pp 256-258 which treats the political situation of East Cameroon up to 1960. He equally

outlines the difficult birth of the UPC and the problems posed to the party by the French administration.

Cameroon also became independent in 1960 but against the background of dramatic and original political experience. Thus arose within the duality of a nationalistic campaign at grips both with Paris and local settlers, and took its rise from a miniature repetition of Algeria in 1954 and Madagascar in 1947. Out of that brusque contest there emerged the first of tropical Africa's revolutionary nationalist parties, and, opposing it, the stiffest of the early post colonial dictatorship.

Beti, Mongo. *Remember Ruben*, Heineman, 1980; *Perpetua and Habit of Unhappiness*, Heineman, London. *Main base sur le Cameroun: Autopsie d'une décolonisation*, Paris 1972.

2. Forje, John. *Unification and After: A Political Study of the Federal Republic of Cameroon*, Lund 1972; *The Man in Khaki*, Department of Politics, Lund, 1972. *Africa Report*, "Out of Africa: Cameroun", XVIII, No. 9, November 1972, pp 4-6; *International Institute for Strategic Studies*, *Military Balance*, 1972-73 London, September 1972.
3. Coleman, J. and Rosberg, C (eds) *Political Parties and National integration in Tropical Africa*, 1964. pp 655-680. See the contribution of Le Vine, Victor, op cit which deals with the Cameroon.
4. *ibid.* See also Welch, Claude Jr. *Political Mobilization*, Belmont, 1967, p. 267.
5. Pye, L. *Aspects of Political Development*, Boston 1966; Binder, L. *Crisis and Sequences in Political Development*, Princeton, 1971.
6. Wiener, Myron. op cit. See also his other book, *Modernization: The Dynamics of Growth*, Basic Books, 1966. Kebschull, Harvey (ed) *Politics in Transitional Societies*, 1968. Meredith Corporation, USA.
7. Ake, Claude. *A Theory of Political Integration*, 1967.
8. Hydén, Göran. *Political Development in Rural Tanzania*, Lund 1968, p. 165.
9. Ahidjo, Ahmadou. *General Policy Report to the 1st CNU Ordinary Congress, 1969; 2nd Ordinary Congress 1975*. Ahmadou Ahidjo from A-Z, *CNU 10th Anniversary*, Yaounde 1976. *Contribution to National Development*, op cit.
10. *CNU Militant Guide*, 1976. Yaounde - Cameroon.

The complementary nature of Party and State actions correlates to "mutual responsiveness, 'we-feeling', 'peace and security'" as the prime political ends for which integration is advocated. Without mutual responsiveness, there can be no peace and security; without peace, common political institutions and the capacity of the state to regulate the functional interactions of these institutions is not only curtailed, but breeds secessionist tendencies. It goes without saying that the very considerable potentialities of a pluralistic party system constitute an unfavourable background for political integration and national cohesion in a fragmented society like the Cameroon.

Divergent views must be politically accommodated so as to satisfy the needs of the system. That is why for the party to be truly the mainspring of government action, militants of the CNU must always remember that they have a primary role to play in the hoped-for reconciliation between administration and population, as well as in the continual development of the national conscience, by dynamic cultural and civic action conducted within the framework of party organizations and in the development of other public organizations.

Rephrased differently, in the bosom of action, the members of the CNU must set the examples by working consciously and devotedly. They must be the first to consider themselves in a state of permanent mobilization. Mobilized for the construction of the nation and also mobilized to defend the institutions whenever necessary. Because a nation when founded on adherence to a collective ideal can only be maintained by discipline.

Without individual security, without institutional stability, without public order, national development can never attain its objectives.¹⁾

If there is no consensus among the fragmented ethnic groups, regions and other interest bodies making up the Cameroon society, there can virtually be little potentiality for the peaceful resolution of varying political differences and other conflicting values in the society. Political integration therefore cannot flourish meaningfully under a situation of intense polarized cleavages. Thus, the CNU harnesses the instruments for balancing consensus and cleavages as well as it manifests the civic culture necessary for national integration and political stability.

Because of the authoritative structure, the party leadership has firm grips on the various substrata of the party structure either by recommending or appointing officers loyal to the ideals of the party management to key positions, or by "promoting or buying away" critics of the system; and finally, through the manipulation of the time factor.²⁾ The time factor process could be reviewed in the events leading up to the formation of the CNU. A kind of depoliticizing process within the KNDP, CPNC, CUC and UC related to the dissolution of these parties was carried out; the results subjected party members to internal depoliticization. With the formation of the CNU, a new strategy was conceived to

repoliticize party members towards the new goals of the nature of power and centre of decision-making process necessary to effectuate national integration and political stability.

Some form of referent power was necessary to instigate identification. The CNU houses or offers such referent power necessary in the integrative process. Referent power creates a solidarity situation which, Apter states, "is to serve directly as a coercive instrument - to apply social pressures such as ostracism, and the preferential allocation of resources"³) to bring about structural legitimacy, to co-opt members towards the common identification of the Nation as the focus of a political community. To attain this goal the CNU invoked a combination of various function attributes - mobilization and reconciliation - as the pragmatic incentives of development and authority maximization in the process of national integration. The country is therefore undergoing a process of mobility and reconciliation. See Table 6. The process equally requires effective leadership. The major key to the success of the CNU has been the ability of the party leadership to reconcile different interests through compromise and arbitration and to form strong personal relations with men whose objectives clash with that of the party. In this connection, i.e. in attempting to define the political orientation of the CNU, President Ahidjo has proved himself to be an effective administrator. This has drawn praise from his supporters and opponents who are quick to point out that his attitudes are essentially pragmatic and encouraging in shifting attitudes and promoting national integration.

PRAGMATIC ATTRIBUTES OF DEVELOPMENT AND AUTHORITY MAXIMIZATION;

CAMEROON	Mobilization system	Establishing a new polity; Conversion from multi-to-one party system: From federal to unitary government. A sense of community and political stability; Common action for the common good. Cooperation between low and high politics. etc. ----
	Reconciliation system	Planned liberalism; localized initiative and individual entrepreneurship under state and party guidance: Collaborative actions between various interest groups: Balancing regional inequalities with national integration; Cultural differentiation and national cohesion planned and guided.

Table 6

The CNU has both access to information, power as well as it is the instrument of the interpretative mechanism in the integrative process and

that different polities employ different mixtures of coercion and information in trying to maintaining authority, achieve stability.....⁴⁾

The pragmatism of the CNU leadership in the process of political development and national integration has taken place within the context of sufficient acceptance of the values of the nation-state by the largest possible population of the society. The result has been policy cohesion, an ultimate stimulant to economic growth, and the politics of unity is of course exactly fitting to contemporary Cameroon polity. There is no doubt that through this structural setup, the articulation of the political mechanism has paid great dividends to the Cameroon people.

The constitution bestows on the President certain authoritative powers of appointing and dismissing political leaders. During 1961-66 these powers were secretly utilized in manipulating the political actors so as to create stability and forge a united party. The successful application of authoritative power entails political centralism and paternalism. The prevailing political environment from 1961-66 was pluralistic and decentralized and therefore it required an articulated sense of direction particularly from the person who had access to the source of authoritative power. The formation of the CNU in 1966 created a different political climate which facilitated the process of harnessing and enhancing the appropriate use of authoritative powers in the innovation of certain governmental and political changes that were dramatically implemented during the period 1966-72. Some of these changes could not have been possible under the decentralized or pluralistic party system that operated in the country before the creation of the CNU.

Some of the changes that could be seen as both authoritative and innovative and requiring tactful political manipulation of the various actors and institutions within the system, include:

- i. *The removal of Augustine N. Jua and the appointment of S.T. Muna as Prime Minister of West Cameroon in 1968. The appointment of Muna reversed the situation of 1966 when the President settled for Jua. This implied that the President did not want to impede his objectives of political centralisation therefore he had to abide by the verdict of Kumba KNDP convention.*
- ii. *The immediate take-over of the police force as a federal subject under Muna's Premiership. Jua was an ardent supporter of the police remaining a regional subject since it guaranteed the safety and security of West Cameroonians. East Cameroon police were brutal and had little respect for laws and way of life that existed in West Cameroon. The brutality of East Cameroon soldiers is vividly stated by Ardener:*

The Years 1961-63 were marked by the activities of the

federal gendameri whose emcampments were established in or near the major centres. The occasional serverities of the new forces of security can be attributed to their education and to their experiences in terrorist areas of the East.... The search of lorries, the questioning of travellers, and the use of public violence, were novelty to the West Cameroon population. Complaints finally appeared in the press alleging that even police and officials and their families were not immune from assaults....⁵⁾

- iii. The dismissal of John Ngu Foncha as Vice-President and the amalgamation of the post of Vice-President and Prime Minister of West Cameroon. The post had been separated after the 1965 elections which took Foncha to Yaounde as Vice-President. Muna became both Vice-President and Prime Minister of West Cameroon.⁶⁾

In order to balance the imbalances and create a solid base for mobilization and participation in national politics, the use of such authoritative power became obvious. The President now had authoritative control over the political apparatus as well as the governmental machinery. The issue of Decrees became the most frequent instrument for appointing and dismissing Ministers as well as for administrative changes. Thus, the formation of the single party gave the President the optional room of drawing together a team of political actors with identical perceptions and placing them in key governmental positions for the second phase of his objective, political and bureaucratic amalgamation.

The political attitude and behaviour of the people had undergone socialization and the politicization process had the positive consequences of innovations or political practices capable of resolving problems of economic and political development. Secondly, there emerged new interest-areas within the newly constituted group which created roles intermediate between the society and government, and their effect on such things as political participation, the narrowing of the boundary-difference and the distribution of power. The dismissal and appointment of political leaders which became rampant during the period could be interpreted as a new process for political recruitment and participation and coercing of political leaders to bury the hatchet and seek consensus rather than confrontation, to accept the status quo and its overall consequences from the evolution of the political system.

We can categorically state that the concentration and political authoritarianism encompass components of influence such as (a) the base activity of leaders; (b) the reference-support groups of those in political authority; (c) the social cleavages that underlie local interest groups; and (d) the lines of social struggle that reach the point of outright conflict.

The interrelationship of these components exhibits a curious mixture of an unlimited quest for power concentration - the indispensable desire that they must also further social transformation. With a pluralistic party system these areas were dif-

fused and eventually fanned disintegrative attitudes and behaviour, whereas a uniparty system under the umbrella of the CNU had just the opposite effect. The CNU fulfills a number of missions necessary for the appropriate use of authoritative power. The party as such supplies the base activity from which political changes directly contribute towards pushing major administrative changes. Secondly, it offers a forum from which social cleavages and fragmentation within the society can be resolved. Thirdly it limits any kind of political struggle that can directly and effectively disrupt the socio-political fabric of the society and lastly, it constitutes the main political authority of the society.

Thus, not only are the leaders committed to integration and the national cohesion of their fragmentary or culturally pluralistic societies through authoritarian rule, but they are equally required to be "innovating leaders"⁷⁾ by supplying initiatives for realizing system change and meeting rising expectations. Hence, the issue of Decrees and the constant cabinet changes or other top administrative appointments/dismissals should be seen within these innovation perspectives.

Political integration with national cohesion as the goal requires system change on a massive scale. It requires leaders that are "innovating". Such leaders must, as Claude Ake points out,

destroy or modify certain habits of mind and undermine certain traditional symbols of collective identity; they must induce the people to accept new norms, new goals, new motivations; they must readjust patterns of social and economic relations. Political leaders have to give their followers confidence and a sense of purpose and help them to find coherence and meaning in their new life.⁸⁾

The unique Cameroon situation called for such leadership not only enthroned with oligarchic concentration of power and initiative but also with a supreme and uncontested ability and willingness to lead.

In the new states the breakdown of tradition and colonial legal systems of authority produces conditions of uncertainty conducive to the emergence of charismatic leadership. Through strategies of cultural management, the charismatic leader legitimizes his claims by associating with himself the sacred symbols of the culture. Disintegration of nationalist unity after independence often makes incompatible the simultaneous pursuit of the two goals of political development: the consolidation of the state and the growth of central government capacity to modernize. Charismatic appeal is initially concentrated on and contributes to the achievement of national cohesion.⁹⁾

President Ahidjo has proved able through his charismatic leadership to wear down political and tribal rivalries. Declaring unity to be the highest priority, he persuaded leaders of rival parties to join him in forming the CNU in 1966, thus creating a

single-party state. It was the first step to the replacement of a post colonial federal system with a unitary government which materialized in 1972 and the National Assembly enlarged from 50 to 120 members.

Under the prevailing circumstances and issues involved, the empirical indicators of paternalism of a leader seeing himself as "father" of the nation, it can be testified that through the leadership of the CNU a situation has been created where conflicts tend to be solved according to Cameroon village traditions. In that sense, he acts more or less as a chief while the National Assembly plays the role of a village council of elders. His role and powers are indiscriminately spelled out within the constitution and the statute book of the party. The goal however, is the ultimate disappearance of tribal allegiances in the interest of national unity.

Many instances can be quoted to illustrate that role as "father" of the nation. One or two examples will suffice: The infighting amongst KNDP leaders about the successor for the post of Prime Minister in West Cameroon in 1965, the tense relationship between the KNDP and the CPNC before and after the 1961 plebiscite and the procrastination concerning the formation of a single national party. As Johnson puts it;

Ahidjo demonstrated his independence from regional and personal pressures by keeping the men in their high-playing posts. Both sides were thus indebted to Ahidjo; both called some of his actions wise and fair.¹⁰⁾

On the formation of the CNU, the leader of the CPNC, following the dissolution of UC led by Ahidjo, stated, in a manner that elucidates the issue in question:

His Excellency the President of the Federal Republic with his usual generosity, candor and love of fair play, has come one stop towards us warring West Cameroonians and volunteered to dissolve his large and well established Party, the UC, so that we may meet him half-way and together build up the CNU on a stable basis of equality with no advantage or privilege to anyone, big or small.¹¹⁾

On the basis of this presentation, it could further be accentuated that the President as a political leader is motivated or oriented more towards system innovation than to system maintenance in the sense that dying colonialism and the onslaught on traditional values created a situation of total lack of clear-cut and generally acceptable norms for the legitimacy of authority like the chaotic predicament of the two federated states under the First Republic.

The absence of the legitimacy of authority and the way it is exercised because of the constraints of domestic political pressures - fulfilling rising expectations for example - created the need for clearly defined political leadership that could serve as a viaduct between a disillusioned past and uncertain future. Such a climate of doubt and fastidiousness becomes a seedbed for the emergence of charismatic leadership.

Well aware of the conditions propitious for the birth of

charismatic leadership, the validation of such charisma requires interaction between the ruling elites and the masses. And this is what the Cameroon polity has presented since the historical events of 1 October 1961. Political integration and stability could not be realized without the paternal attributes of a political leader playing the role of "father" of the nation.

Notes:

1. Speech by President Ahidjo at the Gaoura CNU Congress, 10-15 March, 1969. See also his "General Policy Statement" to the Douala Congress 10-15 February 1975; The Third Ordinary Congress of the CNU 12-17 February 1980, Bafoussam. Yai, Martin. "Cameroons celebrate 20 Years of Independence, 8 Years of Unitary State", Cameroon Tribune, May 21, 1980.
2. Easton, David. *A System Alternatives of Political Life*, John Wiley, 1965.
3. Apter, D. *The Politics of Modernization*, London. 1965. p. 363.
4. *ibid.* p. 40.
5. Ardener, "The Nature of the Reunification of Cameroon", in Hazlewood, A. *Op cit.* p. 332-332. See also Lewis, William H. *French Speaking Africa*, 1965. p. 214-215. Forje, John W. *Unification and After. A Political Study of the Federal Republic of Cameroon*, Lund 1972.
6. See Johnson, *The Cameroon Federation*, 1971; Le Vine, *The Federal Republic of Cameroon*, *op cit.* See *Cameroon United Congress Newsletter*, Vol. 1 1966. Egbe, Tabi E. "Too many parties: Why Then the CUC?" *CUC Newsletter* March 2, 1966. See *Cameroon Times*, 1966. *Cameroon News Bulletin*, Federal Republic of Cameroon, Embassy, Washington, D.C. 1966, p. 12.
7. See Friedrich, Carl J. "Political Leadership and the Problems of Charismatic Power", *Journal of Politics*, XXIII, February 1961, p. 3-24.
8. Ake, Claude, *A Theory of Political Integration*, *op cit.*
9. Willner, Ann Ruth & Dorothy Willner, "The Rise and Role of Charismatic Leadership", *The Annals*, Vol. 358, March 1965, pp 77-88. See also Ratman, K.J. "Charisma and Political Leadership", *Political Studies*, Vol. XII, No. 3, October 1964, pp 341-354.
10. Johnson, *op cit.* p. 274: See also Rubin, *Cameroon: An African Federation op cit.*
11. Cameroon Times, 1 September, 1966. *Victoria - Cameroon*.

Administrative centralism was necessary in order to keep pace with the process of change that was underway in the country. The political process and the identification of public interest was no longer to be the prerogative of a particular group, since such group or ethnic attachments hindered the drive toward national identification and unity.

In this respect, the federal government hastened the pace of the takeover of most activities as stipulated under Articles 6 and 7. The capacity of the state government to legislate and administer was gradually minimized. By the end of 1970, it was virtually a redundant system within the framework of the centralized federal government.¹⁾ The existence of the state government depended upon what the central government saw fit in its activities as contributing towards national integration. The central government stood in a better position of regulating the activities of the state government partly as a result of the institution of the uni-party system which cemented general, not individual, interest in development, partly because the economic viability of the state government depended upon what the federal government contributed to the state budget, and finally, the positive shift of loyalty from the state to the federal government, from the pluralistic to particularistic (or single) party system.²⁾

The power of the economic purse had great impact on administrative changes that took place between 1966-72.³⁾ Moreover, the maladministration of the KNDP government between 1961-65 - inner-party fighting in the KNDP (Kumba convention 1965) - maximized the struggle for centralized political and administrative governing of the territory. Ironically, it turned out that the leading architects and exponents of West Cameroon political assimilation with Nigeria, the CPNC, became fervent believers in centralized state authority on the grounds that the KNDP administration had subsumbed to selfish interests and to plundering forces that criticized the KNDP administration. In other words, the CPNC found safety and security under the federal and not state administration only when there was a change in the state administration (KNDP-CPNC alliance, 1966-68).⁴⁾ By then, the degree and impact of federal penetration into the state of West Cameroon had reached a level of no return to local autonomy. The integrative process involving authoritarian, consensual, identitic and paternal attributes in varying degrees was paying handsome dividends for national cohesion in a fragmented environment. The trend of development was moving further away from federalism towards other symbols. The new rules following a special constitutional provision in October 1969 seem to have broken down the concern by which West Cameroon political elites had for Anglophone-Francophone differences since, in a sense, these differences had been depoliticized. Whereas at reunification the influential West Cameroon politicians had all remained in Buea rather than take federal positions, by 1969, they all had federal positions or none. There was nothing to be gained by clinging to the old boundaries, old parties, old value dimensions and decentralized views of federalism. The single

party with Ahidjo at its head completely changed the situation. A situation had been created that demanded the active participation (orientations toward community) of every Cameroonian.

West Cameroonians started reaping the benefits of unification during the period following 1966. Most of the institutions established on the eve of political integration were now in a position of exerting greater influence and their impacts felt in wider perspectives. The education and the social structure of the administrative elites were no longer limited to the "been to's". The recruitment background shifted greatly because the country was in the process of meeting the objectives of Cameroonization and had established schools of administration from which the new breed of administrators were trained. Trained, of course, they were within the precepts of centralization. In this respect they had no attachments towards preserving local autonomy, which was dear to West Cameroonians. The new administrative elites were created through open competition and with the political objectives of shifting the legacy of political pluralism and decentralization to one of the goals of centralized state and general interest with Yaounde as the supreme custodian of state idealism and comprehensive central control. The new elites served to perpetuate the ideals of national integration. It was natural under the prevailing circumstances that the powers of the state governments were curtailed as more and more people became available who were conversant with the ideals of political and administrative centralization. Since more and more West Cameroonians were recruited into the federal service, it implied that the roots of politicians in the territory were under strong pressure, which, finally crumbled in 1972.

In the economic sector, the drafting of the second five year development plan⁵⁾ was carried out under a different environment unlike the first plan (1960-65) which was drawn purposely to serve the needs of East Cameroon. The success of the plan both at the drafting and implementing levels required an integrated centralized administrative apparatus. Party centralism had to go with administrative centralization so as to create a responsive network to make possible a degree of fit between structures and functions in meeting community needs.

The main target of the plan was to double per capita income by 1980 through the philosophical orientation of "planned liberalism", which, to borrow the language of Ahmadou Ahidjo, implied

....an efficient use of the resources available, to limit the role of chance in economic undertaking and consciously orientate development towards measured and predetermined targets, we are, on the other hand, convinced that liberalism remains a decisive factor of progress....because, finally, it alone can reconcile harmoniously the demands of rationalisation with the necessity of private cooperation in a country where saving is still in an elementary stage of growth, and the State, even though it may be called upon, by force of circumstance, to play a determining role of impulsion and control, is far from possessing the means of assuming the

whole 'burden of development'.⁶⁾

Such a pragmatic ideological policy approach affirms the functionalist esoteric of administrative reticulation and co-operation sanctifying community needs, particularly in view of the fact that internally, the retarded development and lagging economic growth of West Cameroon and of the interior posed mounting challenges for national development which could only be met by cooperation and centralized planning and administrative supervision. The economic gains of integration and the economic potentials of the two territories have already been discussed.

Cameroon east of the Mungo was more viable economically than the territory west of the Mungo. What was required was a pragmatic and realistic policy of generating growth in the west and doing so not at the total expense of promoting development recession in East Cameroon which had taken the burden of seeing West Cameroon through its perpetuated level of economic backwardness. Therefore reciprocation of the development policies of the federated states required a centralized guidance and overall supervision of balancing economic backwardness and economic viability within a national context. Again, the demand factors of combined forward and backward linkages with differential impacts on the economies of the two states (such as population, inter-state trade and barriers, exports and urbanization) required careful planning if the economy were to truly reflect the political aspirations of the people.

The internal development disequilibrium between the two states was reflected by the level of inter-state trade. This area forms the most appropriate sector of analysis on economic integration. The theory of customs union views economic integration as

that branch of tariff theory which deals with the effects of geographically discriminatory changes in trade barriers.⁷⁾

The customs barrier that existed between the two states prior to unification was removed and this had a profound impact on the economic relationship and development between the two states and within West Cameroon. The potential economic effects arising from the economic integration were twofold. First, "trade creation" - which implied that the derangement of internal customs barrier between the two states on either side of the Mungo forced a change in the direction of trade, i.e. from high-cost to low-cost producing states. In reference to the economic integration of the two Cameroons, possibilities for "trade creation" existed in that the removal of tariffs led to the exploitation of the low production capacity cost in West Cameroon by Easterners at the same time that East Cameroon had to bear a large share of the economic development burden of West Cameroon.

On the other hand, "trade diversion" - where a nation that had previously been importing from a low-cost producing area is forced because of the new political constellation to be importing from a high-cost producing state. West Cameroon by virtue of its partnership in the federation lost its commonwealth trade preference and was now forced to import from the highcost-producing franc regions. It was because of this difference in "trade

creation and trade diversion" that West Cameroon went through a difficult period of adjusting to the realities of unification. It was also a period (1961-71) when the region experienced high inflation.

Nonetheless, the material status of the people of West Cameroon and of the entire federation was greatly improved during the period. The gap in salary-scale declined between the two territories and government economic policy of "planned liberalism" intensified. There was an annual average growth of 8.6 per cent between 1965-70. The country according to President Ahidjo rapidly approached the point of an economic take-off. In this respect, economic development was declared to be the main priority area of the government in all sphere of activities. In social investment, priority during the period went to education and health care. Facilities for higher education were expanded at the University of Yaounde and other opportunities created in broadening the educational base of the people.

The relative degree of material status and other socio-economic development can be used as bases for measuring the level of integration. The degree of institutional cooperation and the level of active support for national policies contributed also to the nature of political stability. Political stability was equally another form of measuring instrument for the degree of integration. The expectations of both states to the nature of integration equally mirrored their economic policy approach. For West Cameroon it was the desire for a loose and cooperative approach and for East Cameroon, it was centralized federal structure. West Cameroon, opting for decentralization, harboured a federalist approach to economic development and East Cameroon, that believed in centralism, adopted a "developmentalist" attitude in tackling the economic and political problems of the country. In examining the course followed by the country's economic policy approach it is not out of place to conclude that the pattern of "developmental federalism" played an essential factor in maintaining an acceptable equity balance between the two states. Not only were the two economies complementary but each from its vantage position helped in expanding the basis of the other; particularly, the economy of East Cameroon with its industrial infrastructural base contributed to setting in motion some positive aspects of what Hirschman sees as the forces of "trickling-down"⁸⁾ effects by transmitting growth from East to West. Such a policy could have effectuated the increase of exporting raw materials across to East Cameroon. The problem of disguised unemployment in the primary sector of West Cameroon could have been absorbed by East Cameroon.

Both sides being purely agricultural producing nations, though with some progressive industrial undertakings in East Cameroon, implied also that East Cameroon could not absorb the agricultural products of the west without consequences to its own primary sector. The urbanization of areas like Yaounde, Edea and Douala implied also that the industrial sector of East Cameroon had an upsurge of expansion at the expense of stagnated primary sector. The reverse development was taking place in West Cameroon where the primary sector was somehow expanding while its

prevailing "small-size and inefficient, yet income generating secondary sector" was not able to absorb and utilize its manpower resources.

One would have expected, as a result of the political union of the two territories, and following the degree of industrialization and economic growth in East Cameroon, some form of inter-state labour migration from West to East if there were no cultural and linguistic differences impeding labour mobility between the two territories. Instead of absorbing 'disguised unemployment' the industrial expansion of East Cameroon could have denuded the West of its already limited technicians and potential business managers, as well as the more enterprising segment of the population. All these forces could have generated inhibiting or polarization effects. Thus, a loose cooperative union as agitated for by West Cameroon politicians could have resulted in negative growth in the region, and to more rapid positive development east of the Mungo. Consequently, a loose cooperative union of East and West Cameroon could have hampered the development of the latter state particularly as the former had greater resource endowment and productive capacity.⁹⁾

Therefore, political and administrative centralization had the trickling down effect of engineering the economic development of West Cameroon in the long run. Rather, political integration in the short run implied that West Cameroon experienced economic hardship partly as a result of the economic recession that plagued the territory prior to unification, and partly because the institutions established had not got off the ground to respond visibly to the aspirations of the people of West Cameroon. Of course, the economic hardship of West Cameroon was equally felt by the East and the federal government which had to take charge of subsidizing the economic viability of the federated state of West Cameroon.

In the final analysis, the economic benefits of political integration could not be realized immediately and the realization of the benefits depended upon the degree of centralization which started taking effect from 1966 and materialized finally on 2nd June 1972.

Faced with economic imbalance between east and west, and the west suffering from acute underdevelopment, social and economic isolation, the federal government could not stand by to permit further deterioration and the "considerable suffering" of the region even if this implied policy approaches that curtailed certain egalitarian principles or the basis of federal bargain between the two states.

The spread of the jurisdiction of the central government as a result of the establishment of "superstructures" - administrative, political and legal institutions; - and certain development infrastructures - roads and railways linking the two states facilitated the assimilation of West Cameroon. For many West Cameroonians it implied a form of military control of the state or unnecessary pressures and constraints on the identity of the region. But the expansion of federal jurisdiction also implies the development of a "sense of community" which is of crucial importance in any polity.

CONCLUSION:

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The peculiar circumstances of the country warranted the need for a one-party system. The staggering problem of nation-building and modernization requires a central and unified organization of power within the state to achieve the structural changes required. The single party provides the only available structures under such circumstances in meeting the objectives of nation-building. Thus in effectuating these national obligation they find themselves in a situation described by Kwame Nkrumah as "almost analogous to a state of war and national emergency which is always met in the older established nations by the formation of coalition or national governments". Any nation at war adopts stringent measures in order to secure the survival of the nation. Adopting such stringent measures means the curtailment of human rights that underline the cardinal precepts of democracy. The point in question is succinctly raised by Johnson.

...The structures erected for the central government tend to be authoritarian. Yet it must be admitted that the disparities between the states are very great and centralized authority may be the key to holding the federation together long enough to permit solution of the initial, agonizing problems consequent to the union.¹⁰⁾

A country like the Cameroon undergoing a process of mobilization and reconciliation required centralized political and administrative authority for the reformation of its basic institutional structures and promoting national integration.

The ideological orientation of the CNU streamlined the unflinching determination to defend and uphold the sovereignty of the country, its authentic values, national cohesion and political stability. The underlying characteristic or goal being national integration.

As a supranational political organization, the CNU symbolises the end product of the integrative process. Conversely, the era of multi-party system was one that mirrored the disintegrative peculiarities of the Cameroon system. Pluralistic party systems articulate their policies to satisfy particular groups from where they derive their parliamentary strength as well as it helps to suppress all tendencies that contribute to national cohesion. A multi-party system as a source of fragmentation limits the propensity for national integration especially in societies that were under foreign rule. Conversely, the one-party system fulfills a mission succinctly summed up by Gardinier:

A multi-party system...denied the nation the opportunity to utilize the talents of all its citizens and wasted their energies in interparty battling. The continued existence of parties which were above all regionally and ethnically rather than ideologically based made good government more difficult and hindered the growth of national unity. At a time, too when Cameroon was beginning to play an important role in attempts at co-operation among French-speaking African states, it seemed imperative that the government should be able to speak and act with the support of the whole nation. With these thoughts in mind UC leaders sought the formation of a single party....¹¹⁾

Formation of the CNU contributed towards constitutional changes in the country. It helped in easing the process and above all, cooling-off the quest for secession, inter-party fighting and particularism. The differential of loyalties according to Party and State equally shifted. Loyalty today is geared toward the CNU, the State and the Nation. With the CNU as the embryo of the State, and the State being the organizing and functional structure of the Nation, then loyalty to the CNU entails loyalty to the Nation. The people constitute the Nation and the Nation is a reflection of the people's cohesiveness and political community. The national party and the state are such that each becomes the conscience of the other, that each is applying the basic options defined by the other. This assumes also that the people of the Cameroon are now conscious of the complementary nature of the party and of government action, so long as the CNU abides by its covenant of incarnating unity.

The degree of consensus and collaboration between the party and the state set out the habits of cooperation and the eventual realization of the legitimate aspirations of the Cameroon people. The realization of these aspirations must take off from the solid domestic isomorphic authority pattern, guided by a certain code of conduct or covenant regulating the activities of the participants and of the system as a whole. Thus the covenant of the CNU and the constitution have the objectives of propelling and guiding the people towards national integration which for the federalist implies a "supranational state" and for the neo-functionalist "collaboration and cooperation responsive to community needs". The CNU in partnership with the state weds the federalist and neo-functionalist precepts to national integration, and both fulfill the missions of initiating or innovating the propensity towards system change, behaviour of state and the political man in the process of national integration and nation-building or the drive from traditionalism and particularism to modernity and national loyalty. The drive towards a single party symbolized the integration of the centralized state and the general interest which are the cardinal factors in the country's relative degree of political stability and economic development.

It is not germane to assess the sequence of both the mobilization and conciliation process. What can easily be assessed is that simplicity, guarded as it is, is the most striking characteristic of Cameroon politics. The lack of complication in this complex process and the success in achieving a high degree of articulation of the nation's groupings are also consonant with the set of traditional values still widely held and being incorporated in the integrative development process.

Within this consideration, the structures of the political economic institutions have managed to innovate a fairly high level of integration, restructuralization and modernization through the rooting or attachment of certain functions in the old order (traditional values). The CNU is geared more intimately to the structures as well as functions of the nation. Charisma, the cult of personality, remains vital to the mobilization of widespread public support, and the essential solidarity of the entire nation is demonstrated by the ease with which the

party has been collaborating and manipulating the state in the process of furnacing understanding, consensus, reconciliation and cohesion in the integrative process. The process towards an integrated society has equally been aided by the cult of personality, the charm of an individual as exhibited in the following quotes:

Ahidjo is our father - old man in Eden,¹²⁾ Papa Ahidjo, Papa Ahidjo - chant the under twelves in Douala,¹³⁾ which enhance the personality cult of Ahidjo as the symbol of national identity and unity, or as succinctly stated by one youth, "When I see the flag and hear the anthem, I immediately think of my very peaceful and independent country and say aloud, Long live Cameroon". This indicates the degree of citizens' behavioural attachment to the country and the general acceptance of the existing system. From many dimensional perspectives such behavioural attachment and acceptance have contributed towards "guarded democracy" and the two have been essential....

ingredients in the mobilization of political power during the past fifteen years of the CNU and twenty years of political independence. Popular will has in essence been the creation of the manipulations of essentially democratic demagogues and the relative degree of stability, continuity and socio politico-economic changes unequivocally accentuated the natural facts of Cameroonification - the integrated political community of the country. It can also be stated that the task of nation-building is a question of how to accommodate the multiformity of ethnic and cultural differences while strengthening national cohesion, identity and authority. The political actors, and in particular the leaders, are faced with the delicate and important obligation of providing and improving the social well-being of the different ethnic groups and provinces in such a manner that the various factions and provinces can co-exist in harmony and tranquility. There can be no other means of achieving this than through the equitable distribution of political and economic resources of the country. The wealth of the nation must be subjected to an articulated policy of distributive justice, and resources shared in such a way that it does not arouse ill-feelings among the people or induce them to withdraw their support and allegiance from the central authority.

The current situation where "distributive justice" has been replaced by "godfather prerogatives" impedes concerted efforts towards national unity and raises a series of questions about the input and output conversion functions of public institutions. Presently, the most chilling revelation is how government institutions and para-government and private agencies abuse their personnel system. Their hiring policies demonstrate how the structure of democracy can easily be threatened by those who control the public bureaucracy and have coerced illegal, corrupt or improper conduct. It is a very well-known fact that not every Cameroonian citizen has a "godfather" in the government and its agencies, yet this is the criterion used too often in employment and awarding of contracts. Even in the private sector one

needs the aid or assistance of a "godfather" in order to get employment. In this respect, distributive justice is an unknown concept in the code of conduct regulating the input and output functions of the public service in nation-building. Thus, the belief in a public service efficiently governed by a neutral merit system to which all individuals have equal access is at odds with reality. Directly or indirectly, the system as such is sowing the seeds of self-destruction, frustration and confrontation in the society it is intended to build.

Because the system operates as a monopoly for those who wield power within the various institutions and agencies the public service system has failed to implement the concept of distributive justice, fairness, responsiveness and responsibility and has become instead a vehicle for enforcing nepotism, and encouraging other illegal or improper conduct. A public service which is a goal-oriented social system of people in interacting roles can be effective only to the extent that it is close to its environment and is responding to the problems of nation-building. Perspicaciousness in understanding the area within the organization must operate as a problem solving entity and the sophistication in ways of dealing with the problems within its environment is increasingly recognized as important in public administration. The Cameroonian public is entitled to a system that is efficient, progressive, responsive, responsible and accountable.¹⁴⁾

Political leaders and policy-makers have yet to come to grips with the fundamental issue of distributive justice and of creating a bureaucracy (party and state) that serves the interests of all Cameroonians. Equally important is for all Cameroonians to live up to their civic responsibilities. They have to exhibit a sense of purpose by subjecting themselves to change that enhance the process of nation-building. It is not enough for the policy-makers to fabricate policy directions. The people themselves must see to it that such policies are brought to fruition in the proper way. Political integration or nation-building as a process of individual change has yet to take place among Cameroonians. It is here where the major problem lies: the inability of the individual to recognize his/her role in nation-building. The individual must be responsible and accountable by contributing his/her quota to make the system function properly and for the benefit of all. This is perhaps the greatest challenge facing the nation.

It is a challenge that highlights issues underlying the theoretical departure of this study - the need for and the application of authoritarian, paternal, identific and consensual variables as mechanisms propelling the engine for national cohesion, stability, continuity and development.

Notes:

1. Forje, John. *Unification and After: A Political Study of The Federal Republic of Cameroon*. Lund, 1972. See Johnson, W. *The Cameroon Federation* op cit.

2. Forje, John. The Evolution from Multi-to-One-Party Structure in the Federal Republic of Cameroon, Department of Politics, University of Lund. 1971, Billard, R. Le Cameroun Fédéral, 2 vols. Paris-Lyons. 1968; Gonidec, P. La République Fédéral du Cameroun, Paris 1969.
3. See Federal Republic of Cameroon Estimates 1962/63 - 1970/71, Yaounde. Hugon, Philippe. Analyse du sous-développement en Afrique noire l'exemple de l'économie du Cameroun, 1968, Paris Presses Universitaires de France; See The Economic Potential of West Cameroon - Priorities for Development (Menlo Park, Calif., June 1965). See publications from the Ministry of Finance, Buea 1961-72.
4. The issue has already been discussed. See section dealing with the "Integration of Political Actors and CNU as the Integrative Forum". Another example is the Presidential Decree of 26th July 1962 establishing the Federal University of Yaounde. On 25th February 1974, the CNU Party School was opened in Yaounde.
5. See Forje, John W. Cameroon's Five Year Development Plans. Lund, 1977; Ndongko, W.A. Planning for Economic Development in a Federated State: The Case of Cameroon, 1960-71, München 1975. Ministry of Planning and Territorial Development, Second Five-Year Development Plan for Economic and Social Development, 1966-71, Yaounde, 1966: Report of the First Five Year Plan, Yaounde 1965.
6. Ahidjo, A. The Political Philosophy of Ahmadou Ahidjo, Yaounde 1968, p. 93; See Ahidjo, A. General Policy Report, 1st Ordinary Congress of the CNU, Gaouara, 1969; 2nd Ordinary Congress, Douala, 1975, ACAP, 16 October 1971, Douala, Cameroon.
7. Lipsey, R.G. "The theory of custom unions: A general Survey", Economic Journal, 1960, p. 261.
8. Hirschman, A.O. and Lindblom, C.E. "Economic development Research and Development, Policy-making, Some Converging Views" Behavioural Science, April 1962.
9. Ndongko, W.A. op cit. See also Green, R.H. The Economy of the Cameroon Federal Republic of Cameroon, in Robson and Lury, The Economies of Africa, op cit. 1969. Economic Commission for Africa, Report of the ECA Mission for Economic Cooperation in Central Africa, (Addis Ababa, 1966), International Monetary Fund, Surveys of African Economies, Vol 1. Cameroon, Chad, CAR, Congo and Gabon, Washington 1968: Ministry of Economic Affairs and Planning, Second Five Year Plan of Economic and Social Development, July 1966 - June 1971. Yaounde. Budget Speech by P.M. Kemcha, Secretary of State for Finance, July 1966, Cameroon Times, December 21, 1965. Victoria.
10. Johnson, W. in Lewis, H.W. op cit. 1965, p. 219.
11. Gardinier, D. Cameroon: United Nations Challenge to French Policy, London 1963, p. 60.
12. La Presse du Cameroun, 6-7 April 1963, Douala - Cameroon.
13. ACAP, 16 October 1971, Douala.
14. Enaw, J.E. "On the Character of Employment in the Public Service and Parastatals", Cameroon Tribune, August 12, 1981, Yaounde, p. 7.

PAX CAMEROONENSIS: A UNITED MARCH TOWARD NATIONAL REVITALIZATION

THE CENTRALIZED STATE AND
THE GENERAL INTEREST:

National integration involves political values and national goals - it requires not only the establishing of political institutions capable of maintaining peace, order and stability and pursuing policies which foster social and economic development, but also the transformation of the syncretic fragmented ethnic groups into an integrated national structure and content.

The attainment of a concerted balance between national goals and political values requires paternal and identific responses from the leaders and the masses, and, as the mechanism, reinforcing issues of mobility, changeability and adaption in the integrative process. This linkage is necessary since the country was groping for new social and political directions, for new national and coherent values to strengthen its propensity towards a new societal and political order. What was unique in the integrative process is that political mobility and change during the transformation period 1961-1972 did not fabricate political instability but rather generated a living consensus and a political stage where changes were carried out without arousing distrust and without destroying the main fabric and objectives of the political marriage between the two territories.

Therefore, the main concern was national unity since the country inherited a wealth of diversity from history. Thus, the fundamental concern of the political leaders was to give the country "awareness of its unity in order to transform it into a nation", to construct an effective "framework for progress" based on a "homogenous environment and centre of common interest".¹⁾

The diversity of the political background confronting the new Cameroon nation contributed immensely in the direction of change. The degree of political integration depended upon how fully its cultural diversities converged to produce shared values and ideals. In other words, political integration implied the propensity to engineer consolidated structures for shared values and ideas and in a manner that it manifests and harnesses the capacity of the political system to innovate social change on wider dimension without disrupting the impact of change.

Cameroon was threading through a period of political change and that process of system change demanded its own political culture and ardent commitments by the widest possible cross-section of the people to contribute positively and participate actively in the evolving system authentic to the Cameroon political culture.²⁾ The merging political culture of the Cameroon could be visualized as having two goals; for the individual, it offered the framework of political behaviour; and for the system as a whole, it provided

a systematic structure of values and rational considerations which ensures coherence in the performance of institutions and organizations.³⁾

The two streams of development culminated in the aspiration for the centralized state and the general interest system as the specificity of the end product in the integrative process. By 1972, Cameroon had achieved one aspect of the integrated system - that of the general interest. In this respect, the formation of the CNU manifested the political culture thereby providing guidelines for effective political behaviour, and for the collectivity, it gives a systematic structure of values and national considerations which ensures coherence in the performance of institutions and organisations, in the way of:

- consolidating national unity with a view to the genuine construction of a Cameroon nation with authenticity;
- combating energetically all predicaments that obstruct national unity;
- commitment by political actors to reject divisive and deviationist tendencies prejudicial to national unity.

The next stage was that of the centralized state capable of ensuring the performance of the institutions and organisations through which individual political behaviour could function in a coherent manner, so as to achieve the final product - an integrated society having (i) effective control over the use of the means of violence; (ii) a centre of decision-making capable to affect the authoritative allocation of resources and rewards throughout the community; and (iii) the dominant focus of political identification for the large majority of politically aware citizens.⁴⁾

The CNU offers the platform of mobilizing political awareness among the people. But that political awareness needed a channel of authoritative governmental expression, and a government that reflected the widest possible desire or aspiration of the nation, or representing what may be visualized as the public interest involving the peaceful compromising of conflicting interests through agreed procedures and leading to profound change. These changes gave greater impetus in strengthening national unity and the consolidation of the state in the following ways:

- consolidating law and order and the stability of the state;
- achieving trade union unity;
- achieving territorial unity; and
- strengthening the Party, the key-stone of the country's national institutions,⁵⁾ so that the system could operate in a political culture that is homogenous and fusional.

Though the federal and state governments as constituted in 1961 possessed in varying degrees the powers and capacity to function so as to promote integration, nonetheless it lacked to some extent the attributes of a focal point of identification. Without the focal point of identification, the process of shifting loyalty from the individual to the collective stage of na-

tional oneness could not be properly realized.

In a way, the 1961 constitution could be seen as a speed-break towards a collective cohesive attitude in that the creation of two federated states and a federal government disguisedly intensified the particularistic characteristics of the three governments since each was sovereign in its own right. This constituted an essential predicament for national unity. The division of powers among the three governments eventually entailed that the focus of identification was divided between the states and the federal governments.

Apparently, while this was a consensual or shared political formula designed to mitigate against chaos, dampen fears as well as establish an acceptable atmosphere for the political actors on both sides to aggregate a new political culture, nevertheless it was a political and economic burden in the integrative process. The federal system as such had become a handicap to development:

It was contrary to the policy of austerity to have three governments - the federal government and the federated state governments - and four Assemblies, national development would be better served by centralized planning of agriculture and industrialization.⁶⁾

The poor boundary-maintenance between the society and the political system among the various parties of the political system inherited from the colonial period could only be narrowed through well articulated sets of ideals, philosophical orientation towards a supranational state and a sense of supranational political culture in which people would be capable of responding to symbols and other virtues in the same way.

As long as the propensity for local autonomy was ardently harboured by the State west of the Mungo, as long as the focus of identification was impaired by the coexistence of three centres of government, so also was the process of national integration ironically blurred, perhaps even delayed. On the other hand, the possibility that any form of an entrenched drive to force political and administrative centralization as the focus of identification the morning after the historical merger of the two states could have manifested grave political strife within the newly constituted nation. The consequences being that West Cameroon could have held tight to its particularism and even have possibilities of agitating for secession.

Theoretically, East Cameroon would have preferred the dismantling of the political structure of West Cameroon, and the immediate introduction of a centralized system; West Cameroon was not properly prepared for that pattern of government. Political centralism was a system alienated from the political cultural setting of West Cameroon, and the idea would have instigated strong resistance even from the most pro-unificationists of West Cameroon.

Therefore, a slow and well calculated evolving process of social learning, moulding behaviours and attitudes and shifting loyalty from the old centre of the political system to a new locus of power and authority was needed so as to balance the

boundary-maintenance between public consensus and apathy in the integrative process.

Since the two states originally did not share the same political values and beliefs, it was necessary for a consensual and consolidating approach, devoid of either a passive or active authoritarian precept to nurture the political culture and to sustain the process of integration. Both normative consensus and coercion were needed as the essential values for the internalization of the political actors and for the political system to be integrated, hence

the federal structures were adopted at the time of reunification above all to give our fellow citizens of West Cameroon the assurance that the heritage which they were contributing after more than forty years of separation would not only not be ignored but taken into consideration within a framework of a bilingual pluricultural state.⁷¹

Towards 1972, the manifestation of the social learning process in the Cameroon had the consequential effects in changing general public attitudes on the issue of integration. The dynamics of change whether passive, permissive or consensual had set in motion some form of:

- a. genuine and active orientation toward community and the over-all political structure of the nation among the political actors on both sides of the Mungo;
- b. it had generated political participation, interaction, national awareness to such a level that a commonly accepted pattern of political behaviour legitimized by the CNU could be transferred to the state level; and
- c. the prospects for governmental/administrative centralisation were far better than ever before.

Attitudinal change in the country incorporating both public consensus and apathy had reached the situation where public preference and political leadership were effectively influencing and consciously responding to one another in the direction of (1) permissive consensus involving the openness and responsiveness of the national decision-making structures to the authentic needs of the society, and made possible by the emergence of a new ruling class schooled within the parameters of the political realities of the new political order of Cameroon. The administrative elites had now attained a clear and articulated political orientation and sense of responsibility in regulating the political interests and activities of the different groups and social strata.

(2) The effects of the distribution of political and administrative skills in the society intensified cognitive mobilization that manifest public attitudes and behaviour more conducive to national cohesion. The old bureaucratic structure did not destroy the new administrative echelons but some form of

modus vivendi emerged between the two blocs making possible the implementation of new social political and economic goals. Thus, mass participation and involvement in the political process as the result of intensive cognitive mobilization was much greater than before. It did fulfill the fundamental objectives of the CNU, "national unity and national construction" requiring "active membership and the active participation of the entire Cameroonian people."⁸⁾

(3) The third important factor was the internalization of integrative values, i.e. the effects of decisions on values cherished most by the public in general, such as,

the new Cameroon we wish to build when it is achieved, will offer equality of opportunity in social development for all the people of Cameroon,⁹⁾

had a positive feedback effect on the system, in that such statements as "National unity means that in the work-yard of national construction there is neither Ewondo nor Douala, Bameleke nor Boulou, Foulbe nor Bassa... we are, one and all, simple Cameroonians,"¹⁰⁾ eliminate at least in principle all contours of ethnic fragmentation as well as it creates a basis where the values and hopes of the people converge on different fronts and interaction between the centres of power and authority and the masses are identically linked towards stability, change and continuity.

Generally stated, the affective attitudinal changes on both sides of the former colonial boundary had converged into common loyalties and fundamental values crucial in the integrative process giving the appropriate leverage and support to the Head of State to open up new political avenues for the country. The first significant action in that direction was the constitutional amendments incorporating a Law of Referendum with the sole intention of being used in exceptional circumstances. Secondly, a constitutional reform that allowed the National Assembly, in certain cases, the right to delegate the power of legislation to the Government. The move to amend the constitution incorporating a law of referendum and the delegation of legislative prerogatives to the Head of State were policy actions in the direction of harnessing the resources of the nation towards an integrated political community. Patterns of authority serve to co-ordinate or integrate the units of the system. As observed earlier, deviant behaviour often converged to effective goal attainment. The 1972 constitutional changes did not come as a surprise.

THE REFERENDUM: CONSTITUTIONAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL CHANGES

The harmonisation of conflicting interests reached its peak when the President informed the National Assembly of moves to consult the people on the immediate introduction of a unitary state to replace the existing federal structure, since as he pointed out, "the people had already displayed their sense of unity, and, the federal system had become a handicap to development".¹¹⁾ In defence of his actions,

the President stated:

Where federal structures appear a hinderance to rapid development of the country and where the Cameroon people have already consecrated in fact their profound unity, my profound conviction is that the time has come to forego the federal set-up of the state. Conscious of my responsibility towards the nation and posterity, I have consequently decided to consult by referendum the Cameroon people, sovereign and master of its destiny, on the immediate institution of a unitary state. The Cameroon people have shown through unification a possible way to African unity. By establishing tomorrow a unitary bilingual and pluricultural state, they will give an example which will attest to the fact that whenever human beings can transcend mistrust and selfishness they can live together in peace without sacrificing their peculiarities and coöperate hand in hand in the building of a common destiny.¹²⁾

In a message to the nation on 9 May 1972, the President gave details of the draft constitution to be submitted to a referendum on 20 May 1972, where the people were to vote for a unitary state, with the principles of bilingualism and polyculturalism retained, and where the people would solemnly demonstrate to the world their awareness of being one people in a single nation and fatherland as well as their complete unity..... the people would now have a single state government and national Assembly.¹³⁾

What the people were requested to vote on provided important structural changes in the organization of the state as well as embodying certain principles which had become a tradition in the political structure of the country; for example, the tradition of a ruling authoritative presidential system had proved effective in the conduct of public affairs and in forging the (consensual) harmonisation of conflicting political ideas and in bringing about political stability and continuity.

The political regime will remain a Presidential one because we believe that it better symbolises our national unity and is better adapted to our desire for progress.¹⁴⁾

The question put to the electorate read thus;

Do you approve with a view to consolidating national unity and accelerating the economic social and cultural development of the Nation the draft constitution submitted to the People of Cameroon by the President of the Federal Republic of Cameroon and instituting a Republic which is one and indivisible to be styled, The United Republic of Cameroon.

According to official results, 98.7 per cent of the electorate did cast their votes of which 99.97 voted in favour with only 158 votes against a unitary government. The percentage of participation for West Cameroon was 99.38 per cent as against

98.50 per cent for East Cameroon. Percentage of "yes" votes in West Cameroon in relation to East Cameroon was 99.98 and 99.97 respectively. The highest number of "no" votes was 96 registered in West Cameroon as against 62 of such votes in East Cameroon.¹⁵⁾

The 1972 constitutional changes were in accordance with the theoretical exposition of creating political activities and institutions having the authoritative capacity and powers over the pre-existing nation-state and as a means of getting diverse or pluralistic values and aspirations to converge under a common system symbolizing the civic and political culture of the emerging society. It is, as Deutsch points out,

the process in which major clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded or broken down and people become available for new patterns of socialization behaviour.....¹⁶⁾

New political strategies were necessary to stabilize the reconsilatory rationale of the constitutional framework devised for the political environment of 1961 to one that cemented the polar extremes into a unitary government.

The institution of a unitary state is not just the culmination of a magnificent work. It is also the instrument which will serve to give a definite form to the original personality of the Cameroon nation.¹⁷⁾

As far as the Cameroon was concerned, the federal constitutional system provided the best possible political formula of reconciling the requirements of the two fragmented political states, i.e. the requirements of centralized political leadership with the demands of regional autonomy,

Thus Article 38 was intended, in metaphorical terms, to serve as a mirage designed to condition psychologically the minds of the timorous souls that existed at the time of formulating the constitution, while at the same time succeeding in the primary objective of securing a strong reunited Cameroon. It was a compromise solution to a difficult problem.¹⁸⁾

However, the federal compromise proved unable to survive the politics of integration and social change that ensued after the historical alliance of April 27, 1962,¹⁹⁾ and the historical political party compromise of September 1966.²⁰⁾ The political realities of the country could not be concealed anymore.

It will also be seen that although most services have been federalised, the budget of the State of West Cameroon is still experiencing difficulties in spite of a balancing subsidy from the Federation totalling more than 2000 million francs, that is to say an amount equivalent to approximately three-quarters of the budget²¹⁾

proved during the 1960's that other forms of political constellation were needed to guide the country through its last political hurdles to an integrated society. The political climate

in 1972 was totally different from what prevailed in the 1960's and, therefore it did require new political mathematics and other forms of chemical solution to stabilize the political molecule offered by the body politic of the period; hence President Ahidjo's statement;

Now that the federal structure appears to be a handicap to the rapid development of the country, it is my profound conviction that the time has come to go further than a federal organization of the state.....²²⁾

Therefore it was necessary to eliminate whatever impediments of the 1961 constitution inhibited the progressive achievement of an integrated political apparatus responsive to national needs. Within these perspectives, interest articulation and aggregation had to be consolidated under the common political umbrella of a single party (CNU) offering the appropriate functional dimension imbued with conceivable functional duties and supported by other institutions of the system in bringing about the desired change for the common good.

The constitution of the Second Republic is a reflection of institutional changes and political developments in the country during the ten years of the federal experiment. A decade of federalism had given the people the knowledge and understanding of the practical realities of the issues involved in the process of national integration. Political actors by 1972 had accumulated the political experience (the strength and weakness of the functioning of the system) and the mechanisms needed in forging national cohesion. They were in a better position to thrash out their value differences on the eco-socio-political relationship between the two states. They had the tools or rather were more vigilant in fashioning the right policy approaches needed for a one and indivisible Cameroon. The 1972 constitution could be credited as having the impetus and dynamism transcending a code of conduct.

worked out within the federal precincts by men who, given the single party state and the neutralization of western champions of State's rights, were able to fashion a document reflecting the centralizing powers of the President and his closest associates,²³⁾

with the purpose of enhancing the "Presidential institution" as the focal point for national integration and the "state" as the symbol for national identification.

The 1972 constitutional reform was a policy approach to inculcate a sense of national identity among the people. The attempt in that direction refers also to issues of political integration imbued with the enigma of constructing a coherent political society from a multi-fariousness of traditional societies or diversified values and beliefs, the propensity to proliferate cultural uniformity and value consensus, and how to elicit from the individual deference and devotion to the arrogation of the collective interest or of the State as the focus of national identification. The inculcation of national identity equally constituted the aptitude of generating a poli-

tical culture, harnessing expressive symbols and values defining the environment within which political litigation occurs, with the goals of nation-building in mind, i.e.

*the deliberate fashioning of an integrated political community within fixed geographic boundaries in which the nation state is the dominant political institution.*²⁴⁾

Such symbols for identification and rallying point were necessary in the Cameroon context, without which an integrated society could not be achieved.

RADICAL TRANSFORMATION:

The 1972 constitution entailed radical transformation of the rule-making and rule-application structures of the system. Within the rule-making sphere, the legislative assemblies of the federated states were dissolved. At the national level, the office of the Vice President was abolished and the National Assembly re-organised to consist of 120 deputies elected on a common list put forward by the CNU Secretariat and serving a five year term.²⁵⁾ The constitution also entrusted legislative powers to the Head of State creating what may be visualized as a system of "Presidential Ruling Democracy" which (i) enables the President to be a symbol of the unity of the nation, and (ii) enables the Chief Executive to play a significant and dynamic role in national development.

A highly centralized governmental apparatus (fig. 7) was created in which the central government shares no powers with any other levels of government as the case was under the federal system. All policy decisions are vested in the central government which channels them down through lower administrative echelons (regional or provincial sub-governments to the local units for implementation) but subject to direction and control by the central administration.

With these changes, the authoritative powers of the President were further enhanced in that (a) parliament no longer dominates over the executive branch, since the President is not responsible to parliament, i.e. he does not fall on the votes of "no confidence"; (b) the adoption of political system based on the precepts of "ruling democracy" eliminates cabinet instability and crises; "the action of the President is not paralyzed by demagogic rifts in opinion, struggles for position and conflicts of personal interest"²⁶⁾ (c) in contrast to the collective responsibility of the parliamentary system, the concentration of powers in the office of the President permits greater assiduity of direction and it encourages "greater uniformity and speed of action". In this respect, the Presidential system following the Peaceful Revolution of 1972 promotes the unity of the state since the President serves simultaneously as Head of State, as Chief Executive and as Leader of the CNU.

*The special position of the executive branch in the political system of Cameroon, reflects not only a desire for pre-eminence but rather the complexity of the problems posed in our era by the satisfaction of human wants.*²⁷⁾

UNITARY POLITICAL SYSTEM




Fig. 7

Note: The major part of national policies is conceived and coordinated centrally while the regional and local governments may make their inputs, but once a policy is decided upon, their function is to implement it with minimum of discretion.

The Peaceful Revolution of 1972 enables the presidential system to avoid problems of dead-centre government and in this respect, parliamentary—presidential clashes are avoided either by (i) using his powers of dissolution²⁸⁾ or by (ii) appealing to the people over the head of the parliament by means of the referendum.²⁹⁾ The concentration of power in the hands of the President promotes more stable and effective government:

We are disciples of ruling democracy which characterizes our political system because it corresponds to our particular circumstances which call for quick and effective action from the state for the advancement of national development.³⁰⁾

The supremacy of power and authority in the hands of the President apart from limiting the ability of the legislature created on the other hand the stereobate that permits presidential initiation of legislation, the supervision and execution of policy that assists or promotes stability and national cohesion. It is anticipated that unitary political systems unlike federal systems, are considered to be most expedient in decision making and policy implementation, but they can also be the most arbitrary ones, because they do not allow broad

regional and/or local initiative to develop. However, an examination of the administrative branch will assist in tracing the power patterns and functions that emerged under the system following the creation of the Second Republic.

ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES:

The abolition of the state legislatures implied the end of the state governments, and a total reorganisation of the federal system eschewing the responsibilities of a new centralized administrative apparatus under the surveillance of a system of "ruling democracy" as embodied in the constitution. In this way the President is vested with all executive power or authority of the state and the responsibility for seeing that laws are properly executed and administered.³¹⁾ The six federal inspectorates created under the 1961 constitution were reconstituted into seven provinces, with each province placed under the authoritative auspices of a governor, charged with the direct responsibilities for maintaining law and order, and the inspection and coordination of all administrative functions within the province.

In examining the apparent enthusiasm for the Presidential system of "ruling democracy" in the integrative process, we discover that it exerts wide-ranging influence in ensuring national cohesion and political stability in many perspectives. This ranged from balancing ethnic fragmentation and social inequality to a check on legislative recalcitrance, through the aid of emergency power provision in the constitution.³²⁾

The President is given direction over the civil service and authority to appoint, promote or dismiss members of the bureaucracy which permits control over the men and their viewpoints as well as establishing loyalty. The appointment, promotion and removal powers³³⁾ give the President an important patronage lever that is used to strengthen his political power and position; to draw together a team of associates with identical ideas dedicated to the goals of national cohesion, authoritative allocation of powers for the purpose of strengthening and stabilizing unity and promoting genuine and balanced development.

We must strive above all to ensure that our public administration, effective but still too conventional, becomes an administration of development,³⁴⁾

and an instrument for balancing ethnic fragmentation, equalizing uneven development as well as promoting social and economic justice and national unity.

In exercising these wide-ranging powers the president has persistently followed a precise distribution of offices (distributive justice) between the various ethnic groups, ensuring equilibrium between North and South and French and English speaking Cameroons. There has been the attempt to involve everybody in national affairs, either through the "good will of the people" or through the President's capacity for reconciliation by the dynamics of coercion or consensus.

Because the cabinet is under the direction of the President and is directly responsible to him³⁵⁾, the effective conse-

quence of such a control relationship is that it encourages unity of policy on executive programmes. Presidential check on the legislature rests on (i) the power to dissolve parliament at any time he thinks it is in the interest of the nation. Thus, the degree of autonomy of legislative institution is limited.

The degree of the autonomy of the National Assembly within the framework of federal power is both limited and diluted by the constitution. It is limited to the extent that specific powers and responsibilities are conferred on the President. It is diluted because the President is able to exercise powers currently on those subjects which are not reserved by the constitution exclusively for the attention of the National Assembly.³⁶⁾

(ii) the use of the referendum,³⁷⁾; (iii) Statues must receive the assent of the President before being effectual³⁸⁾; and (iv) the executive is granted emergency powers.³⁹⁾

These powers have been effective in creating the basis for political stability and continuity and of changing attitudes and behaviour with the over-all output functions of forging a sense of direction, national awareness and collective responsibility in the process of national integration. It has enhanced the political instruments needed in harnessing societal resources and capacity, better explained as an individual's competence, and the "national interest" must take precedence over any regional and ethnic consideration in the process of national integration. Therefore, centralization of power and unity of direction must be considered as absolute necessities in the promotion of stability and unity.

HARMONISING POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENTAL PROCESSES

Under the First Republic the political structure and process shifted from a multi-party system to a one-party system. The Federal system of government directly or indirectly articulated policies to foster the emergence of the one party in order to achieve (a) the highest degree of unity possible at that period; (b) the accumulation and consolidation of power to trigger governmental changes and changes in the attitude and behaviour of the political actors.

Party leadership was therefore imbued with the functions of enforcing consensus among a wide cross-section of the people. The point of consensual interaction culminated on the affirmative vote for a unitary government. Thus, another significant pattern of development following the 1972 constitutional changes (in which the people obeyed themselves and their true will) was the vigorous drive in harmonising the political and governmental process so as to eliminate all forms of disintegrative backlashes in national integration.

Prior to this period, the ruling CNU had not been fused into the administrative apparatus. The acceptance of the constitutional structure of 1972 reflected the maximum institutional consensus existing in the state. The consensus did not centre on the political traditions of the liquidated colonial system,

or did it mirror a tribal system; rather it represented a radical break with the pre-colonial era. Recapitulated in another way, the acceptance of the constitution mirrored the evolving contemporary political culture of the country, serving as a fully accepted indicator of political compromise and power alignments in the society and warranting a close linkage between the political and governmental machinery.

The significant break with the past is that the 1972 constitutional changes obliterated the "myth of the neutrality of the bureaucracy" a concept so well entrenched in western political systems. Developments since 1972 no longer draw an "artificial distinction" between politicians and civil servants; the neutrality of the bureaucracy whereby civil servants are expected to provide continuity, has altered to continuity being provided by the party. In this context, civil servants are expected to participate actively in the political life of the nation. The boundary difference between the two (i.e. the political and governmental processes) has been eliminated since the underlying goal of the CNU is "to consolidate the union of the Cameroon people",⁴⁰⁾ and following the fact that "The people and the State collaborate closely in the realization of the legitimate aspirations of the Cameroon"⁴¹⁾ provides a preeminent forum in the integrative process and the mechanics of forging national cohesion with the sole objectives of creating a new political integrated society clothed with the fundamentalities of national unity, enriched by all the diversity of cultural and authentic Cameroon values.

In realizing all these objectives the party and the government interact in a variety of ways; see fig. 8, which shows interaction and regulated flow of authority between the party and government and fig. 9, the administrative structure of the two bodies within the Cameroon system. The regulated control systems (governmental and party administration) include specification of the kinds of decisions that are made at each level of the hierarchy and provided such decisions are within the maxim of ".....once the majority of the militants have made a decision, the minority accepts that decision."⁴²⁾

The system of functional contacts, the grid of decision-making centres, the pattern of power and the channels of communication between the government and the party and within each of the two blocs, combined to nourish the integrative process. That is to say, the regulated flows that depict governmental and party organisation as well as ordered, smoothly functioning systems flow process, are regulated in a systematical and explicitly controlled fashion in order to grease the integrative process and as the basis for cementing national unity and consensus. On the one hand, there is the application of direct supervision as a co-ordinating mechanism offered by the office of the President; on the other, the use of standardization, i.e. common norms and regulations bar the activities and functions of the political actors within the Cameroon polity.⁴³⁾

This type of dominant relationship strengthens the claims for clear-cut "sense of direction" and the application of authoritarian - consensual attributes to project that sense of aware-

AN ILLUSTRATION OF INTERACTION AND REGULATED FLOW OF GOVERNMENTAL AND PARTY, INFORMATION, DECISION-MAKING AND ACTIVITIES, FROM THE OPERATING CORE UP THE CHAIN OF AUTHORITY.




Fig. 8

Note: The regulative flow of governmental and party activities is an attempt to show how such regulated flow under an active charismatic and powerful Head of State and where the party machinery is integrated with the techno-bureaucratic institution of government. Party-governmental assimilation is in line with the basic doctrine of the CNU. Flowing upwards (B) is the fed-back information on the operation of activities; flowing downwards (A) is the command and work instruction; and (C) refers to the relationship that emerges by virtue of the constitution governing the structure and functions of the Party and Government institutions. The command instructions and other regulations are fed down the chain of authority emanating from the strategic position of each institution as prescribed by the Constitution of the two.

FLOW OF FORMAL AUTHORITY - GOVERNMENT AND PARTY




Fig. 9

ness for the nation necessary in the process of attaining an integrated stable political community.

The national revolution of 20 May 1972 cannot become a full revolution if it does not go beyond changes in State structures to ensure increasing effective independence in all fields. People should not ascribe to us dishonest Machiavellian intentions. There is no question of our leaning to the Left or Right. We are against both ultra-conservatism and adventurism. It is a question of being faithful to the mission of a State which is worthy of that name and which is aware of its responsibilities. Cameroon

will continue to develop in accordance with the policy of planned liberalism.44)

Nationhood during the colonial period was disguisedly tied around the intellectual myth of the neutrality of the bureaucracy (or governmental process) excluding the political process as the mechanism for constructing an integrated society. It was left to the new leaders after receiving the instrument of independence to give new images to the bureaucratic system they inherited. The arrogates of the dominant bureaucracy incorporating every socio-political stratum of the society represents the realities of national integration in contemporary Cameroon. The 1972 constitutional and administrative reforms were not only an urge to strengthen the claim for national unity and identity but also an express intention to eliminate remaining traces of the colonial system that drew a silver lining between the governmental and political process in political integration.

From 1972 political and administrative centralism and assimilation tie in very much with the fact that the major political actors had consequentially and consensually submerged their political differences by constituting themselves into a single interest body - the CNU. There was a change in the attitude and behaviour of the political actors - a shift from "individualism to collectivism".

With the CNU as the only legitimate instrument of interest articulation and aggregation, a kind of mobilization system emerged symbolizing the major significant features of the Cameroon political system. By so doing, the society eliminated or minimized the potential strength of the forces of disintegration and ethnic fragmentation, a monopolistic arrogation of authority and the distribution of resources being necessary to create internal political unity based on a common identific philosophical orientation of national unity - the "we feeling".

In the eagerness to promote stability, the government did force agreements and conformity resulting in the adoption of authoritarian institutions and procedures severely limiting the areas of diversity. It was not uncommon that policy measures and actions were taken during this period on issues involving (i) the suppression and curtailment of civil liberties (or suppression of the individual feeling and the persistent construction of a collective feeling); and (ii) the elimination of opposition, political parties and individual critics of the system. Priority had to be given first and foremost to the building of a sense of unity and internal political and administrative cohesion.

The political actors had to face the difficult challenge of finding solutions to the quest for unity, solutions to promote or activate the degree of cohesion necessary to assure the effectiveness of the political system as well as means allowing diversity and some degree of individualism, particularly in terms of cultural-traditional norms or religious beliefs. Finding an acceptable balance between unity and diversity is a difficult undertaking even for developed political democracies.

Cameroon has so far succeeded in its process of national in-

tegration partly because its political formula and aspiration coincides somewhat with its distinctive cultural diversity and the conscious attempts made to give it room of operationization within the evolving system, and partly because indigenous institutions exhibit habits of political thinking that link traditional heritage to modern values and aspirations in a rapidly changing world system. There has been a concerted balance in the application of authoritarian, consensual, paternal and identific variables in the integrative process. The people have also responded genuinely towards a new centre of authority. Administrative elites have played varying conciliated roles in directing system change as witnessed in contemporary Cameroon.

THE DYNAMICS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE ELITES:

Analytically, the consensual relationship or assimilation between the party apparatus and the state administration creates the basis on which members of the establishment participate actively in the political affairs of the state. The movement from the non-involvement of the bureaucracy to one of active participation in the political process creates different value perspectives within the political culture of the country. To begin with, the bureaucracy becomes not only the administrative arm of the chief executive, it also constitutes itself as an effective executive and plays a part in establishing, determining and implementing political goals and major policy directions.

Secondly, the involvement of the bureaucracy in the political process makes it one of the principal instruments of political regulation - i.e. one of the channels of political mobilization in which and through which different interests are regulated and aggregated and thus it has eventually become predominant in this facet of the political process.

The third basic characteristic of the social orientations of the bureaucracy following the 1972 political and administrative reforms is its role as a major instrument of social change and political socialization. Before 1972 administrative elites based on the functional specification of "neutrality" and apolitical were prevented from participating openly in the indigenous political life and hence were rarely of any great significance in the political socialization process.

It has already been pointed out that the bureaucratic establishment of the colonial era excluded West Cameroonians from top administrative positions. As a result, unification for the ruling elites was to attain positions created by the system of established privileges. Thus, the 1972 political developments did change the situation; the interest and aspirations of the ruling elites east and west of the Mungo converged within the same political culture. The change of attitude was motivated following the formation of the CNU and with the federal administration taking over most of the functions that were assigned to the state governments. The appetite for belonging to the established privileged class was intensified under federalism since some administrators were placed on the federal payroll

and others limited to the crumbs of the dazzling state budget of West Cameroon. Therefore, the reform policy - from federalism to unitary government-established direct links between government authority, party affiliation and inherited privileges. The move was welcome by West Cameroon civil servants and wage earners. They felt it was designed to narrow the wage-scale differences between federal and state employees. It was not surprising that civil servants openly and actively campaigned in rallying West Cameroon "yes" votes for the unitary government.

By actively propagating for centralism the administrative elites were in fact advocating the ideological development strategy that brings cooperation for political and administrative action in that

there is a general inclination toward a strong government, a strong executive, and a high degree of centralization construed on the supposition that without a strong government and a strong leadership the task of national unity and rapid economic and social transformation becomes difficult if not impossible.⁴⁵⁾

The political path followed by the elites was one committed to modernizing goals, one designed not to jeopardize the political status quo but in which a harmonious relationship could be established with the politicians for fear that the politicians in their attempt to monopolize political power would employ any available means to hold the bureaucracy in check as well as purging its critics. At the same time the party needed the administrative elites as the organ through which to effectuate the desire of the party in power.

Under the competitive system involving political party pluralism, the elites were expected to be neutral and to stand out as the symbol of stability and continuity. Governments came and went, but the bureaucracy stayed on. Because the changing mechanism in the party-government relationship brings pressure on the bureaucracy to be a source for socialization and mobilization and the political system of the country requires total commitments and loyalty from the civil service and the masses to identify themselves with the articulation and aggregation policy strategy of the ruling party.

The dynamics of the administrative elites ensures today a basic fact that the bureaucracy and the party compliment one another. The situation is best illustrated by Apter's statement:

What keeps the system going is the quiet alliance between two often hostile forces, the party bureaucracy and the civil service. If they have mutual contempt for one another, but recognize that they are essential for the running of day-to-day affairs.⁴⁶⁾

The alliance between the political and bureaucratic elites contributes immensely in promoting a smooth transition from one system to another. In this respect, the CNU offers the best hope of bridging the gap between the elites and the masses. Bridging the socio-economic and cultural gap between groups constitutes a significant aspect of the process of national integration. The

basis of political stability and cohesion, political and social integration in the Cameroon depends very much on the degree of interaction and consensus between social groups.

In this connection we can discern the dichotomy embodied in the Machiavellian political orientation that the building and upkeep of a society depends on the creative genius of a leader capable of comprehending the structure of traditional social and historical forces and utilizing his intellect in actualizing the masses so as to ensure the survival and prosperity of the society. There is also the relevance of Gaetano Mosca's conceptualization of "social types" in which he argues that the holding of society together and the maintenance of stability depend upon the proliferation and the effect of such proliferation in the integration process or that the qualities of the political class and the political formula and their relation to political stability and national identity⁴⁷⁾ takes us to the issue of political integration in terms of elite-mass gap, expressed by Coleman and Rosberg as:

Political integration refers to the progressive bridging of the elite-mass gap on the vertical plane in the course of developing an integrated political process and a participant political community.⁴⁸⁾

The administrative elites found a promotion partner in the CNU partly to uphold their status within the upper stratum of the vertical plane and partly to evade being discriminated against by the masses whose quest for realization of self-fulfillment or rising expectations could no longer be ignored. The establishment of a school of administration and the ideological school for CNU militants to instill new methods and value premises but also to meet the demands for skilled managerial or techno-bureaucratic infrastructure in satisfying the needs of the people as the society and the integrative process become more and more complex. The administrative elites have not only assumed full control of the civil service, but equally strengthen their position within the top decision-making hierarchy of the party machinery.

The Cameroon political system has undergone profound changes since the historical merger in 1961. The change has brought the rise of a technocratic state in which the administrative, para-administrative political and private sectors jointly constitute an indispensable aspect of the new political system. The Council of Ministers is no longer composed of traditional politicians or elected members of parliament. A considerable proportion of the core of administrative elites find themselves within the political forum for governmental decision-making. Civil servants appointed to the cabinet normally return to their previous posting if they lose their appointments in a cabinet shake-up. The appointment of a career administrator as Prime Minister has enhanced the position of the bureaucrats in the system.⁴⁹⁾

Constant reshuffling of the cabinet⁵⁰⁾ creates opportunities for more and more administrative elites to be represented within the political decision-making institution of the system: it

further accentuates the degree of balanced representation of the various strata of the society in the process of national integration, thereby eliminating minority fear as well as promoting ethnic harmony. The ruling elites within the political and governmental process are jointly responsible for greasing the process of integration and for balancing the stratification function of the entire system. This consensual coalition of segmented and rival interests has been the key to political stability.

The acceptance of a unitary government has the preferred effects for a variety of reasons:

1. Stability and continuity are promoted because it eliminates the division of powers between the central government and the federated states as was the case under the 1961 constitution;
2. Centralization of powers avoids dead-lock or confrontation between the two levels of government (federal and regional), and between the political and governmental processes;
3. Governmental policies and programmes are no longer subjected to conflicting value perspectives with reserved regional powers and rights of veto as before;
4. A sense of national awareness is encouraged. The individual feeling is suppressed in favour of the "we" feeling and citizens perceive themselves not in terms of ethnic groupings but as "Cameroonians".

Everything must be done by the State as much as by the Party, for continual development of the national consciousness, by untiring civic and cultural action. The purpose is to make the Nation of the Cameroons a true homeland, that is to say, an object of attachment, a centre of communication for the development of all citizens of a national culture which assumes and recognizes the efforts of all regions of the country.⁵¹⁾

5. There is uniformity of enforcement and interpretation of administrative regulations since the bureaucracy is under the control and supervision of the central government harbouring the ideological orientation of what may be fashioned as a "ruling democracy", and the eminency of the President's role in development depends on

....the unified inspiration and cooperation which must exist between the executive power and the legislative power. This cooperation is even more necessary in that a developing country like our own, where national unity is still hampered by ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity, cannot, without seriously compromising its destiny, indulge itself in the luxury of those regimes which, on the pretext of respecting the principle of separation of powers, are faced with a weak executive, incapable of assuming its responsibilities, and a damagocic legislature which can only crystallize divided minds and opposing interests instead of harmonising and reconciling them.⁵²⁾

6. The central government creates the basis for de-emphasizing

local interests and tribal loyalties;

The Cameroons, when attaining sovereignty, inherited an organization established for the needs and the imperatives of colonialism: the State organization established by a foreign power, functions practically without regard to the people. The Cameroons desire that the State, which still has to be built, should plunge its roots in the peculiar realities of the Cameroon people, and that it should be an emanation of this people. But this State, above all, must serve to unify the various particularities of our society. This is why the State spreads its ramifications and its administration and its methods of communication over the whole territory, transcends regional particularism and manifests, in a living way, the unity of the community.⁵³⁾

7. As a followup to the preceeding issue, the cutting-across of tribal frontiers stimulates the development of a national point of view and loyalty is directed towards the Nation and not to ethnic particularism.
8. The unitary system not only lends itself to centralization of authority and greater uniformity of policy and programmes, but it avoids duplication of governmental institutions and personnel. Resources are therefore deployed for other activities of national reconstruction.

There is no doubt that unity in Cameroon has therefore entailed considerable centralisation of political and administrative authority and the output has been economic progress and political stability.⁵⁴⁾ The consensual alliance (holy or unholy) between the politicians and the administrative elites accentuates the paternalistic basis for manipulating national sentiments in order to promote national integration. The assimilation that has taken place between the political process and the governmental process has narrowed the boundary-differences between the various strata of the people and institutions and above all, it has given the system the capacity of innovating the development of the political democracy that mirrors the authentic values of the Cameroon people.⁵⁵⁾ There are legitimate grounds legitimizing the assimilation of the uniparty and administrative centralism as the centrifigural mechanism for carrying out the enormous task of nation-building and the modernization process. Thus the one-party/administrative syndrom can best be described by objective analytical approaches that penetrate both sides of a magnetic-repulsive political continuum.

On one side of the continuum we find that the triumph of the single party rule, the emergence of the dominant party as the gravity of political centralism, and the centralization of the administrative functions of government following the unification of the two Cameroons has not only injected new shifts and goals for political action for a national and balanced developmental process, but it has also aggravated and aggrandized the political forum for the aggregation of national cohesion, stability and continuity. On the other end of the spectrum, we discover that to achieve national unity the use of the instru-

ments of repression, coercion and self-aggrandizement through the exercise of authoritarian power becomes inevitable in shifting attitudes and behaviour from the old to a new centre of power and authority.

A country like the Cameroon undergoing the process of national integration, mobilization and reconciliation requires the reformation of her basic institutional structures inherited from the colonial administration. The country opted for a tightened and more centralized pyramidal system of authoritative allocation of values and resources in the decision-making process so as to destroy the individual or particularistic feeling, to promote the collective feeling and awareness and to encourage greater participation in the political process.

The alliance between the party and the administrative elites has been necessary in developing a tradition of civic responsibility and collective accountability for the attainment of an authentic Cameroon value. The bureaucracy in the Cameroon under the present circumstances may well be argued to be under the control of the political sector, a political control in which the administrative elites have given their blessings thereby creating harmony and consensus between the two repelling blocs. This acquiescence underlines the relative degree of political stability discernible in the society today and explains why no confrontation should be expected between the administrative elites and the masses under the dominant party mobilization system characteristic of the Cameroon polity. "The CNU now spearheads a pacific national revolution which has transformed Cameroon into a peaceful, stable and prosperous State".⁵⁶⁾ More than that, the process of political integration warrants a strong leader, and a state capable of imposing its authority on a fragmented society like the Cameroon.

Notes:

1. Ahidjo, A. General Policy Report, 2nd Ordinary Congress of the C.N.U. Douala, February 10-15, 1975.
2. Verba defines political culture as "consisting of systems of empirical symbols and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place." Verba, S. and Lucian Pye (eds.) *Political Culture and Political Development*, Princeton, N.J. 1965, p. 513.
3. *ibid.* p. 7.
4. Etzioni, *Political Unification*, N.Y. 1965, p. 4.
5. General Policy Report, 2nd Ordinary Congress of the CNU, Douala, February 10-15, 1975.
6. *African Contemporary Records: Cameroon 1972-72*, pp B499-508, London.
7. *Cameroon News*, 9 May 1972, Yaounde. The President raised the issue again at the "Extraordinary Congress of the CNU, 2nd June, 1972, Yaounde by stating:
In truth, the institution of a unitary State is not just the culmination of a magnificent work. In as much as a Nation is "a daily plebiscite", it is also the instrument

which will serve to give a definite form to the original personality of the Cameroon Nation.....it is national institutions, which mould genius, which make a people what it is, which kindle in it this burning love for the fatherland, founded on habits which are impossible to root out, which in a word, promote the blossoming forth of this national culture whose value of communion is obvious and on behalf of which we have always appealed to the creative initiative of the Cameroonian Youth.

See also, A. Ahidjo, "Communication à l'Assemblée nationale", 6 mai 1972, p. 5 et 6. - Tout sur le référendum du 20 mai 1972 - ACAP, supplément au n°105 du 12 mai 1972.

8. Ahmadou Ahidjo from A to Z, Yaounde, 1976, p. 176.
9. Speech by Ahidjo made in Nkondjock, April 1976.
10. Speech by Ahidjo at the UC Ebolowa Congress, July 1962.
11. Speech by Ahidjo to the CAMeroon National Assembly on 6 May 1972.
12. *ibid.*
13. Raido Cameroon, Yaounde 5 May 1972.
14. *ibid.*
15. Results of the referendum of 20th May 1972, Cameroon News, No. 2 August 1972, p. 3-5. See also Reports and results of the referendum, Ministry for Territorial Administration, Yaounde, June 1972.
16. Deutsch, Karl. "Social Mobilization and Political Development", American Political Science Review, LV, September 1964, p. 494.
17. CNU Extraordinary Congress, 2-3 June 1972, Yaounde.
18. Enonchong, H.N. Cameroon Constitutional Law, Yaounde, 1967, p. 169-170.
19. Cameroon Champion, May 4, 1962, Victoria. The KNCP-UC agreement of April 27, 1962 stopped short of merging the two parties, but created an alliance between them instead, in the form of a national Unity Group in the Federal National Assembly. A co-ordinating committee was established to work out comprehensive details for harmonizing their relations and co-ordinating their actions.
The Ahidjo-Foncha (UC-KNDP) accord received the blessings of the CPNC opposition party. The agreement was seen as a step in the right direction. In an open letter to the KNDP the CPNC called for a summit conference on the merger of all political parties into a single national party. See Cameroon Times, 28 May 1962; Cameroon Times, June 1, 1962; Cameroon Champion, May 15, 1962. Johnson, W. The Cameroon Federation, 1970; KNDP, "The Path to a National Party: Steps and Principles", August 11, 1962, Victoria.
20. All existing political parties in the Cameroon were merged into the Cameroon National Union on 1 September 1966. President Ahidjo's speech to the Special Congress of Union Camerounaise is worth quoting;
To the militants of the UC, I recommend modesty, tolerance and an open minded attitude towards others and the intellectual flexibility needed for the avoidance of any sort of party patriotism. The essential point is not so much new organizatio-

nal formulas and new statutes but a radical change in the mentality of party members.

Cameroon Times, September 1, 1966. Cameroon Tribune, Yaounde 1966.

21. Cameroon News, 19 May 1972, Yaounde, p. 12.
22. *Ibid.* and Radio Cameroon, 19 May 1972.
23. Le Vine, V. "Political Integration and the United Republic of Cameroon", in Bentsi-Enchill (ed). The Search for National Integration in Africa, The Free Press, 1976, p. 274-276.
24. Esman, J. Milton, "The Politics of Developing Administration", in Montgomery and Siffin (eds) Approaches to Development, Politics Administrative and Change, N.Y. McGraw Hill, 1976.
25. Article 2(1) 1972; 12(a) 1972. See also the Preamble of the Constitution. The post of Vice President was eliminated. General Policy Report, 2nd Ordinary Congress of the CNU, February 10-15, Douala, pp. 66-67.
26. General Policy Report, 2nd Ordinary Congress of the CNU, February 10-15, 1975, Douala.
27. *ibid.*
28. Article 12(b) 1972. The National Assembly may at the instance of the President of the Republic decide by law, to extend or shorten its term of office. See Decree 72/349 24 July 1972.
29. Article 30(1) 1972. The President of the Republic after consultation with the President of the National Assembly, may submit to a referendum any reform bill which, although normally reserved for the legislature, could have profound repercussion on the future of the Nation and the National Institutions.
30. General Policy Report, 2nd Ordinary Congress of the CNU, February 10-15, Douala, 1975.
31. Article 5(1972). The President of the Republic, as Head of State and Head of the Government, shall ensure respect for the constitution and the Unity of the State, and shall be responsible for the conduct of the affairs of the Republic.
32. Article 11 (1972).
33. Article 8 (1) 1972.
34. General Policy Report, 2nd Ordinary Congress of the CNU, February 10-15, 1975, Douala. See also Cameroon Tribune, "End of the Congress, Special Issue", 23 February 1980. Yaounde, which reports about the 3rd Ordinary CNU Congress, Bafoussam, 12-17 February 1980.
35. Article 8(1) 1972.
36. Ndongko, W. Planning for Development in a Federated State: The Case of Cameroon, 1960-1971, München, 1975.
37. Article 30(1) 1972.
38. Articles 9(7) and 29(1) 1972.
39. Article 11 (1-3) 1972.
40. Article 2(1) of the Statue Code and Charter of the CNU. See also Epule,

- Kom. "The CNU and the National Revolution", Cameroon Tribune, June 18, 1980.
41. CNU Militant's Guide, Annex III, Chapter IX, Final Provisions, Article 17, Yaounde, 1976.
 42. CNU Charter, 1976, Yaounde.
 43. The most distinguished code of conduct in this respect is (i) The Cameroon Constitution; (ii) The CNU Militant's Guide which elaborates in details the CNU Charter; and (iii) The barage of decrees issued time and again by the President.
 44. Speech by Ahidjo to the CNU National Council, 25 November 1973. See also Bayart, Jean-Francois, *L'Etat au Cameroun*, Paris, 1979; Médard, J.F. *Le system politique Camerounaise*, Bordeaux - France, 1977.
 45. Merghani, Hamzah, "Public Administration in Developing Countries - The Multilateral Approach" in Burton A. Baker (ed) *Public Administration: A Key to Development*, Washington, D.C. Graduate School, U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1964, p. 28. See the following Decrees, Decree 61/DF/15 of 20 October 1961; Decree 67/DF/184 of 26 April 1967 and Decree 72/349 of 24 July 1972. L'Unité, No. 604, 19 March, 1976 carries the information on the Press Conference given by Victor Ayissi Mvodo, Minister for Territorial Administration.
 46. Machavelli, The Prince, translated by George Bull, Penguin, 1961, London.
 47. Mosca, Gaetano, *The Ruling Class*, translated by D.K. Hannah, McGraw-Hill, 1939.
 48. Coleman, J. and Rosberg C. *Political Parties and National Integration in Africa*, Princeton.
 49. The National Assembly on May 7, 1975 passed an amendment to the constitution of June 1972. The amendment created the post of a Prime Minister. The new Prime Minister Paul Biya was appointed on June 30, 1975. Cameroon News Agency, 30 June 1975; Cameroon Tribune 30 June 1975.
 50. See Cameroon Tribune Special Issue - "Bafoussam, Mark of Success" February 23, 1980. The Prime Minister is a career administrator as well as a number of ministers. See "Ahidjo addresses New Cabinet", West Africa, No. 3292, August 25 1980, p. 1631; "Cameroon Cabinet Reshuffled", West Africa, No. 3289, August 4, 1980, p. 1437; "Cabinet Appointment: Cameroon", Africa Research Bulletin, Vol. 9, No. 7, July 1-31 and August 15, 1972.
 51. CNU Militant Guide, Yaounde 1976, p 51.
 52. President Ahidjo in an address to a seminar organized by the CNU for deputies at the First National Assembly of the United Republic of Cameroon, June 18-19, 1973, Yaounde. See also L'Unité, Yaounde, June 1973; See also the article by Professor Ngu, "Probleme de la conscience professionnelle", in L'Unité No. 616, 26 February 1977. Yaounde; M. Ahidjo, Instruction générale n. 7/CAB/PR du 14 aout 1975 sur l'organisation du travail gouvernemental.
 53. Charter of the CNU: The State, (Title III, themes 7-11) Younde 1976.
 54. There is the contention that these have been accompanied by severe limitations on the right to dissent. See "New Cameroon Press Law", West

Africa, No. 3295, 15 September 1980, p. 1748; See also "Cameroon Press Law No. 66/LF/18 of December 21, 1966; Amendment Law No. 69/LF/60 of 10th November 1969; Supplement Law No. 69/LF/13 of 10th November 1969 and Amendment Law No. 73/6 of 7 December 1973.

55. I do not imply that social cleavages have been eroded in the Cameroon society, but that an attempt towards balancing the social differences in the country has at least been initiated by the government. Some form of equitable balance social and economic must be established between the groups to narrow the degree of socio-economic cleavages as much as possible. Failing to do so carries the risk that the lower stratum of the society is thrown into the position were the revolution of rising expectations could gradually slip to one of rising frustration. The consequences of rising frustration is grave, ranging from instability to disintegration. The price often paid is the loss of many lives. No one in the Cameroon truly and honestly wants to subscribe to this court of last appeal, Political developments in neighbouring Nigeria, Chad, Congo (Zaire) and Uganda to list but a few replicates prints on the sands of nation-building for Cameroonians to see and draw lessons from.
56. Epule, Kome. "The CNU and the National Revolution", Cameroon Tribune, June 18, 1980, Yaounde. Une interview à l'organisation du comité central de l'UNC sur le renouvellement des organes de base du parti, L'Unité, No. 604, 19 mars 1976.

Attempts have been made throughout the study to elucidate major value spectrums within the dinkum of Cameroon politics of unity in diversity and in sight into the supposition that societies striving for political integration require the application of four attributes (authoritarian, paternal, identific and consensual) in order to attain a substantial level of national cohesion, stability and continuity.

Furthermore, we have been exposed to the maxim that integration involves many complex interrelated changes in cultural values and attitudes, and in social, economic and political institutions and processes. Some of these changes imposed several strains upon the fabric of the society, others have been beneficial in balancing the molecule of fragmentation, development, stability and unity. Developing societies embarking on the process of political integration confront a variety of problems. The acuteness and intensity of these problems vary from country to country and from one time period to another. Some of the problems are solved, thereby increasing the functioning capacity of the system; others remain unsolved with the eventual consequences of jeopardizing the capabilities of the system.

Our concern here is to elucidate in a coherent pattern certain discernible problems such as (i) ethnic fragmentation; (ii) integrating political actors, participation and mobilization; (iii) resource allocation; (iv) Co-ordination and control; (v) administration and political leadership inherent in the Cameroon system.

ETHNIC FRAGMENTATION:

A pronounced characteristic of all emerging nations is the lack of integration among several cultural and ethnic groupings making up the polity. The problem of ethnic fragmentation is an almost unsolvable issue in Africa. Thus, the fragmentation of the country into a cluster of many tribes imposes strains on the new system. How did the evolving system solve the wide discrepancy between the values prevailing between the ethnic groups? How did it create a solid platform for national identity? Integration process in the Cameroon has helped to limit the degree and intensity of ethnic fragmentation. The multi-party system that prevailed until 1966 intensified the problem of ethnic disparity. During this period members of political parties were almost drawn from the party-leader's ethnic group or geographical location. To take just a few examples, the KNDP drew its support mostly from the people of the North-West and the CPNC from the South-West, following the ethnic base of the leaders of the two parties. Politics in this respect created or accelerated ethnic group mistrust and dissensus since the primary identification and loyalty of the individual was to his own immediate group rather than to the larger society.

Ethnic identity was stronger than national identity. Most leaders confronted with the problem of integrating their societies have relied upon nationalistic appeals and the effects of education, socialization and interdependent economy. The creation of the CNU in 1966 did gradually bridge the ethnic-frag-

mentation gap. The single party system has the synergy impact in uniting ethnic-fragmentation, which continues to be a problem of crucial importance and magnitude in Africa. Thus the formation of the CNU inherits all the material benefits of the Cameroonian people that once were dispersed within the OK, CPNC, KNDP, CUC, UPC, UC, MANC etc., "it has inherited the noble ideals which today continue to implement national unity, national awareness and national construction".¹⁾

The CNU has integrated political actors, which broadens the pattern of national consensus and identification and not least Cameroonification. The constituent element of development is no longer the narrow tribal constituency, but the much broader electorate platform - the CNU - for the performance of such functions as political socialization and recruitment, interest articulation, interest aggregation and political communication in a Cameroonian context. It promotes the feeling of awareness and oneness - orientations toward community.

The dominant position which the CNU occupies in the orientation of a wide cross section of the people has made it possible for the country to attain a relative degree of political stability, socio-cultural cohesion and economic integration and development in a magnitude far beyond its structure of socio-ethnic and eco-political fragmentation. In the political arena of contemporary Cameroon, there is no room for the maximization of ethnic affiliation, "peoples" attitudes and behaviour point in the direction of national identification.

Secondly, the policy of balanced development and concerted efforts in improving communication infrastructures has eliminated the isolation of ethnic groups by bringing such groups into contact with others in other parts of the society; the location of new development projects in relatively underdeveloped rural areas has also implied the exodus of people from one region to another. This helps to break down the structure of ethnic setting, just as it promotes a national culture. The expansion of the educational sector, particularly institutions of higher learning, brings together a configuration of people whose ethnic values are suppressed in place of an evolving national culture. Inter-ethnic marriages reinforced by rapid social and economic changes have contributed to an increasing rate of transactional integration at the national level.

The problem of ethnic fragmentation in the Cameroon context could be seen as being under control as a result of two inter-related development (i) the CNU as a dynamic mechanism articulating amalgamated national identity termed Cameroonian; and (ii) the genuine recognition of the diversity of the peoples, while a sense of national integration exists among the fragmented groups. What is taking place in the Cameroon is a policy of inter ethnic integration based on the two approaches. This seems to be the secret behind Cameroon's productive process in national integration.

INTEGRATING POLITICAL ACTORS:

The proliferation of political parties up to 1966 created the situation of competition for power

largely between ethnic units, since other forms of group identity at the national level usually were not sufficiently developed to provide a wide basis of support. The coming into being of the CNU is a maximizing mechanism for fulfilling certain functional imperatives of the polity such as the integration of political actors, mobilization, participation, socialization etc; thus the mechanisms developed within the CNU have the dynamics for conflict-resolution between ethnic groups and political actors shading different political opinions. Membership of the party thus fulfills at least two crucial social imperatives in respect of (i) positive focus or inclination towards national identification, and (ii) the credulous exposure of members to the divulgation of national images which in turn contributes to eliminating the problems of ethnic and political fragmentation. Political boundaries between the political actors have been eliminated at least; the degree of consensus increases as social change increases and the processes of modernization are directed, coordinated and linked together towards national unity, or as President Ahidjo points out, "there is no development without national will, and no nation without national unity".

Cameroonians no longer participate in distinctly different political patterns of behaviour, but their ideals are accommodated within the fulcrum of the CNU as the raw material reservoir for the development of the country. The accommodation of the ideas, the process of socialization and participation under the CNU umbrellla, has eased the enormity of the problems of political instability faced by nations, hence the country's smooth transition from political and ethnic fragmentation to an integrated political community.

The level of involvement and participation within the system, whether passive or active, has a common goal of identification - the Nation. Moreover, the outcome of presidential and parliamentary elections, pulling over 99 per cent of the votes cast, serve as pointers underlying the degree of national assimilation. Populace support for the party throughout the country legitimizes the party. The sociality between the CNU and the bureaucratic machinery of government is a further attempt at getting every person and institution involved in the process of national integration. The following statement mirrors Party-Governmental correlation in the politicization process of national integration.

....in countries like ours where there is only one single political formation in existence, Party-Government relations do not set any problems in theory because the Government is a manifestation of the Party....It is therefore a question of a role which conceives and directs, manages and organizes, controls and animates, tending to emphasize the actual primacy of the Party over the organs of the state machinery.....2)

The CNU creates a platform for the free flow of communication between the political classes and the masses which gives the governed the opportunity of identifying themselves with the ru-

ling elites. Social communication, as Deutsch points out, is a desideratum for the emanation of a sense of identity within the society.³⁾

As an integrating forum, the CNU manifests the basis for mobilization, with the inbuilt mechanism and capacity for communication whereby tensions and confrontations within the society are minimized. There is the contention that the integration of societies with inconsistent value system is more susceptible to conflict if they lack the capacity to communicate, and that a stable integrated political system is realized if the society develops a penetrating sense of mutual awareness and responsiveness among its diverse entities.⁴⁾

The process of integration in the country is relevant within these two suppositions. To begin with both East and West Cameroon had developed under different systems which accentuated the inheritance of non-uniform values and administrative systems. The perceptions of the two states of a new political community were not identical in this respect. The democratic diffusion of the old political power images and quid pro quo warranted a high degree of political integration and the inevitable destruction of old values and beliefs so as to traverse the multifarious pockets of power from exterminating one another and thereby the state. The débacle of such infighting was sufficient to set in motion destructive elements of instability and other forces of disruption within the evolving new political entity.

By developing a sense of awareness the country has evaded conflict and confrontation among its incapsulated socio-cultural units. A political means has been used to create national identity, the party and the state being the symbols for national unity and identification. In this way the masses congregate authority with charisma by responding to national authority. A political formula is created through which the philosophical orientation of the nation is propagated to a wider public. The following factors have contributed to the formula being widely accepted:

- (1) Various cultural symbols and historical experiences have been exploited in fortifying political solidarity;
- (2) The fortification of political solidarity reinforces the social status of the elites-status quo maintenance;
- (3) To some extent, anomic interest articulation is low because initiative and actions come from above, which reinforces authoritarian rule: See Figures 7-9.
- (4) It should also be noted that a low incidence of anomic interest articulation is no indication of mutual identification of interests between the elites and the masses or between governed and governors. It may entail government's repressive attitude towards the people, but where such repressiveness is designed to hold the society as one entity. As one writer puts it,

Ahidjo is in undisputed control of the country, and has built up his seemingly inviolable position by the judicious mixtures of moderate tactics and toughhandedness, when he feels this is necessary in the interest of the nation.⁵⁾

Thus, increased centralization of power in the state, coupled with the weakening of traditional sources of authority or the increasing utilization of certain traditional sources of authority in modern government has in different ways contributed towards the integration of political actors, increased popular participation, and encouraged identification of individuals with the political system in general.

RESOURCE ALLOCATION:

Resource allocation (distributive justice) has so far not presented major problems because East Cameroon gracefully accepted meeting the economic burden of unification. With an economic comparative advantage over West Cameroon, efforts were made at the initial phase of integration to bring the appalling economy of West Cameroon on a sound footing. The policy of equal or balanced development has since been followed. The political strategy of balanced development under the concept of "planned liberalism" has paid political dividends as mirrored by the relative degree of stability and economic growth.⁶⁾

The attempt to level out the differences in economic and social development of the country has had the effect of intensifying participation and involvement. In short the problem of resource allocation was therefore solved almost during the first phase of unification. The unitary system introduced in 1972 intensified the process of balanced development. Much has since been done to improve the quality of life in the rural areas, and even though there is still the rural - urban differentiation, the country by 1978 had already doubled its per capita income as compared to 1960, which was one of the major targets of the country's five-year development plans. As a matter of fact, it is governmental action or inaction which provides the raw material from which supportive attitudes are reinforced or weakened. In respect of resource allocation, the government has supplied the materials in a balanced pattern and with the purpose of consolidating national unity.

THE PROBLEMS OF CONTROL, COORDINATION AND ADMINISTRATION:

Among the integration problems, the one that besets the country most is that of control, coordination and administration. Administrative and political centralization has reduced the economic cost of running four legislative assemblies and three administrative units. But in reality centralization has not brought increased administrative efficiency; rather it has created more problems of serious dimensions.

The most outstanding structural problems inherent in the administrative system of the country include: (i) overcentralization; (ii) poor coordination; (iii) lack of autonomy and initiative; and (iv) the escalating spectre of corruption and growing inefficiency coupled with the lack of responsibility and duty consciousness.

Though the alliance between party-state bureaucracies could be seen as cementing the pillars of national cohesion, nonetheless it is entrenched with certain negative characteristics that impedes social development. It also calls to question the credibility of the system as such.

In the first place, it is now difficult to draw a demarcation line between party and governmental functions; and because party activities (necessary as they may be) are given preference to governmental functions, civil servants of lower ranks who hold high positions within the party hierarchy very often undermine instructions from their senior officers within the administrative apparatus. Senior administrative officers cannot discipline junior workers as such. Such undermining leads to complete lack of discipline, improper flow of communication and worse still, inappropriate verdicts in conflict-situations. Many party members have capitalized on the holy alliance between Party-State bureaucracies in advancing selfish ends. This is one source of corruption.

Secondly, centralization in general necessitates a very powerful control and coordination mechanism involving human expertise and modern technological appliances. The country is short of both. But the degree of corruption and inefficiency prevailing in the country should not be attributed to these but rather to the individuals who administer policies. The sum total of individual actions and behaviour make the system uncreditworthy. The blame is on a system that permits employees from the rank of senior district officers down to messengers invading the capital in search of their dossiers for employment and payment of their salaries. In this respect, one can argue that the system of administrative centralism as practiced in the country is imbued with a clearly inbuilt failure mechanism involving inefficiency and corruption, and the improper utilization of manpower resources.

The inefficiency of the administrative sector is attributed partly to the unclarified institutional relationship between the Party and Government and partly to the individuals making up the system. Secondly, unclarified institutional relationships and individual self-interest add to duty-unconsciousness and a total lack of a sense of responsibility. This is exactly the problem with the contemporary Cameroon administrative system.

Political cohesion and national unity have been achieved but with an administrative centralization that undermines the consolidation of national unity. Individual members of the ruling party are using the fusion of political and governmental process in a highly partisan way, which creates occupational hazards as well as jeopardising professional ethics. That is to say loyalty to the political party at the expense of administrative efficiency or against professional ethics poses grave problems of conscience for the individuals who are generally devoted to the progress of the nation.

When the bureaucracy begins to function in a highly partisan way, it becomes difficult to put an end to ethnic rivalry, particularly when employment no longer departs from the premises

of qualification but from the prerequisite of tribal or ethnic affiliation. This constitutes a major problem within the administrative sector.

Overcentralization, poor coordination and lack of autonomy and initiative add to the work load of the echelon of the administrative sector in that minor disputes which are expected to be resolved at a lower strata of authority are elevated to ministerial, cabinet and chief executive level for settlement. Constant cabinet changes and the barage of presidential decrees could be analytically interpreted within this perspective. Even though these actions enhance the concept of "a ruling or executive presidential system", nonetheless they perpetuate the maxim that inefficiency increases the burden on the top of the hierarchy to impose coordination and supervision.

Administrative efficiency calls for a functional relationship between the party and the institutions of government in a manner that harnesses resources and enhances responsibility and duty consciousness among the people. Therefore,

its performance accordingly must be increasing efficiency. And this will depend not only on the training of its cadres but also and perhaps most of all upon their moral qualities, their sense of duty, their devotion to the public welfare; in a word upon their professional concientiousness.⁷¹

The fusion of the party machinery with the bureaucratic institutions of government has much to gain when there is clear-cut flow of regulatives and disciplines guiding the task it plays in the dynamic enterprise of cohesive development and national unity, an issue aptly summarized in the following statement:

The principle of good administration is that the duties of each service should be clearly defined so that each person knows which missions are entrusted to him so that human and material resources may be properly determined.

Despite these theoretical administrative guidelines, and the spectre of increasing centralization in contemporary Cameroon administration, the problem of efficiency and corruption remains and continues to grow alarmingly for every administrative decree issued. In other words much has yet to be done to maximize the realization in visible practice of President Ahidjo's three principles of good administration advanced at the first ordinary Congress of the CNU in 1969.

In offering these suggestions we have to bear in mind that the move to create political and administrative centralization was of utmost importance in securing national consolidation and an integrated community. With national unity assured, continued overcentralization of the administrative sector rather than serving a useful purpose impedes the credibility of the system.

The basic characteristic of the social orientation of the country's bureaucracy as a major instrument of social change and political socialization should be "decentralization", and trickling down of powers from the centre to the periphery.

Decentralization of the administrative sector and the transfer of power to the periphery will increase the scope of social and political participation of many interest groups in the polity. It will also increase the credibility of the system as well as minimize bribery, corruption and inefficiency.

What are the changes needed in this respect?

1. Each of the seven provinces should have a public service commission charged with the responsibility of coordinating employment in the provinces.
2. Divisional officers should be empowered to employ workers of lower grade from clerical assistant downwards.
3. The outstanding criteria for employment should be qualification.
4. The party-administrative alliance should be re-defined in the sense that party meetings (where possible) should not be conducted during working hours.
5. Party discipline and administrative ethics must be maintained and encouraged but not at the expense of each other. The boundary-difference between the two institutions must be retained and respected so that no one dominates the other, but that both in a harmonious way contribute jointly to the progress and unity of the nation.

In conclusion, a number of distinctive features significant in the process of national integration show that political and administrative centralism, while solving the problems of national cohesion and legitimacy, has also facilitated the problems of administrative inefficiency, bribery and corruption as civil servants chase their employment or pay vouchers in the capital. This explains why discontent with the administrative system is so prevalent among the people, particularly in West Cameroon, which before 1972 was used to clearly defined administrative procedures, functions and ethics. People never left their assignments in the various divisions to go to the regional capital in search of their employment and salary vouchers. Junior workers were reprimanded for breach of professional ethics or gross negligence of their duties by senior officers. There was a considerable sense of duty. Since 1972 the situation has been different. It is a common practice today that people work for more than nine months without receiving their salary. Administrative centralism has created a situation where nobody is responsible for anything and where the morale and the sense of duty of the middle and lower grade civil servants have deteriorated to a very low level.

It can be argued that system innovation has intensified certain malpractices, which have complicated the process of institutionalization. System capabilities designed to forge national cohesion and unity have in certain areas failed to meet the needs of the people. Inefficiency at the lower strata of the civil service increases the duties of the top civil servants, since decisions which ought to be processed and taken at the lower level are instead taken by top bureaucrats. There is a

need for stronger control and integration of input and output flow of the administrative system. Attitude and behaviour change are greatly needed within the administrative sector, that is, individual political attitudes must reflect or become part of the political process of the society. This is not the case within the administrative sector in contemporary Cameroon. The type of disciplinary action which top civil servants are exposed to should be extended to the lower level of the administration, without which people will not truly harvest the fruits of the grand coalition of 20 May 1972.

Paradoxically, since the historical compromise of May 20 1972, the output of the administrative system cements rather than separates two crucial issue areas, namely "favour" and "service". The unholy combination of these two issue areas within the administrative system contributes to the appalling standard of the country's bureaucratic machinery. The cancer of the administrative conscience - where the most easily identified symptom is an irregularity in the way the infected person starts to perform his/her duties - indicates that system change has not occurred at the individual level in this respect. The administrative system has undergone structural changes, but the individuals making up the system have not been able to keep pace with these changes, hence their inability to distinguish between what is "service" and what is "favour" in performing their duties. Professional ethics is an unknown concept within the parameters of the bureaucratic machinery of contemporary Cameroon. There is the need for a paradigm shift within this sector in order to initiate and propel new processes of system and individual changes in the country.

This paradigm shift is necessary, because civil servants constitute a vital organ within the fabric of the nation; and each of them like a cell has a specific function to perform for the efficient functioning of the entire system. Once some of the higher cells (in this case "service" or duty consciousness) become contaminated with the cancerous lower cells of "favour" (bribery, corruption, tribalistic affiliation etc) then the system becomes ill. If several people/organs lose their conscience (professional ethics in performing their duties) or the life-wire organ of the nation loses its conscience, the nation like the human body starts to decompose or disintegrate and eventually becomes unpleasant to live in, hence the quest for a paradigm shift to comprehend the dehumanising and mal-integrative effects of an inefficient bureaucratic machinery.

So far, Cameroon has not reached the critical stage of disintegration - but it is loaded with a top-heavy inefficient bureaucracy that often slows simple decisions for months. If this were allowed to continue, it would create issues that could perpetuate an unpleasant outcome. No one wants to be a witness to the 'court of last appeal' that plagued East Cameroon right up to the early 1970s when the leader of the guerrilla insurgent movement was publicly exposed to the bullets of a military firing squad.

Currently, there is an unquenchable appetite of "favour" replacing "service" as the legalized aspect of the administra-

tive establishment of the nation. If allowed to continue, it would eventually devour whatever gains have been attained in the political, economic and cultural process of national integration. The effects of such a malintegrative process on the nation are far-reaching and appalling. National cohesion resources including human resources become maimed and the nation-state itself becomes maimed.

The 'powers that be' must step in with far reaching political and administrative surgery and amputate the cells that are effecting the nation's body. There is no doubt that such radical measures will hurt initially, but what we are interested in is a healthy, integrated and efficient body emerging from the surgery to truly reflect the authenticity and autonomy of the Cameroon nation.

This kind of political operation is necessary because bureaucracies are of enormous importance in the performance of the communication functions in political systems. The bureaucracy is perhaps the most important source of information about public issues and politically significant events; as such, it goes without saying that bureaucracies, more often than not, monopolize output functions of the political system. Furthermore, they are indispensable in the rule-making and adjudication processes, as well as influential in the political processes of interest articulation, communication and aggregation.

Since bureaucrats enforce laws, policies or decisions, and are in constant contact with the public and in possession of vital information on a wide variety of issues affecting the daily life of the people (and in making and enforcing public policy) the role of the bureaucracy in the conversion processes of political systems can make or mar the political objectives of the evolving system.

If the authority wishes to come to grips effectively with the problems of national integration and political development it must act swiftly in devising ways for controlling and preventing the bureaucracy from getting out of hand in the conversion processes of the political system of the country.

It is vital for the country at this stage, given the complexity of its colonial past and technical nature of the activities of the country's endeavours in the process of modernization, to develop effective checks on the conversion or output functions of the Party-State bureaucracies. The bureaucracy as the core of the government and the party should function in such a pattern that it neither arouses malintegrative and instability tendencies nor creates situations that challenge the fundamental political will of the people.

In the final analysis, the four attributes underlying the thesis of this study must at this stage of development be applied more vigorously to ensure the emergence of a proper functioning of the services within the framework of an increasing enlarged development-oriented administration. It is only through the proper functioning of government services, that is, the output conversion of the party/state bureaucracies, that the State can achieve its objectives - a sense of community and distributive justice for all.

The political system of the Cameroon and the relative degree of political cohesiveness and stability has much to do with the style, content of ideological orientation and the personality of the President towards the nation. This has directly or indirectly influenced the pattern of administrative responsiveness, the alliance between the political and governmental process, and participation within the system, as well as it has shaped the overall trend of national development in the process of national integration and socio-economic transformation.

A framework for analysing how an individual leader can shape and influence his society has already been presented in the section "Conceptual Propositions"; It is sufficient here to further elaborate on that framework by defining the leader of a polity in structural terms as an individual occupying the political role which entails compliance from the broadest range of other office-holders in the political structure, and leadership as being the measure of how effectively the person occupying the role of leader uses his power.

The outstanding issue in this section is to focus attention on how President Ahidjo has tried in different ways to deal with certain specific problems namely (i) to establish and maintain his legitimacy and effectiveness, and from which sector does he draw support; (ii) which of his significant policies could be perceived as innovative and which are creative and how far have these policies been received by the various social and economic groupings of the society; and (iii) how has he sought to build support for himself and for his policies? What have been the overall consequences of his policy approach to national integration?

Political leadership in the Cameroon posits a combination of (i) rational or legal authority, grounded on the belief in the legality of rules and the right of those holding authoritative positions by virtue of those rules to issue commands, and (2) charismatic or personal authority, resting on devotion to the specific sanctity, heroism, or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative pattern or order revealed by him.

Secondly we have to bear in mind the wide variety of ways in which the Head of State interacts with persons and institutions in the performance of his duty. The range of structural relationship ranges from the involvement of those who are directly subordinate to the leader in a hierarchy, to those who share the common values of the society but work in autonomous institutions, for example certain powerful traditional dynasties or religious institutions. These two variables of institutional autonomy and identical degree of commitment to common values interact with other variables in manipulating the extent of resources and intensity of concern over issues in order to establish the degree to which actors will either restrict or promote the structural role of the leader.

As a matter of fact, the constraints placed on the role of the leader following the dynamics of institutional consanguinity can be changed, i.e. the leader can alter the pattern

of relationships existing between him and others by utilizing his inherent power resources, for example, using the letter of the constitution in dismissing parliament or appointing ministers and other officials. The possession of such powers and the ability in his dealings with other issues combine in developing and manifesting the greatest possible margin of committed support for his activities. In short, the leader has to establish his legitimacy and the way of generating support evolves around the type of policies or style of his role. The second factor involves effectiveness. The combination of the two variables gives what may be termed as "ideal types" or an abstraction of leadership or the relationship between the leader and other actors. This also forms what can be fashioned as the stereotype of a charismatic leader, with the attributes of possessing the capacity to inspire and sustain loyalty and devotion to him personally, apart from those powers bestowed by his office or status.

"IDEAL TYPES" OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A LEADER
AND THOSE SUBJECT TO HIS SUZERAINTY

Committed to leader as:

Fig. 10

		INDIVIDUAL	INSTITUTIONAL
Formation for reward for supporters is:	Immaterial	Charismatic	Rational-Legal (Identific)
	Material	Boss (Authoritarian)	Patrimonial (Paternal)

EFFECTIVENESS

Fig. 11

		+	-
LEGITIMACY	+	1	2
	-	3	4

Box (I) = High legitimacy and effectiveness denotes stable political systems. Box 4 denotes unstable political systems like those in Congo (Zaire) 1960-66; Nigeria 1966-70; Ghana, Chad and other African countries.

The legitimacy of the country's political leadership can be perceived from two dimensions, the combination of which gives us four "ideal types" of relationship between the leader and

those subjected to his suzerainty fig. 10. The second diagram fig. 11 Box 1 shows the legitimacy and effectiveness in the system as it affects political stability. Cameroon fits in Box (1)

LEGITIMACY AND EFFECTIVENESS:

The process of national integration as already discussed in the previous sections reveals that political leadership operates with charismatic and authoritarian characteristics on the individual level and with paternal and identific attributes at the institutional level. Thus, the Cameroon political leadership operating under the ideological concept of "planned liberalism"⁹⁾ and "ruling democracy"¹⁰⁾ creates an ideal policy "innovator" leader, that is a leader who makes changes in policy in any possible direction. The president has made policy changes reforming the nature and pattern of the political and governmental process in the country. Furthermore, we can add that the President has equally presented two ideal types of "style" - the "brokerage" and the "creative". In respect of the "brokerage" style, priority has always been given to the constellation of interests in the polity by directing efforts to putting together those combinations of interests that seem most likely to provide the leader with the best possible support needed in articulating and aggregating system change.

One or two examples will suffice. For example, Ahidjo faced a hostile South when he became Head of State in 1958. With political skill he was able to incorporate even his most bitter critics in the governmental and political process of the country.¹¹⁾ The coming into being of the CNU, governmental changes in West Cameroon during 1965-68, the unitary government, and statements such as;

The time has come for us to proceed to the higher stage of national and social integration. This means that from now on, in every day lives, we must bear in mind that before being a Cameroonian, from this tribe to that tribe...we are first and foremost Cameroonians... We must bear in mind that before being English-speaking or French-speaking, we are first and foremost Cameroons... ¹²⁾

offer the best illustration in this respect.

The other is the "creative" style where the leader establishes new groupings over the existing structures either through attracting new participants into the national political platform or by inducing existing participants to articulate and aggregate issues from different perspectives. Constant cabinet reshuffling, appointment and promotion of people to certain key posts, present typical examples in this category. The "brokerage" and "creative" styles of leadership complement one another, and the "brokerage" leader functions best where role expectations are already established, and where potential interests are already articulated. The range of interests among the political actors at the time of the creation of the CNU

were identical and thus facilitated the "broker's" style of leadership. "Creative" leadership functions best in a situation where role expectation is more diffuse, for example during the early phase of unification and the quest by West Cameroon for decentralization or continued regional autonomy, or the kind of uncertain situation that clouded East Cameroon up to mid-1960.¹³⁾

The leader had to be creative to make new alignments to provide him with support. Thus, the UC/KNDP parliamentary alliances in the Federal National Assembly contracted in 1962 were policy actions for upgrading the common interest in areas where there existed the possibilities of manifesting political potential for consensus in pursuit of policies for the common good. The "brokerage" and "creative" leadership style has been skillfully exploited by the President of the Cameroon and this furthers the legitimacy and effectiveness of political leadership in the country.

As a developing polity the leader operates under two distinct sectors, namely the "modern" and "residual", since these two sectors hold different perceptions of the role of the leader as well as they provide different bases of legitimacy and support to the different political institutions.¹⁴⁾

For members of the residual groups, particularly the peasants and low income groups, the national leader is expected to behave as a traditional chief writ large, the "fatherly" role where his powers are utilized to generate change in the society. For the "modern" sector, composed of elites and the masses, the urban rich and white collar workers, expectations of the leader's role differ somewhat. This category of people expects the leader to innovate policies that accelerate the industrialization of the nation, which in turn enhances their role in the society. Due recognition is given to skill as being the basis for the redistribution of privileges. Therefore established structures with vested interests in the status quo must be maintained.

Political leadership in the country has entailed articulating and aggregating policies that satisfy the needs of the two divergent groups - the elites and the masses and the modern and rural sectors-as well as balancing ethnic fragmentation with the political and governmental process, since the demands of the various sectors, "residual and modern" differ, which increases pressure and expectation on the role of the president to deliver the right goods, and draws attention to (i) the performance of his role and (ii) establishing the legitimacy of that role.

Political leadership in the country has to the largest possible extent been most solicitous in balancing the interests of the various groupings by functioning as (a) "innovating" leader and (b) as a creative leader, which by and large has contributed towards easing the process of national integration. For example the President accepting his nomination as the CNU candidate for the 1975 election and in response to the wishes of the vast majority of the Cameroon people, used the opportunity to outline major policy objectives and actions

which demanded greater changes within the system in order to grease the integrative process. The main policy objectives included: (a) to consolidate national unity, ironing out rivalries and tribal division; (b) to combat natural and historical imbalance between regions to ensure a harmonious development of the whole country; (c) to boost efficiency of state organisation; (d) to promote economic development on a liberal basis; (e) to give priority to agriculture as the foundation for industrialization; (f) to develop traditional culture; and (g) to remain faithful to the ideals of peace and justice and reaffirm the principle of non-alignment and the ultimate goal of total freedom and unity for Africa.¹⁵⁾

As a creative leader, the President, in announcing his intention to accept the CNU candidature for the Presidential election, decided to create the post of - Prime Minister,¹⁶⁾ because he did not intend to "stay in power for ever", and in making the decision he had subordinated his "personal interest to the general interest and the paramount interests of the nation".¹⁷⁾

The policy approach of planting the ideals of national awareness, of resolving social and political cleavages between the various strata of society, continues to appeal to both the rural and modern sectors, to the youths as well as the older generation, from West to East and from North to South. This highlights the basis of his legitimacy.¹⁸⁾ Ahidjo's basis of legitimacy, which originally was in the North, has proliferated into every sector of the social fabric of the society. His legitimacy now comes from the basis of mass consent. Stated in another way, Ahidjo's presidential style has been of a "mobilization" character, in that he has all along sought to mobilize the masses. The President has articulated social change among the northern pagans whose political emergence could threaten the Fulani-dominated Moslem emirates on which Ahidjo had initially based his party's strength. Perhaps in an effort to avoid too abrupt a change in the north he has also encouraged the Islamization of the pagan communities and their incorporation into the mainstream of the political party's life. In the south and west Ahidjo has sought to build a base of genuine if not frenzied support by capitalizing on the rivalries and disunities among the southern political groups, by carefully playing the role of honest broker between them, and by displacing the older established leadership with younger and more technically oriented and competent people who owe their high position solely to Ahidjo's favour.¹⁹⁾

Therefore the basic values with which the President has sought to underpin his legitimacy and effectiveness revolve around the egalitarian basis of popular consent, hierarchical values of playing the role of a chief with large being a prudent modernizer, nearness to the ruling elites and maintaining their status quo, and the open policy appeal to the youths.

Our young people, who are the soundest, readiest and most forceful part of the Nation's strength, must be in the fore-front of the struggle which the Party and the

Government are waging to achieve national unity and enhance independence in every sphere. In other words, the Nation's drive to win full mastery of its destiny will not attain its full magnitude until there is a feeling among young people that they are mobilized for the construction of a strong, prosperous and independent nation.²⁰⁾

Election results demonstrate that his charismatic appeal cuts across all the sections of the society. In the 1975 presidential elections only 50 blank votes were cast as against three million yes votes for his re-election. The very high percentage of votes cast for the President bears eloquent witness to the attachment of the Cameroonian people to the sacred alliance which they have sealed with their prestigious leader within the CNU. "It illustrated the democratic nature of the Cameroon's political system"²¹⁾ as well as giving incentives for system change as indicated by the following statement from the Head of State.

The next five years, emphasis would be given to creative initiative, competence, productivity, professional conscience and professional integrity and commitment, responsibility and merit. A policy of realistic reformism should lead to self-development and the construction of a new Cameroon.²²⁾

The massive vote for a fifth consecutive term of office for Ahidjo following the 1980 elections (in which he pulled 99.99% of the votes) testifies to the basic legitimacy and effectiveness of the nature of political leadership in the country. As one official commented on the importance of continuing Ahidjo's presidency:

It is believed that grim reminders of the sufferings of neighbours, especially those to the North where over 120.000 refugees from strife-torn Chad have been streaming into our cities in droves have lent an added sense of indispensability to Ahidjo's candidacy. More than ever before, a vote for Ahmadou Ahidjo at this juncture was viewed by the true majority of the over three million electorate as truly a vote for stability, peace and progress.....²³⁾

In evaluating a leader's performance in the Cameroon, we need to bear in mind certain advantages President Ahidjo enjoys; being the first President and the leader of the CNU gives him the ample opportunity to structure expectations as to how role functions should be. Thus a subsequent Head of State would face the difficult task of altering established roles. The present pattern of political leadership has become an indispensable factor in the process of national integration and particularly in a country that has enjoyed twenty years of independence and eight years of unitary government without any major internal political upheaval.²⁴⁾

The secret of this fantastic success is attributed to a num-

ber of various factors which incorporate authoritarian; consensual, paternal and identific variables in different combination. Crudely stated, rather than stabilize his regime and secure its future on the basis of an élan (particularly during the early years of independence), Ahidjo articulated policy measures that dampened political militancy, especially in rebellion-weary southern and central coastal regions. He went further by catering to the interests of neglected groups for more equitable distribution of national wealth and development projects in the hope that significant growth in the industrial sector and moderate improvement of the economy generally would mollify the dissident but comparatively privileged areas of the coastal regions. The dynamics and mechanism of this creative and innovative policy approach mirror the latitude of political stability and national awareness enjoyed by the country.

President Ahidjo hit the nail on the head on this issue when addressing the National Assembly and the Nation last year:

....in order to safeguard our precious achievements and pursue our onward march on the road to a new humanism, we have to get rid of moribund values of the past and introduce new values imbued with hope, as well as seek an ideal which acts as a driving force - our wish is that the mystique of unity becomes for all Cameroonians a state of mind, a state of soul and impulse of the heart.²⁵⁾

From the vantage position as head of state and as a skilled tactician he succeeded in the 1960's through different combinations of consensual and authoritative means to build a political party base broad enough to facilitate the allocation of resources on a national basis, thereby alleviating regional disparities and ethnic fragmentation. Through the party it has been possible to develop the cohesive and ideological committed followers and cadres necessary for the mobilization of resources for self-development. The policy of "planned liberalism" has promoted economic growth and the needs of the modern sector met; at the same time, various reforms have brought about the assimilation of the government and party apparatus into a more centralized organisation capable of re-allocating privileges from the modern sector to the residual sector.

Such encompassing principles for political alignments and harmonisation have averted the perils of political instability and stagnation which have brought chaos to a number of African states.²⁶⁾

The tentative conclusion to be drawn from this is that political leadership has directed the course of national integration and planted the seeds of stability and continuity in the Cameroon. The policy approach construed on the basis of "innovation" safeguards the legitimacy and effectiveness of the leader and of the system as well. It gives the leader the leverage to mobilize the people to organise for concerted action. As an innovator with positive responses from the masses, channelling opposition to his leadership through a "brokerage" approach has averted a break-down in civil order. The present political leadership has skilfully utilized its "creative

style" to unite members of the polity and pull them away from dangerously divisive alignments such as regionalism and ethnic fragmentation. On the other hand, the "creative" style has contributed immensely and positively in creating balance between the fragmented groups and enabling the leader to advance towards an equitable and prosperous society, or as one writes it;

....the rulers and the ruled, the old and the young who must continuously demonstrate our patriotism by rallying behind comrade Ahidjo to support him in the difficult task of keeping Cameroon one.²⁷⁾

In the final analysis, the manifest identities and the problems confronting an integrating polity demand political leadership that is both effective and farsighted. It requires an ideal leader imbued with the qualities and characteristics of "creativity and innovation" capable of finding the bases for legitimacy among a wide spectrum of both the modern and residual sectors, and of creating new groupings for the purpose of propelling all forces towards an integrated and stable political entity.

Political leadership in the Cameroon, through skilful manipulation of the political actors and institutions, incorporating authoritarian, consensual, identific and paternal attributes in different mixture and at different time periods, has succeeded in manifesting stability, new values and beliefs, creating new centres of power and propelling the entire nation towards cohesion, the shift from "individualism" to the "we" or "collective" feeling. In short, establishing the basis for national unity in a country plagued by political, regional and ethnic cleavages, not to mention divergent colonial experience inherited from Euro-cultural values and identities. Hence, in the process of socialization emphasis is laid on unity for national construction as demonstrated in speeches and addresses by the President to the mass public.

We shall never be tired of repeating as we have on other occasions, that economic development which will give a more substantial content to our independence cannot be achieved without this National Unity.²⁸⁾

Commitment to the politically desirable goal of national unity is defined by the President of the State and Party in terms of:

Firstly, the State which from now on is extending the network of its administration and its communication over the whole territory is transcending regional peculiarities and manifesting in a lively and permanent fashion the unity of the country. Secondly, economic unification which is linking more and more closely together the different regions in a network of trade relationships which reinforce their solidarity all the more. Lastly, the Party which appears as a privileged framework in which is worked out the will of the community to continue

is solidarity and to collectively pursue the realization of its historic destiny.²⁹⁾

Political leadership and the process of national integration in the Cameroon has within the short period of twenty years, scarcely the span of a generation witnessed immense changes, of historical dimensions unparalleled on the African continent. Cameroon has metamorphosed from colonial tutelage, through pre-independence, self governance and the euphoria of the first years of actual independence, to its present stage of maturity and self-reliance. Cameroon has witnessed the rise and fall and rise again of sister nations all around her; she has stood firm as the rock amidst the tubulent sea around her, of coups and counter coups, mysteriously perhaps, but all the same as firm as granite rock. If history is any indication of the future, if Cameroon is to continue her development on the same steep gradient as in the past, then we are sure to witness sweeping changes in Cameroon in the next two decades. Political leadership will play a decisive role in bringing about anticipated system changes in the country.

Notes:

1. CNU Militant guide, 1976, p. 9 Yaounde
2. *ibid.* p. 63
3. See Deutsch, K.W. *Nationalism and Social Communication*, New York, 1966.
4. See Easton, David. *A System analysis of political life*, Chicago 1965; Wright, Quincy. "The nature of conflict", *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. IV, June 1951.
5. Special Report, Africa Magazine, "Ahidjo holds Tight the Reign", January 1978, p. 53, London.
6. See the following publications. Ministry of Planning and Territorial Development, *Five Year Development Plans from 1960 - 1981*. Five of such five year plans have been put into action since 1960. The Fifth Five Year Plan commences from 1981-86. Publications by Ndongko (1975), Hugon (1968) *International Monetary Fund IMF* (1968), Johnson (1970), Forje (1977), Henn, J.K. *Peasants, Workers and Capital: The Political Economy of Labour incomes in Cameroon*, Harvard University Press, 1978. Clignet, (1976).
7. Ahidjo. Address to the 1st Ordinary Congress of the CNU, Gaoura, March 1969.
8. Address by President Ahidjo to Students at the School of Administration and Magistracy (ENAM), February 1974.
9. See *The Political Philosophy of Ahmadou Ahidjo*, Yaounde 1968, p. 93; Ahidjo, A. General Policy Report, 3rd Ordinary CNU Congress, Bafoussam, 12-17 February 1980.
10. Ahidjo, A. General Policy Report, 2nd Ordinary CNU Congress, Douala, February 10-15, 1975.
11. See Johnson, *The Cameroon Federation*, 1970; Le Vine, V. *From Mandate to*

Independence, 1964; Joseph, R. *Radical Nationalism in the Cameroon*, 1977; Bayart, Jean-Francois. *L'Etat au Cameroun* 1979. Ahidjo, A-Z Youande 1976 and many of his speeches in which he constantly appealed to the people to sink their differences and work for the interest of the country.

12. "President Ahidjo takes oath of Office", Cameroon Tribune, May 7, 1980, Yaounde.
13. See publications by Johnson, Le Vine, Eyinga, A. Introduction à la politique camerounaise, Paris, 1978; Bayart, Jean Francois, 1979.
14. See definition by Aristide Zolberg on the concept of "modern and residual power", in *Creating Political Order: The Party States of West Africa*, Rand, McNally, Chicago 1966, pp 131-134.
15. African Research Bulletin, "Cameroon: Presidential Election, 1975", March 7-13, 1975.
16. Africa, "Cameroon: New Prime Minister", No. 49, September 1975, p. 71; Marchés Tropicaux et Méditerranéens, February 21, 1975; Cameroon Tribune, February 1975.
17. Marchés Tropicaux et Méditerranéens February 21, 1975.
18. In 1975 a 26 year old lawyer, Philemon Yunji Yang was appointed Vice Minister for Territorial Administrations, a move seen as narrowing the generation gap and as incentives to the younger generation playing active roles in national-integration.
19. See Johnson, *ibid*, 1970.
20. Ahidjo in a speech on the occasion of the 9th Youth Day celebrations, Douala, February 1975.
21. Marchés Tropicaux et Méditerranéens, 11-18 April 1975. See also Cameroon Tribune, April 1975.
22. *ibid*.
23. "1980 Presidential Elections: Massive 99.99 % Vote for Ahidjo", Cameroon Tribune, April 9, 1980. See also "President Ahidjo's inaugural Speech", Cameroon Tribune, May 7, 1980, in which he drew attention on the need for peace and development.
We were determined that our revolution should be peaceful, never violent, tumultuous or boisterous, never destructive not nuzzling but living, always creative and innovative, fundamentally dedicated to the gradual but certain improvement of the material and normal living conditions of Cameroons.
(Speech to the National Assembly on taking oath of office, May, 1980, Yaounde.)
24. See Vai, Martin. "Cameroons Celebrate twenty years of independence and eight years of Unitary State", Cameroon Tribune, May 21, 1980.
25. President Ahidjo in a message to the Nation on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of Cameroon Independence and the 8th birthday of the Unitary State, May 20, 1980 Yaounde. Radio Cameroon, 1980, May 20th.
26. Mabu, T. Peter, "Reuniting Cameroon: Task that must be continued",

Cameroon Tribune, May 21, 1980. Yaounde.

27. Editorial, "Unity Strategy", Cameroon Tribune, May 21, 1980, Younde.
28. Ahidjo, Ahmadou. Nation and Development. (Présence Africaine, 1969, Paris). See also his other publication, Contribution to National Construction. (Présence Africaine, 1964, Paris) p. 126 where he enunciates the ideals of "Unity for National Construction", as the motto for every Cameroonian.
29. Ahidjo, *ibid.* 1969.

The present study offers an analytical perspective on one of the most successful processes of political integration so far experienced on the African continent. The approach has been to examine in detail historical, cultural, socio-economic and political factors that have contributed to the articulation and emergence of the Cameroon Nation. The approach demonstrates that the "state model" provides a useful analytical tool in the study of national integration. In the operation of the conceptual framework it has been possible to identify sub units and the guiding principles of interaction.

Successful system change depends on the mutual linkages and appropriate interactions among the subunits making up the system, and interactions are largely rooted on role relations and expectations; roles are often conditioned by the perception of people or what people think is appropriate behaviour involving attitudes, beliefs and values about the political system. The sum total of these social values and orientations constitutes the pillars of the country's political culture.

We have seen how the various constellations of orientations towards community, scope of government, authority, modes of conflict resolution, distributive justice etc under the auspices of the multifarious synthesis of authoritarian, paternal, identific and consensual precepts has helped to manufacture a society that has witnessed stability and continuity in the two decades of its existence.

It is appropriate to emphasize at this point that when values are not held in common or when there is breakdown in values, malintegration or disintegration will occur. Apparently, this is what happened in the Cameroon Republic and why it became the first colony in sub-Saharan Africa to wage a protracted armed struggle against colonial rule. Reunification created new value premises. The values of the people across the old colonial frontiers have converged harmoniously, thereby propelling and influencing the structures of system interaction to engineer a new political culture for the country.

The absence of malintegrative tendencies in the process of system change - and judging from the country's unique pre and post colonial history - has prompted many students of the Cameroon political arena to identify the country as Africa's only successful experiment in reconciling the impact of two colonial legacies and in the process creating one of Africa's arguable few successful attempts at federalism.¹⁾

Communications and infrastructural variables have been instrumental in producing orientations expanding the legitimate scope and boundaries of group affiliation, thereby maximizing identities, loyalties and cultural responses towards the emerging community. We have seen how the mediating role of education (under the precepts of bilingualism) was useful instrument in narrowing cultural value differences among the political actors, especially the elites. These cultural value differences were bound to exist, determined by culture cluster identification within the premise of early socialization - derived from

its colonial past. People were tied to their colonial status quo and this was a hindrance to community formation. That barrier had to be broken. Bilingualism provided the appropriate mechanism and a useful instrument relating conflict-resolution to national integration.

The study has also shown that the most powerful tool in manufacturing the existing political miracle of the Cameroon was the policy strategy of "arbitration" through consensus and reconciliation and the application of other drastic measures when consensual - reconciliatory approaches failed to gain the desired objectives. Different orientations in this respect aggravated an open conflict of values. Reliance on education as a socializing mechanism was a crucial vehicle for orientation toward community and national unity.

Particularism that existed during the era of multi-party system was eliminated somewhat following the creation of the CNU. As pointed out earlier, no particular ethnic group accumulated enough power or had the legitimate authority to impose its will or system on others without forming a coalition with other groups. Cooperation and the assimilation of divergent views under the umbrella of the "rising sun" (CNU party symbol) represents the best example for allowing and encouraging the existence of multiple community identities. The CNU in partnership with the government-articulates policies that produce various patterns of community relations.

The legitimate scope and boundaries of group affiliation (ethnic, cultural interest groups with their various loyalties, identities etc) were not held in check but were allowed to co-exist with the cultural responses linking subnational identity to the national political community. The same can be said of the role or scope of government in national integration where strategies for creating links between subnational units and national structures were effective. For example the central government made federalism irrelevant to West Cameroon elites through the single party system and higher salaries for federal civil servants. Secondly, following the "glorious revolution" of May 20, 1972 the federal government initiated the final eclipse of the pretence of political autonomy in West Cameroon.

Furthermore, the scope and authority of the President/Government were not challenged either by the West Cameroon Legislature or by the people of West Cameroon or the federation in general following the dismissal of two leading advocates of unification and regional autonomy from the highest offices of Vice President and Prime Minister of West Cameroon. Punitive action of this nature also affected the CPNC. No member of the party echelons has been rewarded with a high public office. Yet such punitive action has not inhibited the political actors in seeking reconciliation, consensus and genuine commitment to the politically desirable objectives of national unity.

Government employment of varying forms is one of the factors which contribute toward system unity in the "process of bringing together culturally and socially discrete groups into single territorial unit and the establishment of national identity".²⁾

What this amounts to is that the propensities for subnational patterns were gradually and systematically transferred into a national system. The pluralistic national system that existed between 1960-1966 and even up to 1972 was strategically eroded through the employment of the four attributes underlying the thesis of this study.

Of course, new forms of accommodation emerged, replacing the dying pluralism of the society or the subnational patterns of authority that existed. The best illustration in this respect is the multiparty system and the state governments which were brought together by the formation of a single party system (CNU) in 1966 and the institutionalization of unitary government in 1972. The consensual acquiescence of West Cameroon to the supremacy of an imperial presidential system clearly manifest a conciliatory rather than a conflict orientation towards the general problems of national integration.

In general, the people have opted for non-violent approaches to conflict resolution. So far no subnational group has demanded any kind of fundamental rearrangement in its relations with the national state.

Cameroon is one and indivisible and, in spite of its cultural diversity, there is overwhelming acquiescence with orientations to the symbolic subsystem of political culture - the flag, the national anthem and the institution of the Presidency remain the unchallengeable metaphors of the Cameroon nation.

The skilful manipulation of the four attributes implies that differences of values and opinions are taken into account in the rule-making and rule application functions and structures of the system. The stability and continuity of the country's political system are attributed to the way subnational cultural or political patterns are transferred to the evolving national system. Through this, the state adopts a legitimate means for enforcing internal compliance with its decisions.

System change, or the proposition relating to innovation with national integration, shows that inter-ethnic differences and diversities, or the politico-cultural gap, the legacy of Euro-cultural heritage among the educated class, have not hindered the propensities to change because there is a holy alliance in the party-state bureaucracies and particularly because there exists the most dynamic desire to move ahead in adapting system requirements.

In the process of cultural change, that is, from pluralism to a common Cameroon political culture, responses to power relations have converged in upholding and propagating the fundamental ideals of the four indicated precepts. Pluralistic infrastructure have been replaced by alternative supportive values for the new ambitions. The new generation, born and bred under the distinctive indoctrination process of the new system, is the main bastion of national integration. Furthermore, the socialization process incorporates orientations toward a balanced relationship between distributive justice and national integration, in that in its organizing strategies, the state through its central symbol system is committed to the principles of balanced sharing between the ethnic groups and provinces.

Representation in the ministerial cabinet is an indication of meeting the objectives of distributive justice. The redistribution of the nation's wealth across national subunits serves as a link between units, promotes "fair play", provides community cohesion and is an instrument in the desocialization of ethnic diversity. Distributive justice has employed both punitive and reward incentives to induce desired behaviour in promoting system change.

The range of variation in the process of national integration has been considerable all along, and the intensity of feeling at popular and governmental levels equally great. The degree of government involvement in the lives of citizens is strengthened in a materialistic-expectation sense (economic, education, social, economic development, defense etc). In this respect, the authority and scope of government in terms of magnitude of impingement, regardless of substantive area, from minimal impact to maximum impact, remains an unchallengeable factor in manifesting the process of system and individual change and in solidifying national integration.

The study shows that political integration in the Cameroon has been achieved through conscious, intense and purposeful collaboration among components.

Responses by the people to the leadership role, obedience to authority, acceptance of the decision-making style, mode of resolving intra-communal or sectoral conflicts, collaborative behaviour of ethnic or interest groups, all reveal that the value orientations of these subcollectivities overlap. Functional integration of the polity has to a large extent been achieved.

From a comparative analytical perspective, the study shows that the political actors in East Cameroon were more inclined to a neo-functionalist approach than their counterparts in West Cameroon who strongly favoured a federal approach to national integration. In this context, East Cameroon was pre-occupied with the problem of making the bureaucracy the core of development and more instrumental to political purposes and responsive to ideological norms.

After all, the neo-functionalists attach great importance to the positive and active role of the bureaucracy in advancing the acquisition of more authority for the allocation of values and resources. The Party-State bureaucratic alliance stresses the importance of the bureaucracy and illuminates its significance and the reasons for its predominance in contemporary Cameroon politics.

The federalist approach dominated the first five to ten years of the political system of the country. This approach and system were later undermined by the neo-functionalist ideals. In other words, by 1972, federalism had served its purpose. In general, by 1966 federalism as a process for political integration started to exhibit several weakness in the maintenance of local cultures and, to some extent, it exhibited tendencies of being a threat to promoting national cohesion.

It ought to be understood that the main aim of federalism is to reconcile specific types of unity with specific areas of re-

lative independence. The Cameroon polity at that stage presented all the political and socio-economic ingredients that warranted the application of the federalist approach to national integration. Federalism satisfied the need for co-operation in some things combined with the constitutional prerogatives to separate action in others, or to apply a more fashionable nomenclature - the "separateness within union".

There were clear motives nourishing the moral justification of federalism as the most appropriate mechanism and dynamics in the preservation of diversity of culture pertinent in the country. The colonial past of the country or the Euro-cultural penetration within the social fabric of the society made "unity in diversity" the corner-stone in the process of system change. The people on the west bank of the Mungo were determined to make this kind of "unity in diversity" fulfil the desire and expectations for national cohesion and cultural homogeneity. For them, federalism was perceived as a "cluster of techniques used to try to establish and maintain a particular kind of balance or equilibrium between two levels of government, albeit a moving, changing equilibrium."3)

In fact, by 1966 and more particularly by 1972, the precepts of federalism - as a type of decentralized political system designed to accommodate cultural diversities having political salience - had entered a new stage where it became more or less impossible to maintain a particular kind of balance or equilibrium between the existing levels of government. An accelerating change in equilibrium was set in motion following the assimilation of educational policy, codes of law, ways or patterns of life style and even social institutions. People on both sides of the Mungo were acquiring identical values. The constitutional system by and large, no longer reflected the federal precepts; if it did at all, it was a pretence of federalism or more accurately, unitarianism in disguise.

One caveat which merits attention here is that the decline of federalism has to be attributed first and foremost to the perception and strategy of the political actors in West Cameroon. They had no clear perception of what reunification entailed and, therefore, they were not guided by a clear and concerted ideological strategy and political leadership. West Cameroon was a divided polity and ill-equipped in terms of political leadership to carry out the political tasks involved with the process of reunification. The situation in West Cameroon is best characterized as one blind man leading scores of others to identify the elephant (or to build a new nation). There was support by certain political actors for "centralist federalism", perceptions of others pivoted around "de-centralist federalism", while others thought unification implied a jolly ride to heaven. In the wake of all these confused ideals, they were totally lost in the political bargaining process underlying the federalist precept. East Cameroon presented just the opposite situation.

As a result of the clearly defined perception of the major political actors and elites east of the Mungo, techniques such as constitution/legal, administrative, financial and political which serve to maintain or erode the balance between mutual in-

dependence and interdependence between levels of government were greatly manipulated by the elites and political actors on the other side of the Mungo to such an extent that unitary government could no longer be avoided.

In a way, it can be argued that the forces propelling federalism at this stage were weaker and that the forces of neo-functionalism in terms of value, goals and conditions of integration were now the key mechanism articulating and aggregating the process of system change. From 1966 onwards, the federalist ideals of a particular kind of balance or equilibrium no longer existed in the Cameroon polity, that is between East and West Cameroon or between the federal and state governments.

Interestingly enough, this stage of disequilibrium between centre and periphery did not spark serious conflict or dispute between the competing forces or institutions. The social fabric of the system has never been challenged as such. Not even, to take an instance like the squabble between Ahidjo and Jua concerning their respective perception of the federal-relationship. The incident involved the role of territorial administration in national integration. It started with an article appearing in a local newspaper, where it was stated that the administrative regions would be reconstituted so that East Cameroon regions would cross the border and incorporate West Cameroon: for example, Victoria Division would be merged with the Littoral Region of East Cameroon.⁴⁾ The Prime Minister of West Cameroon, Augustin Jua reacted swiftly against the newspaper for printing what he considered to be "false and sensational" articles, an act which equally revealed his conception of the federal-relationship, as illustrated in the following statement quoted at length.

It must be emphasized that the Federal Republic of Cameroon is a federation of two states with different backgrounds, cultures and traditions; the present arrangement was in fact envisaged as the most ideal solution to the reunification of the two parts of a country which had been kept apart for over forty years by colonial powers. Any exercise, therefore, that is designed to alter this arrangement as speculated by the Mirror will clearly state the basis on which the entire Federation rests and will throw our present system of government into complete disarray. It is equally clear that since ours is a democratic republic a matter of such far-reaching significance and consequences cannot be conceived and executed in secret without the full knowledge and concurrence of the people of West Cameroon through their accredited representatives, to wit the West Cameroon Government.⁵⁾

President Ahidjo made a quick reply to the remarks of Prime Minister Jua, starting in clear language that there was a single Cameroon and its citizens had the same rights and the same duties.

....after the people of West Cameroon massively voted in favour of reunification and not for federation, after reunification itself we freely estimated that it was necessary

*to create a federation between the two states, and to create federal institutions. But that does not permit us to say that there are two Cameroonian nations.*⁶⁾

Ahidjo's reaction had several implications. (i) It indicated that the end of federalism was near, particularly his remarks that "federalism was not sacred, nor was it inextricably associated with bilingualism"; (ii) while Ahidjo's statement clearly revealed his dislike for federalism, it also shows, following the dismissal of Jua as Prime Minister and later John Ngu Foncha as Vice President, that the central administration by the mid-60's had an effective control mechanism regulating its relationship with the periphery and with party members. The dismissal of these two key figures in the politics of West Cameroon in particular and the country in general highlights the reality of central or federal supremacy in the changing political system of the nation.

Stated differently, the federal supremacy does not leave much room for an effective theory of balance between integrating units advanced by federalism. It calls into question certain facets of the federalist theory of political integration. At the same time it highlights the federalist notion as a "cluster of techniques" which provides a problem-solving technique, a particular form of conflict-resolution, which is best understood in terms of the problems to which it has constituted or a set of historically varying answers. Federalism or the federal bargain therefore as a technique or cluster of techniques offered a historically varying answer to the political problems confronting the two Cameroons in the process of national integration.

The study has been able to identify the actual origin of the binding agreement which formed the federated states of Cameroon the morning after October 1, 1961. It has also revealed certain in-built errors or a fallacy mechanism in the process of national integration, the most significant of which is that federalism perpetuated the existence of two Cameroon nations.

In exposing the inbuilt-failure mechanism of the federalist approach, it becomes evident that federalism is a problem-solving technique, or set of techniques geared as a response to a specific problem or set of problems at a particular point in time. Since it is time bound, it becomes necessary to supplement it with other theoretical inroads, hence the relevance of the neo-functional precepts which became more and more pertinent after 1966.

The two concepts complement one another in the understanding of the structures and functions of various institutions, societies and individuals undergoing change. The study has shown how the two can be linked together in a systematic pattern in order to provide a comprehensive analytical framework for studying transitional societies. This it has done in terms of (a) specific nature of the "federal compromise", that is, it has systematically elaborated on the kind of political/legal/constitutional arrangement entered into at a particular point in time. It has also shown how the freezing of local diversity or sovereignty in an institutional construct was effectuated; (b) the se-

cond issue area concerns the peculiar circumstances and events which surrounded the origins and the making of the federal compromise. Here, the various interests at stake and the parties or groups involved in the federal transaction have (given the space at my disposal) been adequately analysed. Both the origin of intent and the diversity of purposes between the two Cameroons have been illuminated in many respects; and (c) lastly, there is the issue of change and development which is perhaps the most difficult, most interesting and most crucial aspect since it involves the wide spectrum of the socio-political process of development. It is here that the neo-functionalist ideals feature immensely. We have also been exposed to facts and circumstances that contributed to the breakdown of the federal system and seen how unitary government cements the essential factors underpinning the neo-functionalist conception of national integration.

Surrounding all the various processes of change has been the underlying utilization of authoritarian, consensual, identific and paternal techniques in innovation and leadership, providing the basis for the overall structure and functions and leading to national integration and development.

By linking the federalist and the neo-functionalist approaches under the banner of the "state model", we have been able to penetrate into the fabric of the Cameroon polity and of its endeavours to constitute a new political community. The application of the four variables, by linking them in a systematic way, enables us to extend the study to cover a brief comparative analysis of other transitional societies and how they have or have not been able to articulate acceptable formulas for creating a new polity.

The systematic linkage of the four variables brings to the forefront certain weaknesses of federalism as a process of national integration; it blazons the fact that federalism is a circumstantial political system which needs the support or complex mix of other sets of relations, variables and techniques to bring about a new polity as exhibited by the Cameroon situation.

In short, the federal bargain or compromise that characterized the political setting of the 1960's had by the start of the 1970's reached a stage that necessitated a genuine commitment to go beyond the relationships based solely on the political contract reached by the two federating states in 1961. The factors or impulses which necessitated the creation of the new polity were now nourished with new value dimensions, particularly that of the authoritative allocation of resources and values, so important to the neo-functionalists. Orientations towards community, distributive justice, scope of government etc. had in 1972 entered or acquired new socio-political dimensions.

From this brief exposition, the study has time and again elucidated issues that point to the direction of discrepancy between practice and theory. Secondly, it has to be understood at this stage that the essence of federalism lies in the creation of a new polity which displays a local constitutional autonomy or local authenticity and sovereignty over certain issues and

buttressed by a cluster of techniques designed to sustain local cultures or identities. The position of West Cameroon up to late 1960 illustrates the issues being presented here. Lastly, the essence of neo-functionalism is its endeavours to appropriate a concerted degree of consensual balance between "low and high politics", to galvanize the foundation for the authoritative allocation of values and resources and to solidify acceptable premises for conflict-resolution among political actors and political activities. West Cameroon in particular and Cameroon nation in general have exhibited profound trends of system change through the assimilation of the federalist and neo-functionalist approaches to national integration.

The Cameroon experience with political integration highlights some theoretical aspects of the process of political integration - the assertion that political integration implies creation of a political community, that is the emergence of a broad and coherent cluster of political values around national symbols of identity and unity. Complementary interaction was earlier identified by political actors on both sides of the old colonial boundary in the early sixties and with conscious manipulation, common values and interests eventually clustered in mid 1972, underlying the unity of the people.

One major aspect of the Cameroon model is the reaffirmation of the correlation between the process of national integration and political development succinctly discussed by Weiner.⁷⁾ The Cameroon experience has also demonstrated a positive development in a high rate of social and economic changes creating new demands and new tasks for the government which have all contributed towards advancing (not impeding) national unity and cohesion. In this respect, the Cameroon case calls to question certain accepted theories of the process of integration and its profitability in an African context. For example Weiner argues that "a high rate of social and economic change creates new demands and new tasks for government which are often malintegrative".⁸⁾ The country can boast of an economy healthier than in many countries which began their economic planning long before. The country has, in the wake of its economic growth, not witnessed malintegrative tendencies; on the contrary, unity has been consolidated.

Another essential feature of the Cameroon process of integration is the enigma of exposing and appraising social change through integration analysis. The sudden emergence of a centralized power system where none existed before (in the case of West Cameroon) did not hamper the functioning of the system in spite of what conflict values may have existed between the two integrating parties. That is to say new structures and processes emerged and "began to function shrouded in controversy and tension, but patterns and continuities did develop."⁹⁾

Thus, from a functional-conflict analysis perspective, the continuities and discontinuities can best be understood from the overall patterns of values, interest and activities that took place within the system. It would be appropriate to state that the pattern of values, interest and activities which came to underline the system revolved around the dynamics of "authori-

tarianism", "reconciliation" and "mobilization", in other words, the system is entrenched with the mechanism and capacity in the management of roles and system changes.

To begin with, the complex nature of the chequered political past coupled with the pattern of political evolution created a situation where authoritarian rule could not be by-passed if the end product of what the political actors envisaged was really a cohesive political entity where pluralistic interest and social organizations and values had to converge within the same framework and to function so as to hold the society and the political system together. Thus, the link between the political past with the current evolving socio-political structures called for a drastic shift from past value practices and the functioning style of the old institutions to a new centre of power articulating and aggregating new values and goals for the nation.

Given the situation, political authoritarianism of the Cameroon body politic (since the political culture of the new nation is still in an embryonic stage) is understandable. The transition from colonial tutelage to independence and the reunification of the two territories was more than a fertile compost pile for political disharmony. Within this frame of reference, the pursuit of integration indicated the need for authoritarian rule. Any political leader with a charismatic appeal and with a sense of direction could employ various strategic propensity relevant to the political environment of the community bring into being a system of government that controlled every facet of individual and public activities.

Mobilization and reconciliation were necessary because the displacement of communal or traditional loyalty for the sake of forging national values and focus of identification - the issue of establishing national authority that overshadows other political units had to be overcome through mutual understanding and political bargaining among the various interest groups.

Certain elements of resistance in terms of human attitudes, politics, and economic and social structures needed changes in order to smoothen the integrative process particularly in a divided developing polity. The society had to employ different mixtures of coercion and information in stabilizing authority achieving stability, and increasing efficiency.

Mobilization and reconciliation were needed in order to narrow the value premises in relationship changes, in behaviour and in interest. When there is no mutual adjustment of the value changes of the interacting parties to a common situation, the positive goals of integration would change to exhibiting malintegrative tendencies. Events in Nigeria (1966-70), Congo - Zaire (1960-65) are reflections of the unharmonious adjustment between the decline of traditional values and the aspiration for modernization. The coalition course between the participating parties (and as each side endeavours to expand its area of influence at the expense of the other) indicates that integration as a process is dynamic and tends to generate its own dynamism. The integration process in the Cameroon reflects degrees of dynamism at different time periods, under different environments or in different group constellations.

There is no doubt that one accepted premise ostensibly crucial to the integration process in the Cameroon case is consensus formation that incorporates reconciliation and rehabilitation. Without consensus across a broad political spectrum on the core of values and attitudes, interest articulation between political demands and the mobilization of popular support for integration into a common framework of continuous political activity and organisation, e.g. political parties, the country would rather crystallize into political upheavals and possibly disintegration. By this I do not mean that integration is preconditioned by a prevailing unanimity on every aspect issue, idea, belief and values on the left-right political spectrum. But it is essential that conflict between traditional and modernism or the problems posed by nation-building as a result of the liquidation of colonial rule be narrowed to approaching unanimity. The mechanism for political integration requires consensual agreement on prominent objectives converging on the triangular relationship between the concepts of nation, state and people, which has been the fulcrum and virtually, the conception and misconceptions and vicissitudes regarding democracy and socio-economic transformation in Africa.

The situation of Cameroon is very interesting to observe on the conflict-consensus formation continuum. National consciousness for integration had crystalized long before the state was founded. The attitudes, beliefs and values determining the general concern for integration cut across the ethnic spectrum, creating a legitimate foundation for the pursuit of these objectives. This made it easier for the systemization of political life throughout the polity and the sorting out of ends and means in which specific objectives were to be pursued. Fundamental values and interests in integration were identified at an early stage in the country east and west of the Mungo. In retrospect, the case of Congo (Zaire), for example, differs from that of the Cameroon because the more disparate and conflicting the fundamental values and identification of important groups are, the more difficult is the task of achieving political integration.

Cameroonians were able to identify the focus of cohesion at an earlier stage. Secondly, no major ethnic group stood in a position of dictating the course of development without forming alliances with other groups. No party was able to command an over-all majority without forming alliances with other parties. Of equal importance was the fact that the majority of the people reacted favourably to the new structures that were established following the unification of the two states.

Therefore, the first republic from its inception did not suffer any problem of legitimacy and identity. The second republic has been accorded the same response. The existence of a strong positive response from different social strata towards the regime is a clear manifestation of the people's identification with the nation, hence system capabilities have attained a high degree in articulating goals. Orientations toward the scope of government has not been challenged.

The Cameroon situation elucidates the maxim that the device

of a political party as well as the approaches of the state are maximized in countries where national consciousness and popular mobilization exist. Viewed in this contest, the system following the formation of the CNU and the institutionalization of unitary government in 1972 implies that widespread national sentiment founded on the preemptory expression of popular will co-exists harmoniously between the party and state apparatus. The harmonious co-existence maximizes the effective use of state power in enhancing its legitimacy and the coercive machinery of the administration. The traditional fabric (system) of the society is fast on the decline and new social and political roles are instilled through a nation-wide political organization - the CNU. Thus, the dominant position of the CNU as a socializing mechanism enhances government efforts in maximizing participation in national development.

We intend to promote a truly integrated economy in which effective control is exercised over the main factors of development.¹⁰⁾

Where every citizen plays a meaningful role accentuates a kind of proposition about the conscious manipulation of symbols by those in authority to change the awareness and the loyalties of the people towards desired goals, and that pressures and experience of decision-making, problem-solving and conflict resolution will help to articulate gradual shifts in the attitudes of participants which will facilitate the process of national cohesion. In other words a social learning process is necessary.

Within this context, the creation of the CNU has contributed immensely towards institutionalizing new national values and other structural innovations, which perhaps would not have been possible under a multiparty system. Categorically stated, the CNU has emerged as an essential tool in articulating changes which are indispensable in structuring the political culture more sympathetic to the demands of a modern political system. In this respect, the party creates a basis of a unified communication and dissemination of information among the participants and in general has contributed to shifting attitude-change and behaviour or a means of creating a consensus underlying the new system. Social communication constitutes an essential ingredient in the federalists' and neo-functionalists' precepts of political integration, whereby governmental activity is geared to create cohesion through the aetiology of a new common political culture.¹¹⁾

The country has a single general political structure and process that is the focus of all political activities for the population; there is no longer any conspicuous division between the dominant national politics of the more urban elements and the more traditional village level of politics. The prevailing attitudes and behaviour among the people in respect of social and political change are identical. Such structural behavioural consensus adds to the mobilizing capacity of the system in meeting modernization objectives.

Analytically, political power as accumulated by the party since 1966 bisects on two strategic objects designed to insti-

tutionalize national cohesion in terms of (i) the utilization of power as a self-generating agent, (e.g. the attainment of more power; the reinforcement of social, economic and the electoral bases of support; the centralization of control mechanisms); and (ii) the application of power as an agent of change (e.g. to codify one or several aspects of the context in which power is applied, say in shifting attitude and behaviour).

It has to be understood at this stage that all these attempts to locate and effectuate change within the polity depend upon the understanding and the relationship between the various components within the system as interdependencies of mutually compatible parts.

The study has shown how these two relational aspects of conflict and consensus have developed side by side as a set of common acquiesce and as the code of conduct in the game of politics. The two relational aspects were dominant in the political arena of Cameroon until the birth of a unified party and government system. Today, the area of conflict is significant within the bureaucratic sector. The institutionalization of the CNU and unitary government inhibit a high degree of substitutability of roles¹²⁾ as mirrored by the discussion of the administration, coordination and control problems facing the country.

As stated earlier, most politically and administratively relevant roles are not clearly differentiated following the holy alliance between the political and governmental process. The roles have been functionally diffuse rather than of a functionally specific character. Thus in the Cameroon, the civil bureaucracy is not limited to the role of a politically neutral instrument of public administration but assumes some of the functions of the CNU, or CNU activities are conducted during official hours. Such concurrent assignment of roles has brought inefficiency, corruption and lack of duty consciousness.

Suffice to add also that pomp and ceremony have become too prevalent as a basic feature of Cameroon politics and this gives room for corruption and loss of useful working hours. Hence, that "aspect of politics which tends to over-ride the problem-solving or public-policy aspects of politics",¹³⁾ needs to be properly redefined within the Cameroon context as one mechanism of limiting the ever-growing level of duty unconsciousness.

The politics of Cameroon following the events of colonial decline have been analyzed in terms of (a) the form and scale of political organisation, traditional political cultural units and their arbitrary replacement by the modern state concept; (b) political institutions involving federal and unitarian organs, multi-party and single party democracy; and (c) the nature of political authority and participation. The direction of Cameroon politics since independence has been toward concentrating enough powers in the office of the President as an effective instrument for internal reforms - i.e. a concerted political community.

It can truly be said that the Head of the Cameroon nation reigns with plenary powers, with enough skill to rule. We can categorically state that the Cameroon has a living Presidency

using the living constitution to give leadership for the purpose of attaining national unity and viable and concerted developmental changes for the benefit of all. It can further be stated that the quality of the Cameroon Presidency is institutional, but perhaps even more moral leadership and credibility of power, succinctly outlined by Le Vine

.....in all, the constitution creates a hybrid President who combines the attributes of a British-style Governor-General, a Fifth French Republic President and an American Chief Executive.¹⁴⁾

It can be argued that the employment of the varied inherent powers of the President may create a situation of personal power consolidation. Power corrupts, absolute power corrupts absolutely. Scholars and critics who argue along this line would refer to Article 11 (1972) in the constitution which grants the President unfettered powers to proclaim a state of emergency. Critics adopting this line of argument would very often employ Article 21(1) in their analysis of the quality of the Cameroon Presidency as a personal institution, and an imperial presidency or a feudal monarchy in modern time.

The study elucidates the significance of the leadership role in political integration and how the four attributes in different constellations have brought about national unity and stability. The Cameroon situation reinforces the proposition that societies experiencing cultural and political change need charismatic leadership or that societies undergoing structural changes of wider dimension provide an ideal setting for persons with the characteristic of charismatic authority to give the nation a sense of direction and to hold the various competing forces together. The output of such charismatic leadership role input in the Cameroon has been the encouragement and development of functional interest organisations that genuinely represent the general interest of the nation.

Backed by the constitution, charismatic leadership became institutionalized during the early stages of the integrative process. This was very crucial in maintaining stability and promoting reconciliation among the fragmented interest groups. Institutionalized roles consciously aggravated and accelerated the carrying of tasks pertaining to (a) clarifying and delimiting the distribution of demands and interests within the population; and (b) engaging in the bargaining operation necessary to accommodate and maximize the satisfaction of those demands and interests in a fashion consistent with the general desire of the people. The pattern of leadership is that of the "political broker's" role in maintaining the balance between conflicting values and demands. Political centralism and particularism were two such demands, operating within the wider context where traditional values and the quest for modernization impede one another. Tension between national loyalty and communal or particularistic loyalty aggravated the need for a leadership role entrenched with the capabilities of effectuating the course of modernization in such a pattern that the goals of the system are congruent with the needs of the widest possible

cross-section of the people.

The specificity of the leadership role has been stressed throughout the study. There are sufficient grounds for further elaboration here, for without the kind of leadership the country was lucky to have, particularly during the early stages of integration, stability and continuity as witnessed today would only have been an illusion. Articulating and aggregating the combined role performance of an "innovator", and "mediator" leader, an autonomous basis of power and identification was established in the early stages of unification. Cameroonians were quickly and sufficiently acculturated to the ideals of national awareness and cohesion. The output was the alienation of disintegrative tendencies such as the secession of West Cameroon. The degree of communication and participation was broadened to encompass every person in the society and the major political actors began to articulate and identify common values.

It is essential to note that much of the success of the Cameroon system in solving the developmental problems is intransigently correlated with the behaviour of political leadership and the people's will to respond to these behaviours and attitudes. Of course, the leaders cannot be held responsible for the conduct and behaviour of individuals within the system (as exhibited in the case of corruption within the bureaucracy), nonetheless, because national awareness is assured, it does not prevent the leaders from further recognizing the great dangers of the sum total of individual behaviour inject in the political system. As it stands, the administrative sector poses the greatest challenge to political leadership in contemporary Cameroon politics. It remains an open question whether leadership can solve the acute problems inherent in the bureaucratic set-up of the country.

On the other hand, charismatic leadership has helped in manifesting a powerful ideological platform that has accentuated the process of socio-economic and political changes. In the words of David Apter,

The powerful ideologies are those that, at crucial moments during the cycle of perception give individuals a sense of identity and solidarity with their fellows - all in a political context.¹⁵⁾

National unity was a must and ideological direction was needed to activate abiding commitment to promote internal development, modernization and a sense of community to act as a shield against foreign influence and internal instability. In short, the political leadership style in the country has shown the ability and capacity of articulating solutions to problems, which enhancing the attraction and integration of the various sub-culture units in nation-building.

The Cameroon constitution creates "democratic authoritarianism". This, with other attributes (paternalism, consensual etc) has contributed successfully to the drive for an achievement of greater socio-political integration that has so far withstood the impact of rapid and massive socio-economic change.

Events in other African territories have shown how the velocity of socio-economic and political restructuralization have brought disruption and other forms of disintegration because these countries lack the attributes described here, or because they have not been able to combine effectively the presence of these integrative characteristics in the process of creating a political community.

The paternal element has been and continues to be, strong. The President and his associates have under the prevailing circumstances given political leadership to the nation; the country has not lacked a sense of purpose and direction. In both the external and domestic political milieus, the country has set a practical example of what can be achieved when authoritarian, consensual, paternal and identific attributes in a variety of combinations can integrate fragmented communities. This issue has been succinctly outlined as;

under this leading (federalism succeeds) the example offered by the Cameroon....to Africa is extremely interesting as it is the only African state building a bridge between English-speaking and French-speaking Africa. The Cameroon is simple enough to respond to all possible development.¹⁶⁾

The identific element is equally strong. There exists a political formula for harnessing the resources of the nation, making it possible for the elites and masses to interact harmoniously within the system and to forge a new community, stable and economically viable. The flow of communication between the various strata of society exists under the auspices of the CNU that mobilizes the people with the nation as the focal point of identification.

BRIEF COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

A comparative analysis with Nigeria shows that the collapse of the First Nigerian Republic could be traced to the absolute weaknesses in the four attributes. There was liability in the consensual element. The constellation of the Federal Government was structured on a coalition between the NCNC and NPC and with Ministers drawn from the three/four regions that made up the federation. Yet still, ethnic fragmentation and other forms of rivalries generated scepticism and suspiciousness among the political actors. Concomitant with consensual weakness was the rational fragility. The government under the stewardship of Abubakar Belewa failed to give the nation the type of leadership the country deserved and to mirror its position on the continent. The elite-mass consensus was weak, which enhanced political actors to exploit tribal differences ruthlessly, thereby destroying the basic trust among the different ethnic groups. Because there was little consensus as to the legitimate ends and means of political action the country succumbed into chaos. There was a total lack of a sense of purpose and direction. The identific element was clothed with frailness since political actors

enunciated a strong drive towards fortifying particularism, and increasing their privileged positions within the system. The limited consensual relationship that existed in the NCNC-NPC alliance was perhaps the only driving force that made the system workable until the 1966 military coup. Belewa was not a charismatic leader. He lacked the kind of authoritarian aetiology needed to integrate a fragmented society like Nigeria.

Looking eastward, we find Tanzania as a country very close to the Cameroon situation: its integration with the Island of Zanzibar, her uniparty system and the charismatic leadership of Julius Nyerere present development trends similar to those of the Cameroon. Notwithstanding this, there are some significant differences; for example ethnic and linguistic fragmentation is not as pronounced in Tanzania as in the Cameroon. Secondly, Cameroon developed under two different systems of colonial administration, which was not the case of Tanganyika and Zanzibar.

In spite of these differences, we find many common grounds of politicization in the two countries which contribute towards national cohesion. On the basis of these identical precepts, we can theorize on the same stratum of acquiescence that Tanzania harbours a strong consensual element in its integration process, but that her consensual attributes do not arise from the same fragmented anvil as that of Cameroon. Since the unsuccessful revolt of 1964, Nyerere's administration has consistently pared its way through authoritarianism and through popular voluntarian acquiesce. The two societies in many respects have applied coercive means of stabilizing their political environment. The politics of coercion requires someone able to respond quickly to the needs of containing political dissent. We see how Belewa failed to respond to the needs of coercive acquiescence in the integrative process. Furthermore, the fall of Patrice Lumumba in Congo (1960-61) was due to the rudimentary weakness of the issues we have just addressed ourselves to. The paternal, consensual, and identific elements were completely missing in the society during the early years of independence. Of course, in treating the Congo, one must not by-pass international influence and the forces of imperialism that created the chaotic political bedlam. The lack of these attributes made the situation worse.

IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER DEVELOPING SOCIETIES:

What lessons does the Cameroon experiment in political integration offer to other developing countries? Can what has been articulated and aggregated in the Cameroon during the past twenty years be repeated in other fragmented polities? As the study shows, the conditions that prevailed in the Cameroon were unique and may not be available to other societies wanting to integrate. On the other hand, provided there is articulated political leadership prepared to give a sense of direction to the nation and with the positive concerted response of the masses towards such clearly defined

ideological leadership any fragmented society wishing to integrate can make a success of its endeavours to forge national awareness and cohesion, as well as achieve a relative degree of social changes and political stability. Without good leadership and without positive response from the widest possible cross-section of the polity, political stability cannot endure for long; and without stability and continuity, socio-economic transformation cannot meet the basic requirements of the people. The positive combination of "will" and "leadership" must co-exist at every stage of change that takes place.

However, in offering a caveat to other countries, the study has clearly indicated that stress must be laid on constructing political structures and a political ethos strongly rooted in the political environment of the society, which is most conducive to furthering integration. Such a political system must be imbued with political characteristics of authoritarianism and the propensity to politicize every aspect of social life that positively advances the process of national integration; it has to be authoritarian as well as being capable of reconciling differences. It must show great evidence of paternalism and the people must identify themselves with the process of change.

Political leadership must be capable of putting an end to the state of frustration by means of creating alliances between the various groupings and institutions in the society. It must have the capacity for equitable allocation of resources, and planned balanced development so as to satisfy the thirst for economic equity. We have seen how the consequence of the changes resulting from federation in the Cameroon was to redistribute collective wealth in favour of the West which was economically weak, at the same time as development was encouraged in the North, which was formerly justified in considering itself forsaken. In other words, balanced developments give a veritable whiplash to the economy of the entire nation, in a fashion that it consolidates unity and national homogeneity. By and large, resource allocation and economic equity reinforce unity, or as Ahidjo puts it:

We desire that the inequalities which were born of geography and history should be corrected, whenever economic realities permit it, and that development should not be the privilege of some regions to the detriment of others.¹⁷¹

Equally important is that the Cameroon experiment focuses attention on the fact that whatever the nature of the political decision-making centre, it acts within a double frame of reference - that of the objective dimensions of manoeuvre, and that of the functional requirement of unloading or avoiding accumulated frustration. Any fragmented society in the process of national integration must develop an impressive measure of relative inter-meshing of various units with emphasis on common identity - something must be manufactured as the symbol of national identification and with the authoritative capacity of imposing national unity among the fragmented values and de-

mands of the people or of the regions making up the new polity.

It must also appreciate its political and cultural diversity; and most important of all, articulate ways and means of harmonising these diversities within a commonly accepted framework. Stated differently, the process of merging nations is not easy, but is made considerably cheaper if the process begins from the ideal of an honestly pluralistic identity with each unit genuinely contributing its quota in the process of system change. Here lies the first political trick of Cameroon's successful march towards an integrated political community.

Cameroon thus offers a model in which Ahidjo's postulation, "it is not by attacking the tribes that we will overcome tribalism" must seriously be taken into consideration by nations wishing to bring about a stable and integrated polity. As Johnson points out, "the Cameroon does offer some lessons to the partisans of African unity. For one thing, it adds new strength to the counsel: 'Seek ye first the political kingdom and all things shall be added unto you': Cameroon certainly does not demonstrate the futility of a gradualist and functional approach to political union, but it does indicate the possibility of achieving it and making it work despite the lack of extensive homogeneity or bonds of social intercourse between the merging units."

The reality of the integration process in the Cameroon reveals the presence, and the nature of the authoritative increase of power (including personal power); coercion, manipulation, mobilization and reconciliation of all that makes for politics in the strictest and most positive sense of the word and which has enhanced the stability of the political system of the country.

A purely political or purely presidential and parliamentary regime containing the inevitable executive power in the nature and capacity of an active and ruling head of state and political institution as practiced in the Cameroon, serves as a model for political systems undergoing the process of integration. It is essential for such a system to have a unified political party as the organic solidarity base that binds together the various units of the society, and having the entrenched capacity of meshing it into a bureaucratised political power that authentically serves the needs of the people.

The real unity which the Cameroon people have shown in the process of political integration during the past two decades has been built on the foundation of the freedom to disagree to agree. With this has come the renewed sense of being participants in the political process which establishes the authenticity and unity of the people as one nation. Cameroon's capacity to apply authoritative power to satisfy the interests of its various factions was necessary and the people's capacity to respond to such coercive and reconciliatory powers has been positive, not negative. It seems evident that the Cameroon union has evolved around the "spill-over" precepts advanced by Ernst Hass, where new commitments to the central union structures and the expansion of their undertakings are made necessary in order to fulfill the former commitments and tasks. The

greatest proportion of the "spill-over" occurred in the economic sector. In this respect, most of the input and changes introduced into the life of West Cameroon and in the underdeveloped sectors of the northern regions were rooted in the productive commercial sector, and engendered the need for ever more encompassing harmonization of the two economies.¹⁸⁾

What is the conclusion to be drawn from the political theatre of the Cameroon? First, we must bear in mind that the aim of the consolidation of power in the Presidency is to stabilise and integrate the ethnic minorities, create the basis of national identification, promote greater self-reliance under the slogan "autocentric programmes for the common good". Such a desire is understandable. After all it is the Cameroon electorate that has bestowed unprecedented powers over the country's institutions as well as the legislature and the judiciary as a means of attaining national cohesion and even development. It has helped in halting the kind and form of political bedlam that has bedevilled many developing countries since the achievement of independence.

Secondly, we must bear in mind the complex nature of the society - its ethnic fragmentation, its political past, the desire to meet human needs, the changing international system, and the influence the system has on efforts to bring about autonomous and self-reliant development. What are the forces internal and external impeding the struggle for meeting rising aspiration and limiting growing frustration?

Thirdly, we cannot run from the fact that there are great discontinuities and consequent tensions in development, as the nation muddles through the manifestations of traditional beliefs and the imprints of foreign values and judgements associated with modernization. Bearing in mind that traditional political structures have proved to be gravely weakened due to the forces of colonialism, and following the growing acceptance of foreign values and beliefs by the ruling elites in the emerging nations, the relationship of unity and mutual trust no longer exist.

Fourthly, and still related to the previous observation, the nature and extent of change in the various developing nations are bound to differ from one setting to another and the concrete transformation process of the society, economic and political policy are paralyzed by competing values and criteria to such an extent that it warrants extensive reliance on centralized government and party structure.

Fifthly, the existing situation implies that wide-ranging changes cannot occur peacefully and without the backing of a centralized political and administrative institution's entrusted with enormous powers. How to use these powers appropriately to bring about developmental changes for the benefit of all is the most challenging question. Yet the essence of national integration is precisely about this specific issue.

Analytically, the issues advanced here reveal that the most evident lesson from the country's process of national integration is that the integrative advance every African country desires to make is not limited solely to the road of nation-

building in the limited consensus-building or common core-value and singular-identity sense of the term. It has revealed something of the difference between nation-building and state-building, as it were.¹⁹⁾ The aspiration of every developing polity is to articulate and aggregate policies in achieving the two. Cameroon has been successful in that respect. The first Republic created a federal government, empowered it to explore ways and means of expanding the basis for greater national cohesion and oneness among the people who had for over four decades been governed by different colonial institutions. The second Republic creates a unitary system, and changes the state structure but with the purpose of cementing national unity in truly authentic Cameroon values.

For political integration to become a reality in a fragmented society requires a balanced combination of four characteristics, authoritarian, paternal, identific and consensual. How these variables are applied depends upon the political shrewdness of the major political actors and the prevailing political and economic environment under which it operates, and not least, the response of the international political community towards the long term objective of the community undergoing structuralization.

On the one hand, the assimilation of these attributes has so far been successful in the Cameroon, and on the other, the response of the international community has up till now been positive towards the realization of the ideals of the new Cameroon Nation. Cameroon has been able to play her cards well in not hurting the value beliefs or the economic and political intent of the western world. Above all, the credit for national unity belongs to the entire Cameroon population, for being vigilant towards the positive contribution of national unity and being active and alert in seeking new avenues in meeting the challenges of nation-building. The burden of meeting the norms of democracy lies, in the first instance, in the hands of those whom the people have thrown their trust to navigate the ship through the stormy oceans of system changes, which this study has demonstrated, following the historical events of 11 February 1961 and 20 May 1972 when the people decided to consolidate their forces in creating an indivisible Cameroon Nation.

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DECISIVE PHASE

... "We have just ended the first and most decisive two decades in our quest for the assertion of our identity. It was a period of groping in the dark, and, above all of trial and struggle..."



THE ONE AND INDIVISIBLE CAMEROON

LUND POLITICAL STUDIES 35

The study is an exposition in the process of political and economic integration in a fragmented developing society and of its efforts to create a sense of national cohesion among the people.

It addresses itself to the problems, constraints and prospects involved in a society like the Cameroon with a chequered political past in trying to organise itself in meeting not only cultural cohesion, but economic and social equity within the society.

Attention is focused on how system changes as a result of political integration and the skilful manipulation and application of authoritarian, consensual, paternal and identific attributes have significantly contributed to the emergence of a system that permits change in accordance with general popular support.

Apart from being a contribution to the political sociology of the Cameroon, it considers to what degree such knowledge and experience of the country can be of relevance to other developing states, particularly those that have become regular visitors to the great hall of violence and the super-market of chaos and instability. Why has the Cameroon in spite of its historical "political culture" diversity and ethnic fragmentation been able to balance change and stability and above all, continuity?

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